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Author

Louis Fisher

Bio: Louis Fisher is an academic researcher from Constitution Project. The author has contributed to research in topics: Presidential system & Constitution. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 123 publications receiving 1664 citations. Previous affiliations of Louis Fisher include Indiana University & American University of Sharjah.


Papers
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Book
21 Mar 1985
TL;DR: Fisher's durable classic remains at the head of its class -a book that Congressional Quarterly called "as close to being indispensable as anything published in this field." This newly revised and updated fifth edition emphatically reinforces that sterling reputation as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Nearly three decades after its initial publication, Louis Fisher's durable classic remains at the head of its class - a book that Congressional Quarterly called "as close to being indispensable as anything published in this field." This newly revised and updated fifth edition emphatically reinforces that sterling reputation. Fisher dissects the crucial constitutional disputes between the executive and legislative branches of government from the Constitutional Convention through President Clinton's impeachment battles to the recent controversies over President Bush's conduct as commander in chief. He ventures beyond traditional discussions of Supreme Court decisions to examine the day-to-day working relationships between the president and Congress. To scholars, this book offers a comprehensive examination of the institutions and issues of public law. For practitioners, general readers, and students of American government, it demonstrates how constitutional issues shape and define current events. New material in this edition includes: post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; military tribunals and NSA eavesdropping; Kosovo war in 1999; impeachment of President Clinton; termination of ABM treaty; controversies over appointments and removals; disputes over executive orders and proclamations; presidential signing statements; developments with item veto and pocket veto; public access to intelligence budgets; FBI search warrant of congressman's office; state secrets privilege; and, presidential and vice-presidential immunity.

130 citations

Book
01 Mar 1995
TL;DR: Fisher's Presidential War Power as discussed by the authors is a classic and bestselling work by one of our top Constitutional scholars, which covers the life of the Republic from the Revolutionary Era to the nation's post-9/11 wars, including new military initiatives including the Use of Force Act, the Iraq Resolution of 2002, George W. Bush's new "preemption doctrine, and his order authorizing military tribunals.
Abstract: A classic and bestselling work by one of our top Constitutional scholars, Presidential War Power garnered the lead review in the New York Times Book Review and raised essential issues that have only become more timely, relevant, and controversial since its initial publication nearly a decade ago. In this new edition. Louis Fisher updates his arguments throughout, critiques the presidential actions of William Clinton and George W. Bush, and challenges their dangerous expansion of executive power. Spanning the life of the Republic from the Revolutionary Era to the nation's post-9/11 wars, the new edition now covers: New military initiatives including the Use of Force Act, the Iraq Resolution of 2002, George W. Bush's new "preemption doctrine," and his order authorizing military tribunals. President Clinton's overt and covert military actions in Bosnia and against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden. George H. W. Bush's reasons for not pushing on to Baghdad to overthrow Saddham Hussein after Desert Storm. Numerous Congressional initiatives, including a 1995 effort to amend the War Powers Resolution and a proposed 1998 amendment to use the power of the purse to limit presidential power.

123 citations

Book
01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Who makes constitutional law? Is constitutional doctrine the monopoly of the courts? In accessible and persuasive prose Louis Fisher explains that constitutional law is not solely or even primarily the Supreme Court's "final word" but rather a richly political convergence of separate interpretations. With a broad range of examples, he argues that constitutional principles emerge from a dialogue among all three branches of government--executive, legislative, and judicial. Important contributions also come from the states and the general public. Fisher identifies executive and legislative initiatives in many areas of constitutional significance. Where there is litigation, the Court generally upholds these initiatives or may avoid making a constitutional decision by using "threshold devices." On those rare occasions when the Supreme Court exercises judicial review and strikes down a presidential or congressional action, it is usually only a matter of time before the proposal is revived and the dialogue begins again.Originally published in 1988.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

88 citations

Book
21 Nov 1975
TL;DR: Fisher as mentioned in this paper investigated different forms of discretionary action: the transfer of funds that initially financed the Cambodian incursion; impoundment during the Nixon administration; covert financing; the reprogramming of funds; and unauthorized commitments.
Abstract: Each year billions of dollars are diverted by the President and his assistants from the purposes for which Congress intended them. Billions more are used in confidential and covert ways, without the knowledge of Congress and the public. Here is the first account of how this money is actually spent.Louis Fisher writes: "When it comes to the administration of the budget, we find nothing that is obvious, very little that is visible. Our priorities here are peculiar. We fix upon the appropriations process, watching with great fascination as Congress goes about its business of making funds available to agencies. What happens after that point --the actual spending of money--rarely commands our attention."To unravel the mystery, Louis Fisher has investigated different forms of discretionary action: the transfer of funds that initially financed the Cambodian incursion; impoundment during the Nixon administration; covert financing; the reprogramming of funds; and unauthorized commitments. He describes each of these devices in operation and provides the historical background of Presidential spending power. In conclusion Louis Fisher presents a cogent and timely analysis of what can be done to improve Congressional control. Sufficient control, he maintains, cannot be achieved merely through the appropriations process, and he makes important recommendations designed to preserve discretionary authority while improving Congressional supervision.Originally published in 1975.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

