Author
Linda DeAngelo
Other affiliations: University of Rochester, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan
Bio: Linda DeAngelo is an academic researcher from University of Southern California. The author has contributed to research in topics: Dividend & Dividend policy. The author has an hindex of 39, co-authored 52 publications receiving 17079 citations. Previous affiliations of Linda DeAngelo include University of Rochester & University of Pennsylvania.
Topics: Dividend, Dividend policy, Equity (finance), Earnings, Cash flow
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that audit quality is not independent of audit firm size, even when auditors initially possess identical technological capabilities, and when incumbent auditors earn client-specific quasi-rents, auditors with a greater number of clients have more to lose by failing to report a discovered breach in a particular client's records.
4,969 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the allegations of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities and the Securities and Exchange Commission that "low-balling" on initial audit engagements impairs auditor independence.
1,656 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that the fraction of publicly traded industrial firms that pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total assets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than earned.
Abstract: Consistent with a lifecycle theory of dividends, the fraction of publicly traded industrial firms that pays dividends is high when retained earnings are a large portion of total equity (and of total assets) and falls to near zero when most equity is contributed rather than earned. We observe a highly significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, leverage, cash balances, and dividend history, a relation that also holds for dividend initiations and omissions. In our regressions, the mix of earned/contributed capital has a quantitatively greater impact than measures of profitability and growth opportunities. We document a massive increase in firms with negative retained earnings (from 11.8% of industrials in 1978 to 50.2% in 2002). Controlling for the earned/contributed capital mix, firms with negative retained earnings show virtually no change in their propensity to pay dividends from the mid-1970s to 2002, while those whose earned equity makes them reasonable candidates to pay dividends have a propensity reduction that is twice the overall reduction in Fama and French (2001). All our evidence supports the lifecycle theory of dividends, in which a firm's stage in that cycle is well-proxied by its mix of internal and external capital.
1,262 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors observed a highly significant relation between the decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix, controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances, and dividend history, a relation that also holds for dividend initiations and omissions.
1,094 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that managers' accounting choices primarily reflect their firms' financial difficulties, rather than attempts to inflate income, and that firms with and without binding covenants exhibit minor accrual differences in the ten years before the dividend reduction.
861 citations
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TL;DR: The authors surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and presents a survey of the literature.
Abstract: This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.
13,489 citations
TL;DR: Corporate Governance as mentioned in this paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world, and shows that most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance.
Abstract: This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor
10,954 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
Abstract: We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
8,270 citations
TL;DR: This article investigated the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm, as measured by Tobin's Q. In a 1980 cross-section of 371 Fortune 500 firms, they found evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship.
7,523 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test whether firms that would benefit from import relief attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC).
Abstract: This study tests whether firms that would benefit from import relief (eg, tariff increases and quota reductions) attempt to decrease earnings through earnings management during import relief investigations by the United States International Trade Commission (ITC) The import relief determination made by the ITC is based on several factors that are specified in the federal trade acts, including the profitability of the industry Explicit use of accounting numbers in import relief regulation provides incentives for managers to manage earnings in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining import relief and/or increase the amount of relief granted While studies of earnings management typically examine situations in which all contracting parties have incentives to "perfectly" monitor (adjust) accounting numbers for such manipulation, import relief investigations provide a specific motive for earnings management that is not
7,362 citations