Mancur Olson

Bio: Mancur Olson is an academic researcher from University of Maryland, College Park. The author has contributed to research in topics: Public good & Collective action. The author has an hindex of 38, co-authored 93 publications receiving 41997 citations. Previous affiliations of Mancur Olson include United States Air Force Academy & Princeton University.

Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.

Abstract: Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.

The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups

Abstract: Introduction I. A Theory of Groups and Organizations A. The purpose of organization B. Public goods and large groups C. The traditional theory of groups D. Small groups E. "Exclusive" and "inclusive" groups F. A taxonomy of groups II. Group Size and Group Behavior A. The coherence and effectiveness of small groups B. Problems of the traditional theories C. Social incentives and rational behavior III. The Labor Union and Economic Freedom A. Coercion in labor unions B. Labor-union growth in theory and practice C. The closed shop and economic freedom in the latent group D. Government intervention and economic freedom in the latent group IV. Orthodox Theories of State and Class A. The economists' theory of the state B. The Marxian theory of state and class C. The logic of the Marxian theory V. Orthodox Theories of Pressure Groups A. The philosophical view of pressure groups B. Institutional economics and the pressure group--John R. Commons C. Modern theories of pressure groups--Bentley, Truman, Latham D. The logic of group theory VI. The "By-Product" and "Special Interest" Theories A. The "by-product" theory of large pressure groups B. Labor lobbies C. Professional lobbies D. The "special interest" theory and business lobbies E. Government promotion of political pressure F. Farm cooperatives and farm lobbies G. Noneconomic lobbies H. The "forgotten groups"--those who suffer in silence Index

Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches

Abstract: This article synthesizes the large but diverse literature on organizational legitimacy, highlighting similarities and disparities among the leading strategic and institutional approaches. The analysis identifies three primary forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, based on audience self-interest; moral, based on normative approval: and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. The article then examines strategies for gaining, maintaining, and repairing legitimacy of each type, suggesting both the promises and the pitfalls of such instrumental manipulations.

“Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital”

Abstract: After briefly explaining why social capital (civil society) is important to democracy, Putnam devotes the bulk of this chapter to demonstrating social capital’s decline in the United States across the last quarter century. (See Putnam 1995 for a similar but more detailed argument.) While he acknowledges that the significance of a few countertrends is difficult to assess without further study, Putnam concludes that crucial factors such as social trust are eroding rapidly in the United States. He offers some possible explanations for this erosion and concludes by outlining the work needed to consider these possibilities more fully.

Bowling alone, america's declining of social capital

Abstract: http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/assoc/bowling.html 5/28/2012 Copyright © 1995 The National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press. Registered users of a subscribed campus network may download, archive, and print as many copies of this work as desired for use within the subscribed institution as long as this header is not removed -no copies of the below work may be distributed electronically, in whole or in part, outside of your campus network without express permission (permissions@muse.jhu.edu). Contact your institution's library to discuss your rights and responsibilities within Project Muse, or send email to copyright@muse.jhu.edu. The Johns Hopkins University Press is committed to respecting the needs of scholars -return of that respect is requested.

The Theory of Economic Regulation

Abstract: The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries. Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon it. A central thesis of this paper is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit. The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce. The state can seize money by the only method which is permitted by the laws of a civilized society, by taxation. The state can ordain the physical movements of resources and the economic decisions of households and firms without their consent.

Why Do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output Per Worker than Others

Abstract: Output per worker varies enormously across countries. Why? On an accounting basis, our analysis shows that differences in physical capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in output per worker--we find a large amount of variation in the level of the Solow residual across countries. At a deeper level, we document that the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker are driven by differences in institutions and government policies, which we call social infrastructure. We treat social infrastructure as endogenous, determined historically by location and other factors captured in part by language.