78 citations

Book
01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify the nuts and bolts of the national dialogue and relate succinct examples of how elected officials and the general public often dominate the Supreme Court in defining the Constitution's meaning.
Abstract: Constitutional law is clearly shaped by judicial actors. But who else contributes? Scholars in the past have recognized that the legislative branch plays a significant role in determining structural issues, such as separation of powers and federalism, but stopped there-claiming that only courts had the independence and expertise to safeguard individual and minority rights. In this readable and engaging narrative, the authors identify the nuts and bolts of the national dialogue and relate succinct examples of how elected officials and the general public often dominate the Supreme Court in defining the Constitution's meaning. Making use of case studies on race, privacy, federalism, war powers, speech, and religion, Devins and Fisher demonstrate how elected officials uphold individual rights in such areas as religious liberty and free speech as well as, and often better than, the courts. This fascinating debunking of judicial supremacy argues that nonjudicial contributions to constitutional interpretation make the Constitution more stable, more consistent with constitutional principles, and more protective of individual and minority rights.

65 citations


Cited by
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Book
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: The first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches was proposed by Epstein and O'Halloran as discussed by the authors, who examined major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992 and described the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy.
Abstract: In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy.

1,098 citations

Book
01 Jan 2006
TL;DR: Jones and Baumgartner as discussed by the authors studied how politicians manage the flood of information from a wide range of sources, and which issues do they pay attention to and why, in American politics.
Abstract: On any given day, policymakers are required to address a multitude of problems and make decisions about a variety of issues, from the economy and education to health care and defense. This has been true for years, but until now no studies have been conducted on how politicians manage the flood of information from a wide range of sources. How do they interpret and respond to such inundation? Which issues do they pay attention to and why? Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner answer these questions on decision-making processes and prioritization in "The Politics of Attention". Analyzing fifty years of data, Jones and Baumgartner's book is the first study of American politics based on a new information-processing perspective. The authors bring together the allocation of attention and the operation of governing institutions into a single model that traces public policies, public and media attention to them, and governmental decisions across multiple institutions. "The Politics of Attention offers a groundbreaking approach to American politics based on the responses of policymakers to the flow of information. It asks how the system solves, or fails to solve, problems rather than looking to how individual preferences are realized through political action.

884 citations

MonographDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea and Mongolia, and argue that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests.
Abstract: New democracies around the world have adopted constitutional courts to oversee the operation of democratic politics. Where does judicial power come from, how does it develop in the early stages of democratic liberalization, and what political conditions support its expansion? This book answers these questions through an examination of three constitutional courts in Asia: Taiwan, Korea, and Mongolia. In a region that has traditionally viewed law as a tool of authoritarian rulers, constitutional courts in these three societies are becoming a real constraint on government. In contrast with conventional culturalist accounts, this book argues that the design and functioning of constitutional review are largely a function of politics and interests. Judicial review - the power of judges to rule an act of a legislature or national leader unconstitutional - is a solution to the problem of uncertainty in constitutional design. By providing 'insurance' to prospective electoral losers, judicial review can facilitate democracy.

737 citations

01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: For better or for worse, the judicialization of politics has become one of the most significant trends of the end of the millenium as discussed by the authors, and political scientists, legal scholars, and judges around the world trace the intellectual origins of this trend, describe its occurence and lack of occurrence in specific nations, analyze the circumstances and conditions that promote or retard judicialization, and evaluate the phenomenon from a variety of intellectual and ideological perspectives.
Abstract: In Russia, as the confrontation over the constitutional distribution of authority raged, Boris Yeltsin's economic program regularly wended its way in and out of the Constitutional Court until Yeltsin finally suspended that court in the aftermath of his clash with the hard-line parliament. In Europe, French and German legislators and executives now routinely alter desired policies in response to or in anticipation of the pronouncements of constitutional courts. In Latin America and Africa, courts are--or will be-- important participants in ongoing efforts to establish constitutional rules and policies protect new or fragile democracies from the threats of military intervention, ethnic conflict, and revolution. This global expansion of judicial power, or judicialization of politics is accompanied by an increasing domination of negotiating or decision making arenas by quasi- judicial procedures. For better or for worse, the judicialization of politics has become one of the most significant trends of the end of the millenium. In this book, political scientists, legal scholars, and judges around the world trace the intellectual origins of this trend, describe its occurence--or lack of occurence--in specific nations, analyze the circumstances and conditions that promote or retard judicialization, and evaluate the phenomenon from a variety of intellectual and ideological perspectives. (Less)

494 citations