Ludovic Montastruc

Bio: Ludovic Montastruc is an academic researcher from University of Toulouse. The author has contributed to research in topics: Multi-objective optimization & Supply chain. The author has an hindex of 21, co-authored 96 publications receiving 1518 citations. Previous affiliations of Ludovic Montastruc include Centre national de la recherche scientifique & university of lille.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Review: A state-of the-art survey of TOPSIS applications

Abstract: Multi-Criteria Decision Aid (MCDA) or Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) methods have received much attention from researchers and practitioners in evaluating, assessing and ranking alternatives across diverse industries. Among numerous MCDA/MCDM methods developed to solve real-world decision problems, the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) continues to work satisfactorily across different application areas. In this paper, we conduct a state-of-the-art literature survey to taxonomize the research on TOPSIS applications and methodologies. The classification scheme for this review contains 266 scholarly papers from 103 journals since the year 2000, separated into nine application areas: (1) Supply Chain Management and Logistics, (2) Design, Engineering and Manufacturing Systems, (3) Business and Marketing Management, (4) Health, Safety and Environment Management, (5) Human Resources Management, (6) Energy Management, (7) Chemical Engineering, (8) Water Resources Management and (9) Other topics. Scholarly papers in the TOPSIS discipline are further interpreted based on (1) publication year, (2) publication journal, (3) authors' nationality and (4) other methods combined or compared with TOPSIS. We end our review paper with recommendations for future research in TOPSIS decision-making that is both forward-looking and practically oriented. This paper provides useful insights into the TOPSIS method and suggests a framework for future attempts in this area for academic researchers and practitioners.

Microbial biosurfactants production, applications and future potential

Abstract: Microorganisms synthesise a wide range of surface-active compounds (SAC), generally called biosurfactants. These compounds are mainly classified according to their molecular weight, physico-chemical properties and mode of action. The low-molecular-weight SACs or biosurfactants reduce the surface tension at the air/water interfaces and the interfacial tension at oil/water interfaces, whereas the high-molecular-weight SACs, also called bioemulsifiers, are more effective in stabilising oil-in-water emulsions. Biosurfactants are attracting much interest due to their potential advantages over their synthetic counterparts in many fields spanning environmental, food, biomedical, and other industrial applications. Their large-scale application and production, however, are currently limited by the high cost of production and by limited understanding of their interactions with cells and with the abiotic environment. In this paper, we review the current knowledge and the latest advances in biosurfactant applications and the biotechnological strategies being developed for improving production processes and future potential.