M. le Bars

Bio: M. le Bars is an academic researcher from Lamsade. The author has contributed to research in topics: Water resources & European union. The author has an hindex of 2, co-authored 2 publications receiving 33 citations.

An Agent-based simulation for water sharing between different users

Abstract: In France, water sharing has become a serious problem. We observed that many negotiations take place at local level between farmers, water suppliers, public services and environmentalists to allocate water resources between users. We suggest that Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) using a multi-agent approach could help negotiations. The model intends to show to negotiators possible consequences of different rules to share water. These consequences are evaluated upon different criteria. The model is based on different type of agents with different behaviour.

An Agent-Based Simulation for Water Sharing Between Different Users

Abstract: Water sharing has become a serious problem in France. One of the objectives of 1992 and 2000 directives proposed by the European Union was to reduce both the frequency and the extent of water conflicts through the establishment of multilateral negotiations, where different public and private interests can be represented in a structured institutional environment. In France, many negotiations take place at local level between farmers, water supplies, public services and environmental lists to allocate water resources between users. We suggest that Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) using a multi-agent approach could help negotiations between different players by showing the consequences of water allocation rules and taking in consideration the players' respective attitudes and their ability to change their behaviour.

Agent-Based Residential Water Use Behavior Simulation and Policy Implications: A Case-Study in Beijing City

Abstract: Residential water use constitutes a major part of urban water demand, and has be gaining importance in the urban water supply. Considering the complexity of residential water use system, an agent-based social simulation, i.e. the Residential Water Use Model (RWUM), is developed in this paper to capture the behavioral characteristics of residential water usage. By disaggregating total water demands down to constituent end-uses, this model can evaluate heterogeneous consumer responses on water, taking into account the factors of market penetration of water-saving technologies, regulatory policies, economic development, as well as social consciousness and preferences. Also, uncertainty analysis technique is innovatively applied in this agent-based model for parameter calibration and model robust testing. According to the case study in Beijing, this model can provide insights to water management agency in evaluating different water usage polices, as well as estimations for potential water saving for future infrastructure development planning.

A Framework for an Agent-Based Model to Manage Water Resources Conflicts

Abstract: Competition for use of water is increasing and leads to many conflicts among competing interests with complex goals and water management systems. Technical system models are essential to create performance and other decision information, but models to simulate views of the competing parties are also needed to help resolve or mitigate conflicts. Agent-based models (ABMs) offer promise to fill this role, and in this study a new approach to agent-based modeling is introduced to simulate the behavior and interactions of the parties participating in a conflict scenario, which is modeled as a game. To develop this framework, we considered water issues of California's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta region as an example of a long-standing situation, with emphasis on the San Joaquin watershed. However, this approach can be used in other watersheds and more complex systems. The ABM explains the interactions among the parties and how they can be encouraged to cooperate in the game to work toward a solution. The model also enables decision-makers to test management scenarios and understand the consequences of their decisions on different stakeholders and their behaviors.

A bargaining model to simulate negotiations between water users

Abstract: The French water law of 1992 requires that regulations on water use and water management be negotiated collectively and locally in each river sub-basin. Decision-makers therefore need new tools to guide the negotiation process which will take place between water users. A formal computable bargaining model of multilateral negotiations is applied to the Adour Basin case, in the South West of France, with seven aggregate players (three farmers, two "environmental lobbies", the water manager, the taxpayer) and seven negotiation variables (three individual irrigation quotas, the price of water, the sizes of three dams). The farmers' utility functions are estimated with hydraulic and economic models. A sensibility analysis is conducted to quantify the impact of the negotiation structure (political weights of players, choice of players...) on game outcomes. The relevance of the bargaining models as negotiation-support tools is assessed.

Game Theory: Limitations and an Alternative

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to describe current practice in the game theory literature, to identify particular characteristics that ensure the literature is remote from anything we observe and to demonstrate an alternative drawn from agent based social simulation. The key issue is the process of social interaction among agents. A survey of game theoretic models found no models representing interaction among more than three agents, though sometimes more agents were involved in a round robin tournament. An ABSS model is reported in which there is a dense pattern of interaction among agents and outputs from the model are shown to have the same statistical signature as high-frequency data from competitive retail and financial markets. Moreover, the density of agent interaction is seen to be necessary both to obtain the validating statistical signature and for simulated market efficiency. As far as competitive markets are concerned, game theoretic models evidently assume away the source of the properties observed in real high frequency data and also the properties required for market efficiency.