Maarten Pieter Schinkel

Bio: Maarten Pieter Schinkel is an academic researcher from University of Amsterdam. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cartel & Competition (economics). The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 81 publications receiving 777 citations. Previous affiliations of Maarten Pieter Schinkel include VU University Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute.

European antitrust policy 1957–2004 : an analysis of commission decisions

Abstract: This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

European antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions

Abstract: This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe

Abstract: The European Commission has made transparent in a number of recent publications that undertakings that colluded to fix prices or share markets can expect fines based on affected commerce as well as private antitrust damage claims. Research on discovered cartels characterizes modern international cartels in terms of illegal gains, duration of the infringement and success on appeal. This paper offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation into the net effective (expected) liability of a representative modern international cartel. The exercise reveals that the Commission's recent commitments to punish cartels are likely to remain insufficient to deter collusion, unless European cartel enforcement produces a high (perceived) probability of discovery across the board. This calls for broad, unbiased, random and active cartel detection.

On the scope for the european commission's 2006 fining guidelines underthe legal maximum fine

Abstract: By relating antitrust fines explicitly to the value of affected commerce, the 2006 fining guidelines reaffirm the European Commission's commitment to deterring competition law infringement. We show that the legal maximum fine specified in Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 seriously constrains the Commission in reaching this objective, however. The maximum fine will be binding the calculated fine for low ratios of affected EEA commerce over total worldwide turnover. Therefore, there is little scope for the Commission to apply its new fining method effectively.

Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It

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What determines cartel success

Abstract: Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up? We conclude that many cartels do survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry.