Luis A. Rios

Bio: Luis A. Rios is an academic researcher from Purdue University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Organizational structure & Organizational learning. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 13 publications receiving 251 citations. Previous affiliations of Luis A. Rios include Duke University & University of Santiago, Chile.

Make, buy, organize: The interplay between research, external knowledge, and firm structure†

Abstract: We bridge current streams of innovation research to explore the interplay between R&D, external knowledge, and organizational structure�three elements of a firm's innovation strategy, which we argue should logically be studied together. Using within-firm patent assignment patterns, we develop a novel measure of structure for a large sample of American firms. We find that centralized firms invest more in research, and patent more per R&D dollar, than decentralized firms. Both types access technology via mergers and acquisitions, but their acquisitions differ in terms of frequency, size, and integration. Consistent with our framework, their sources of value creation differ: while centralized firms derive more value from internal R&D, decentralized firms rely more on external knowledge. We discuss how these findings should stimulate more integrative work on theories of innovation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Capital Markets and Firm Organization: How Financial Development Shapes European Corporate Groups

Abstract: We investigate the effect of financial development on the formation of European corporate groups. Because cross-country regressions are hard to interpret in a causal sense, we exploit exogenous industry measures to investigate a specific channel through which financial development may affect group affiliation: internal capital markets. Using a comprehensive firm-level data set on European corporate groups in 15 countries, we find that countries with less developed financial markets have a higher percentage of group affiliates in more capital-intensive industries. This relationship is more pronounced for young and small firms and for affiliates of large and diversified groups. Our findings are consistent with the view that internal capital markets may, under some conditions, be more efficient than prevailing external markets, and that this may drive group affiliation even in developed economies. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

The Organization of R&D in American Corporations: The Determinants and Consequences of Decentralization

Abstract: We study the relationship between decentralization of R&D, innovation and firm performance using a novel dataset on the organizational structure of 1,290 American publicly-listed corporations, 2,615 of their affiliate firms, as well as characteristics of 594,903 patents that they hold. We explore the tension between centralization and decentralization of R&D, which trades off between responsiveness to immediate and local business needs and the type of research that can benefit the firm as a whole. To do this, we develop two novel measures of decentralization. First, using intra-firm patent assignments, we distinguish between patents that are assigned to the inventing unit rather than to corporate headquarters. Second, we exploit the variation between firms which posses a central corporate R&D labs and those that do not. We find that centralized R&D tends be more scientific, broader in scope, and have more technical impact, while being more likely in firms that operate within a narrower range of businesses, in complex technologies, or that are less reliant upon acquisitions. Additionally, we find that firms with a more decentralized structure, on average, invest less in R&D, generate fewer patents per R&D, and exhibit greater sales growth and higher market value. We discuss several theories that can explain these relationships, as well as potential avenues for future research.

Organizational change and the dynamics of innovation: Formal R&D structure and intrafirm inventor networks

Abstract: Research Abstract Prior research has argued and shown that firms with more centralized R&D produce broader innovations, but the organizational mechanisms underlying this relationship are underexplored. This gap limits our understanding of whether and how formal R&D structure can be used as a lever to influence research outcomes. To address this question, we study the relationship between formal R&D structure, internal inventor networks, and innovative behavior and outcomes. We find that centralization of R&D budget authority increases the connectedness of internal inventor networks, which in turn increases the breadth of both innovation impact and technological search. Surprisingly, decentralization does not have the opposite effect. Our results suggest that changes in formal structure influence innovation outcomes through changes in inventor networks, with a lag reflecting organizational inertia. Managerial Abstract Diversified corporations can organize their R&D functions to be more or less centralized. Prior research has shown that this organizational choice is associated with different types of innovative outcomes. But what happens when a corporation changes its level of R&D centralization? This paper suggests that centralization of R&D gradually leads to new patterns of collaboration among inventors, which in turn will be associated with innovations that draw on and influence a wider range of technologies. However, future work is needed to understand why decentralization does not appear to have the opposite effect.

