A mathematical framework to optimize resilience of interdependent critical infrastructure systems under spatially localized attacks

Pandemics cause chaotic situations in supply chains (SC) around the globe, which can lead towards survivability challenges. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that has severely affected global business dynamics. Similar vulnerabilities have been caused by other outbreaks in the past. In these terms, prevention strategies against propagating disruptions require vigilant goal conceptualization and roadmaps. In this respect, there is a need to explore supply chain operation management strategies to overcome the challenges that emerge due to COVID-19-like situations. Therefore, this review is aimed at exploring such challenges and developing strategies for sustainability, and viability perspectives for SCs, through a structured literature review (SLR) approach. Moreover, this study investigated the impacts of previous epidemic outbreaks on SCs, to identify the research objectives, methodological approaches, and implications for SCs. The study also explored the impacts of epidemic outbreaks on the business environment, in terms of effective resource allocation, supply and demand disruptions, and transportation network optimization, through operations management techniques. Furthermore, this article structured a framework that emphasizes the integration of Industry 4.0 technologies, resilience strategies, and sustainability to overcome SC challenges during pandemics. Finally, future research avenues were identified by including a research agenda for experts and practitioners to develop new pathways to get out of the crisis.

https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/5/2504/pdf

Supply Chain Operations Management in Pandemics: A State-of-the-Art Review Inspired by COVID-19

Optimizing the Resilience of Interdependent Infrastructures to Regional Natural Hazards with Combined Improvement Measures

A defender defends and an attacker attacks each of n interdependent targets which can operate or fail and be in 2n possible states. Interdependence is modelled from each target to each other target. Despite such systems usually being analysed numerically, this paper succeeds in determining analytical solutions, accounting for unit effort costs, target values, and contest intensities. Increasing interdependence from some targets to some other targets induce both players to exert higher efforts into the former targets. For 100% interdependent targets, the attacker encounters a substitution effect. In contrast, for independent targets the defender encounters a substitution effect, defending the essential targets. For similarly advantaged players, increased target contest intensities cause higher efforts and lower expected utilities. Both players may withdraw in both 100% interdependent and independent systems. Applying the model to the US economy, we illustrate how interdependence between petroleum r...

Defence and attack of complex interdependent systems

Modeling multi-target defender-attacker games with quantal response attack strategies

Systems under attack-survivability rather than reliability: Concept, results, and applications

System survivability in the context of interdiction networks

In this paper, we develop solutions to the problem of identifying the k most vital cut-sets of a network under limited attacking resources in a network interdiction context. We treat three different versions of the problem, each having a different objective: namely, the highest probability of a successful attack, the least cost attack, and the least expected cost attack combining both success probability and attacking cost. We introduce a budget constraint to reflect the resource limitation of the attacker. We consider both the case of disjoint and non-disjoint cut-sets to target. We develop a simulation-optimization approach accounting for various techniques including the shortest path problem and the min-cut problem. The solution method is found to be very efficient even for large-scale networks. We implement the suggested algorithms for illustration purposes.

/pdf/attack-strategies-on-networks-with-a-budget-constraint-20ndirbx08.pdf

Attack Strategies on Networks With a Budget Constraint

The chapter focuses on treating a particular problem of intelligent threats. We consider a least cost attack in a network-interdiction framework with a single source and a single destination. We suppose that a network is disabled if all links of a full cut set fail. That is, no flow can reach its destination node. We propose an exact solution under a budget constraint accounting for a threshold of success probability of the attack on targeted cut sets. We investigate the efficiency of the suggested solution through some illustrations. We extend the results to the case of networks with multiple sources/destinations.

An Exact Method for Solving a Least-Cost Attack on Networks

The paper investigates the most critical k cut-sets to target in the context of attacks on networks. The targeted network fails if the attack successfully disables a full cut-set. The attack process is dynamic and targets one link at a time. We assume perfect information, so that the attacker picks the next link to target after identifying the outcome of the attack on the previous one. The attack may continue to reach up to k cut-sets. The problem is to identify which cut-sets to target (referred to as the k-critical cut-sets of the network) that maximize the probability of a successful attack. We distinguish both cases of disjoint and non-disjoint cut-sets. We develop an algorithm for each case with illustrations. We explore the large scale of networks and offer guidelines on the corresponding defensive strategies.

M. Naceur Azaiez

Papers

Systems under attack-survivability rather than reliability: Concept, results, and applications

System survivability in the context of interdiction networks

Attack Strategies on Networks With a Budget Constraint

An Exact Method for Solving a Least-Cost Attack on Networks

Optimal k Cut-Sets in Attack/Defense Strategies on Networks