Lucas Swaine

Bio: Lucas Swaine is an academic researcher from Dartmouth College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Liberalism & Politics. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 21 publications receiving 259 citations. Previous affiliations of Lucas Swaine include Brown University.

Anchoring Political Preferences: The Structural Bases of Stable Electoral Decisions and Political Attitudes in Britain

Abstract: The paper applies a structural perspective to the analysis of political preferences. Examining two British surveys, the 1987 cross-section of the electorate and a panel survey that covers the 1983 and 1987 elections, the research explores the bases of persistent voting for the same party, location on left-right scales, and the probability of holding the same policy views on a host of different issues over time. A set of structural variables rests at the heart of the paper';s theory: discussion networks, patterns of interactions with members of political parties, social class networks, and location in the social structure. Several hypotheses guide the analysis: The effects of the structural variables on the probability of casting a ballot for the same political party in any one election and in adjacent elections will remain, even after controlling for party identification; political party socialization; location on left-right scales; positions taken on any and all political issues; age, and past levels of electoral stability. The effects of structural variables on left-right position will remain, even after controlling for locations on alternative left-right scales. Finally, reinforcing attitudinal context provides the only consistent determinant of stable policy positions, after controlling for a host of alternative explanations including level of education; age; interest in politics, and a general propensity to offer stable answers to political questions.

The Liberal Conscience: Politics and Principle in a World of Religious Pluralism

Abstract: AcknowledgmentsIntroduction1 A Liberalism of Conscience2 Liberalism and the Liberty of Conscience3 How Should Liberal Democracies Treat Theocratic Communities?4 Inspiring Public Reason: The Promise of LiberalismReview and Conclusion: The Ultimate Appeal of LiberalismNotesIndex

Institutions of conscience: Politics and principle in a world of religious pluralism

Abstract: This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate valuation of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe.

How ought liberal democracies to treat theocratic communities

Abstract: Etude du probleme politique et juridique que posent les communautes theocratiques aux democraties liberales. A travers l'exemple des Etats-Unis, l'A. souligne le caractere obsolete de l'argumentation sur la liberte de conscience et revendique la reconnaissance du statut de semi-souverainete aux communautes religieuses.

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

Abstract: Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

The Law of Peoples

Abstract: The Law of Peoples John Rawls Harvard 1999 John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in Perpetual Peace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The Law of Peoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however, revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called "decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member state of the foedus pacif cum must have a republican form of government, which is partly founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast, Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency. Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which principles of justice for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and common good conceptions of justice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. …