The Organization of R&D in American Corporations: The Determinants and Consequences of Decentralization

Abstract: We study the relationship between decentralization of R&D, innovation and firm performance using a novel dataset on the organizational structure of 1,290 American publicly-listed corporations, 2,615 of their affiliate firms, as well as characteristics of 594,903 patents that they hold. We explore the tension between centralization and decentralization of R&D, which trades off between responsiveness to immediate and local business needs and the type of research that can benefit the firm as a whole. To do this, we develop two novel measures of decentralization. First, using intra-firm patent assignments, we distinguish between patents that are assigned to the inventing unit rather than to corporate headquarters. Second, we exploit the variation between firms which posses a central corporate R&D labs and those that do not. We find that centralized R&D tends be more scientific, broader in scope, and have more technical impact, while being more likely in firms that operate within a narrower range of businesses, in complex technologies, or that are less reliant upon acquisitions. Additionally, we find that firms with a more decentralized structure, on average, invest less in R&D, generate fewer patents per R&D, and exhibit greater sales growth and higher market value. We discuss several theories that can explain these relationships, as well as potential avenues for future research.

An Overview of Innovation

Abstract: Models that depict innovation as a smooth, well-behaved linear process badly misspecify the nature and direction of the causal factors at work. Innovation is complex, uncertain, somewhat disorderly, and subject to changes of many sorts. Innovation is also difficult to measure and demands close coordination of adequate technical knowledge and excellent market judgment in order to satisfy economic, technological, and other types of constraints—all simultaneously. The process of innovation must be viewed as a series of changes in a complete system not only of hardware, but also of market environment, production facilities and knowledge, and the social contexts of the innovation organization.

The Limits of Organization

Abstract: (1975). The Limits of Organization. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 543-544.

Recruiting for Ideas: How Firms Exploit the Prior Inventions of New Hires

Abstract: When firms recruit inventors, they acquire not only the use of their skills but also enhanced access to their stock of ideas. But do hiring firms actually increase their use of the new recruits' prior inventions? Our estimates suggest they do, quite significantly in fact, by approximately 202% on average. However, this does not necessarily reflect widespread "learning-by-hiring." In fact, we estimate that a recruit's exploitation of her own prior ideas accounts for almost half of the above effect. Furthermore, although one might expect the recruit's role to diminish rapidly as her tacit knowledge diffuses across her new firm, our estimates indicate that her importance is surprisingly persistent over time. We base these findings on an empirical strategy that exploits the variation over time in hiring firms' citations to the recruits' pre-move patents. Specifically, we employ a difference-in-differences approach to compare pre-move versus post-move citation rates for the recruits' prior patents and the corresponding matched-pair control patents. Our methodology has three benefits compared to previous studies that also examine the link between labor mobility and knowledge flow: 1) it does not suffer from the upward bias inherent in the conventional cross-sectional comparison, 2) it generates results that are robust to a more stringently matched control sample, and 3) it enables a temporal examination of knowledge flow patterns.

Government-subsidized R&D and Firm Innovation: Evidence from China

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of government R&D programs on firm innovation outputs, which are measured by the number of patents, sales from new products, and exports. Particularly, we examine the effects of Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund), which is one of the largest government R&D programs that support R&D activities of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. Using a panel dataset on Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2007, we find that Innofund-backed firms generate significantly higher technological and commercialized innovation outputs compared with their non-Innofund-backed counterparts and the same firms before winning the grant. Moreover, the changes in the governance of Innofund in 2005 from a centralized to a decentralized one because of policy amendments have significant effects on the effectiveness of the program. Specifically, the magnified effects of Innofund on technological innovation outputs become significantly stronger after the governance of Innofund becomes more decentralized. Identification problems are addressed by utilizing both propensity score matching and two-stage estimation approaches.