Luis R. Gomez-Mejia

Bio: Luis R. Gomez-Mejia is an academic researcher from Arizona State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Socioemotional selectivity theory & Executive compensation. The author has an hindex of 64, co-authored 185 publications receiving 24783 citations. Previous affiliations of Luis R. Gomez-Mejia include University of Colorado Boulder & University of Miami.

Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills

Abstract: This paper challenges the prevalent notion that family-owned firms are more risk averse than publicly owned firms. Using behavioral theory, we argue that for family firms, the primary reference point is the loss of their socioemotional wealth, and to avoid those losses, family firms are willing to accept a significant risk to their performance; yet at the same time, they avoid risky business decisions that might aggravate that risk. Thus, we propose that the predictions of behavioral theory differ depending on family ownership. We confirm our hypotheses using a population of 1,237 family-owned olive oil mills in Southern Spain who faced the choice during a 54-year period of becoming a member of a cooperative, a decision associated with loss of family control but lower business risk, or remaining independent, which preserves the family's socioemotional wealth but greatly increases its performance hazard. As shown in this study, family firms may be risk willing and risk averse at the same time.

Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future Research

Abstract: This article makes the case for the socioemotional wealth (SEW) approach as the potential dominant paradigm in the family business field. The authors argue that SEW is the most important differentiator of the family firm as a unique entity and, as such, helps explain why family firms behave distinctively. In doing so, the authors review the concept of SEW, its different dimensions, and its links with other theoretical approaches. The authors also address the issue of how to measure this construct and offer various alternatives for operationalizing it. Finally, they offer a set of topics that can be pursued in future studies using the SEW approach.

The Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms

Abstract: A growing body of research shows that family firms are different from other organizations in significant ways. In this paper we review this literature by examining how family firms differ from nonfamily firms along five broad categories of managerial decisions. These categories encompass a set of key organizational choices concerning management processes, firm strategies, corporate governance, stakeholder relations and business venturing. We argue that socioemotional wealth or affective endowment of family owners explain many of these choices. We also examine some contingency factors (namely family stage, firm size, firm hazard, and the presence of nonfamily shareholders) that moderate the influence of socioemotional wealth preservation as a point of reference when making managerial decisions in family firms. Lastly, we explore the firm performance consequences of family ownership.

Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less?:

Abstract: This paper compares the environmental performance of family and nonfamily public corporations between 1998 and 2002, using a sample of 194 U.S. firms required to report their emissions. We found that family-controlled public firms protect their socioemotional wealth by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly at the local level, and that for the nonfamily firms, stock ownership by the chief executive officer (CEO) has a negative environmental impact. We also found that the positive effect of family ownership on environmental performance persists independently of whether the CEO is a family member or serves both as CEO and board chair.

A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking

Abstract: Building on agency and prospect theory views, we construct, in this article, a behavioral agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements of internal corporate governance with problem framing to explain executive risk-taking behavior. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk-seeking as well as risk-averse behaviors. We develop specific propositions that combine monitoring with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices of strategic risk. The resulting propositions enhance and extend the agency-based corporate governance literature on executive risk taking.

Justice at the millennium: a meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice research

Abstract: The field of organizationa l justice continues to be marked by several important research questions, including the size of relationships among justice dimensions, the relative importance of different justice criteria, and the unique effects of justice dimensions on key outcomes. To address such questions, the authors conducted a meta-analytic review of 183 justice studies. The results suggest that although different justice dimensions are moderately to highly related, they contribute incremental variance explained in fairness perceptions. The results also illustrate the overall and unique relationships among distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice and several organizational outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, evaluation of authority, organizational citizenship behavior, withdrawal, performance). These findings are reviewed in terms of their implications for future research on organizationa l justice.

Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders.

Abstract: A role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders proposes that perceived incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles leads to 2 forms of prejudice: (a) perceiving women less favorably than men as potential occupants of leadership roles and (b) evaluating behavior that fulfills the prescriptions of a leader role less favorably when it is enacted by a woman. One consequence is that attitudes are less positive toward female than male leaders and potential leaders. Other consequences are that it is more difficult for women to become leaders and to achieve success in leadership roles. Evidence from varied research paradigms substantiates that these consequences occur, especially in situations that heighten perceptions of incongruity between the female gender role and leadership roles.

Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

Abstract: We investigate the relation between founding-family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure. FOUNDING-FAMILYOWNERSHIPAND CONTROL in public U.S. firms is commonly perceived as a less efficient, or at the very least, a less profitable ownership structure than dispersed ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983) note that combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents. Demsetz (1983) argues that such owners may choose nonpecuniary consumption and thereby draw scarce resources away from profitable projects. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that the large premiums associated with superiorvoting shares or control rights provide evidence that controlling shareholders seek to extract private benefits from the firm. More generally, firms with large, undiversified owners such as founding families may forgo maximum profits because they are unable to separate their financial preferences with those of outside owners.1 Families also often limit executive management positions to family

Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning

Abstract: Much of the prior research on interorganizational learning has focused on the role of absorptive capacity, a firm's ability to value, assimilate, and utilize new external knowledge. However, this definition of the construct suggests that a firm has an equal capacity to learn from all other organizations. We reconceptualize the firm-level construct absorptive capacity as a learning dyad-level construct, relative absorptive capacity. One firm's ability to learn from another firm is argued to depend on the similarity of both firms' (1) knowledge bases, (2) organizational structures and compensation policies, and (3) dominant logics. We then test the model using a sample of pharmaceutical–biotechnology R&D alliances. As predicted, the similarity of the partners' basic knowledge, lower management formalization, research centralization, compensation practices, and research communities were positively related to interorganizational learning. The relative absorptive capacity measures are also shown to have greater explanatory power than the established measure of absorptive capacity, R&D spending. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.