Author
Łukasz Balbus
Other affiliations: Wrocław University of Technology
Bio: Łukasz Balbus is an academic researcher from University of Zielona Góra. The author has contributed to research in topics: Markov perfect equilibrium & Stochastic game. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 27 publications receiving 270 citations. Previous affiliations of Łukasz Balbus include Wrocław University of Technology.
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: A suitable change in the terminology used in this paper provides (in the case of perfect altruism between generations) a new Nash equilibrium theorem for standard stochastic games with uncountable state space.
34 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a class of discounted innite horizon stochastic games with strategic complementarities with monotone operators on the space of values and strategies is studied, and the existence of a Stationary Markov Nash equilibrium under dierent set of assumptions is proved.
25 citations
TL;DR: This article provided conditions for existence and uniqueness of a monotone, Lipschitz continuous Markov stationary Nash equilibrium and implied invariant distribution in a class of intergenerational paternalistic altruism models with stochastic production.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a new class of infinite horizon altruistic stochastic OLG models with capital and labor, without commitment between the generations, is introduced, and for these models, continuous monotone Markov perfect Nash equilibria (henceforth MPNE) are shown to exist, and form an antichain.
22 citations
TL;DR: An iterative method leading to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite horizon game with the discounted evaluation is studied.
Abstract: A large class of nonzero-sum symmetric stochastic games of capital accumulation/resource extraction is considered. An iterative method leading to a Nash equilibrium in the infinite horizon game with the discounted evaluation is studied.
21 citations
Cited by
More filters
TL;DR: Convergence of Probability Measures as mentioned in this paper is a well-known convergence of probability measures. But it does not consider the relationship between probability measures and the probability distribution of probabilities.
Abstract: Convergence of Probability Measures. By P. Billingsley. Chichester, Sussex, Wiley, 1968. xii, 253 p. 9 1/4“. 117s.
5,689 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce a new condition characterizing when the single crossing property is stable under aggregation, and also identify sufficient conditions for the preservation of the cross-crossing property under multidimensional aggregation.
Abstract: The single crossing property plays a crucial role in economic theory, yet there are important instances where the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum or convex combination of two functions with the single crossing property need not have that property. We introduce a new condition characterizing when the single crossing property is stable under aggregation, and also identify sufficient conditions for the preservation of the single crossing property under multidimensional aggregation. We use our results to establish properties of objective functions (convexity, logsupermodularity), the monotonicity of optimal decisions under uncertainty, and the existence of monotone equilibria in Bayesian games.
86 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise is established, where noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the transition probability on states.
Abstract: This paper establishes existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in general stochastic games with noise—a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and not directly affected by the previous period's state and actions. Noise may be simply a payoff-irrelevant public randomization device, delivering known results on the existence of correlated equilibrium as a special case. More generally, noise can take the form of shocks that enter into players' stage payoffs and the transition probability on states. The existence result is applied to a model of industry dynamics and to a model of dynamic electoral competition.
60 citations
01 Nov 1994
TL;DR: This paper analyzed the potential conflict between econonnic growth and environmental quality in an overlapping generations model and provided a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and income, whereby ecotiomic growth is associated first with declines, then improvements, in environmental quality.
Abstract: This article analyses the potential conflict bpiween econonnic growth and the maintenance of
environmental quality in an overlapping generations model. Shorl-livcd individuals make decisions
which have long-lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment. The model
provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and
income, whereby ecotiomic growth is associated first with declines, then improvements, in
environmental quality. It suggests circumstances in which multiple Pareto-ranked steady-state
equilibria may arise, and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality
may occur. Overmaititcnance of the environment, analogous to dynamically inefficient overaccumulation
of capital, may emerge.
60 citations