Luiz A. DaSilva

Bio: Luiz A. DaSilva is an academic researcher from Virginia Tech. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cognitive radio & Wireless network. The author has an hindex of 42, co-authored 299 publications receiving 7454 citations. Previous affiliations of Luiz A. DaSilva include University of Kansas & George Washington University.

Cognitive networks

Abstract: This paper presents a definition and framework for a novel type of adaptive data network: the cognitive network. In a cognitive network, the collection of elements that make up the network observes network conditions and then, using prior knowledge gained from previous interactions with the network, plans, decides and acts on this information. Cognitive networks are different from other "intelligent" communication technologies because these actions are taken with respect to the end-to-end goals of a data flow. In addition to the cognitive aspects of the network, a specification language is needed to translate the user's end-to-end goals into a form understandable by the cognitive process. The cognitive network also depends on a software adaptable network that has both an external interface accessible to the cognitive network and network status sensors. These devices are used to provide control and feedback. The paper concludes by presenting a simple case study to illustrate a cognitive network and its framework

Cognitive networks: adaptation and learning to achieve end-to-end performance objectives

Abstract: In this article we advance the idea of a cognitive network, capable of perceiving current network conditions and then planning, learning, and acting according to end-to-end goals. Cognitive networks are motivated by the complexity, heterogeneity, and reliability requirements of tomorrow's networks, which are increasingly expected to self-organize to meet user and application objectives. We compare and contrast cognitive networks with related research on cognitive radios and cross-layer design. By defining cognitive networks, examining their relationship to other technologies, discussing critical design issues, and providing a framework for implementation, we aim to establish a foundation for further research and discussion

Using game theory to analyze wireless ad hoc networks

Abstract: The application of mathematical analysis to the study of wireless ad hoc networks has met with limited success due to the complexity of mobility and traffic models, the dynamic topology, and the unpredictability of link quality that characterize such networks. The ability to model individual, independent decision makers whose actions potentially affect all other decision makers renders game theory particularly attractive to analyze the performance of ad hoc networks. In this article we describe how various interactions in wireless ad hoc networks can be modeled as a game. This allows the analysis of existing protocols and resource management schemes, as well as the design of equilibrium-inducing mechanisms that provide incentives for individual users to behave in socially-constructive ways. We survey the recent literature on game theoretic analysis of ad hoc networks, highlighting its applicability to power control and waveform adaptation, medium access control, routing, and node participation, among others.

Game theory for wireless engineers

Abstract: The application of mathematical analysis to wireless networks has met with limited success, due to the complexity of mobility and traffic models, coupled with the dynamic topology and the unpredictability of link quality that characterize such networks. The ability to model individual, independent decision makers whose actions potentially affect all other decision makers makes game theory particularly attractive to analyze the performance of ad hoc networks. Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that describes and analyzes interactive decision situations. It consists of a set of analytical tools that predict the outcome of complex interactions among rational entities, where rationality demands a strict adherence to a strategy based on perceived or measured results. In the early to mid-1990's, game theory was applied to networking problems including flow control, congestion control, routing and pricing of Internet services. More recently, there has been growing interest in adopting game-theoretic methods to model today's leading communications and networking issues, including power control and resource sharing in wireless and peer-to-peer networks. This work presents fundamental results in game theory and their application to wireless communications and networking. We discuss normal-form, repeated, and Markov games with examples selected from the literature. We also describe ways in which learning can be modeled in game theory, with direct applications to the emerging field of cognitive radio. Finally, we discuss challenges and limitations in the application of game theory to the analysis of wireless systems. We do not assume familiarity with game theory. We introduce major game theoretic models and discuss applications of game theory including medium access, routing, energy-efficient protocols, and others. We seek to provide the reader with a foundational understanding of the current research on game theory applied to wireless communications and networking.

Rendezvous for Cognitive Radios

Abstract: Cognitive radios have been touted as a solution to communicating in a Dynamic Spectrum Access environment. This paper examines how cognitive radios initially find one another among the expanse of ever-changing open spectrum, termed the rendezvous problem. Specifically, it addresses the problem of rendezvous under varying levels of system capabilities, spectrum policies, and environmental conditions. The focus is on rendezvous when there are are no control channels or centralized controllers, which we term the blind rendezvous problem. Under these conditions, a sequence-based and modular clock blind rendezvous algorithms are proposed, and it is shown that the performance of these algorithms compares favorably to that of a random blind rendezvous algorithm. Specifically, the sequence-based algorithm provides a bounded Time To Rendezvous (TTR) and the ability to prioritize channels where rendezvous is more likely to occur; the modular clock algorithm reduces the expected TTR, requires little precoordination among radios attempting to rendezvous, and is robust to radios sensing different sets of available channels.

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

Abstract: THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

Modern Applied Statistics With S

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Table Of Integrals Series And Products

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博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index