A hypothesized need to form and maintain strong, stable interpersonal relationships is evaluated in light of the empirical literature. The need is for frequent, nonaversive interactions within an ongoing relational bond. Consistent with the belongingness hypothesis, people form social attachments readily under most conditions and resist the dissolution of existing bonds. Belongingness appears to have multiple and strong effects on emotional patterns and on cognitive processes. Lack of attachments is linked to a variety of ill effects on health, adjustment, and well-being. Other evidence, such as that concerning satiation, substitution, and behavioral consequences, is likewise consistent with the hypothesized motivation. Several seeming counterexamples turned out not to disconfirm the hypothesis. Existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation.

The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation.

Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para

/pdf/illusion-and-well-being-a-social-psychological-perspective-5acx7rw6hx.pdf

Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental health

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

A theory of norms and normality is presented and applied to some phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it to the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. This article is concerned with category norms that represent knowledge of concepts and with stimulus norms that govern comparative judgments and designate experiences as surprising. In the tradition of adaptation level theory (Appley, 1971; Helson, 1964), the concept of norm is applied to events that range in complexity from single visual displays to social interactions. We first propose a model of an activation process that produces norms, then explore the role of norms in social cognition. The central idea of the present treatment is that norms are computed after the event rather than in advance. We sketch a supplement to the generally accepted idea that events in the stream of experience are interpreted and evaluated by consulting precomputed schemas and frames of reference. The view developed here is that each stimulus selectively recruits its own alternatives (Garner, 1962, 1970) and is interpreted in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been. Thus, each event brings its own frame of reference into being. We also explore the idea that knowledge of categories (e.g., "encounters with Jim") can be derived on-line by selectively evoking stored representations of discrete episodes and exemplars. The present model assumes that a number of representations can be recruited in parallel, by either a stimulus event or an

https://www3.canyons.edu/faculty/rafterm/0%200LLI%20LOVEandLOSS/Day%206%20Files/1986%20-%20Norm%20Theory%20-%20Comparing%20Reality%20to%20Its%20Alternatives.pdf

Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives

Self–other judgments and perceived vulnerability to victimization.

Individuals who have not been victimized by negative life events, such as serious illness, accidents, or crime, tend to perceive themselves as “uniquely invulnerable,” as less vulnerable to victimization than others The actual experience of victimization, however, appears to shatter this illusion of invulnerability, creating in victims a new and unfamiliar sense of vulnerability often accompanied by psychological distress This article reviews literature documenting nonvictims' perceptions of unique invulnerability and victims' heightened perceptions of vulnerability, and addresses the potentially adaptive versus maladaptive consequences of these perceptions It is argued that victims who have the most difficulty coping with their misfortune may be precisely those individuals who initially felt least vulnerable prior to being victimized Therefore, how victims cope may depend in part on their prior beliefs about risk In addition, a distinction is made between victims who feel “uniquely vulnerable” (more vulnerable than others) and those who feel “universally vulnerable” (equally vulnerable as others) to future misfortune It is proposed that perceptions of universal vulnerability may be a more adaptive reaction to victimization than are perceptions of unique vulnerability

Perceptions of Vulnerability to Victimization

Nonvictims, individuals who have not been victimized by undesirable life events, often underestimate their own personal vulnerability to victimization relative to other people’s vulnerability. In other words, non-victims appear to have an illusion of unique invulnerability, in which they see themselves as less vulnerable to victimization than they see most other people (Perloff, 1983). This biased perception is reflected in the common saying, “It won’t happen to me,” a statement that generally implies that it will instead happen to others. Although many studies have demonstrated the existence of these illusions, we still know relatively little about the underlying causal mechanisms or the behavioral consequences of harboring these misperceptions. Past evidence suggests that people who feel invulnerable to victimization are less likely to engage in precautionary behaviors than are people who feel vulnerable (Becker, 1974; Haefner & Kirscht, 1970; Tyler, 1980). Thus, illusions of invulnerability may be dangerous insofar as they discourage adequate self-protective, preventive behavior (cf. Weinstein, 1980).

Social comparison and illusions of invulnerability to negative life events.

As a test of ‘control theory’, 75 Type A/B undergraduates completed a multidimensional health locus-of-control measure. Type A behaviour correlated significantly with beliefs regarding personal control over health, but not with beliefs regarding chance or powerful others. These findings suggest Type As' desire for control is multidimensional.

Control theory and type A behaviour.

Memorializes Evelyn Perloff (1921-2022). During the mid-20th century, Dr. Perloff embarked on a lifelong career as a psychologist, characterized by an abiding concern with scientific measurement and a passion that impelled her to launch an international database on psychosocial instruments years before databases became de rigueur in the behavioral sciences. She was a staunch advocate for measurement as a quintessential engine of science and professional practice and was a visionary provider of measurement-related information for students, researchers, and practitioners in the health and psychosocial sciences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Linda S. Perloff

Papers

Self–other judgments and perceived vulnerability to victimization.

Perceptions of Vulnerability to Victimization

Social comparison and illusions of invulnerability to negative life events.

Control theory and type A behaviour.

Evelyn Perloff (1921-2022).