Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.

Time and Narrative

basic research and clinical data in an attempt to derive a cohesive model which explains the behavioral effects of the drug. Johnson is an experimental psychologist, and his work underlies many of the chapters which suggest that lithium decreases the behavioral response to novel external stimuli. He then utilizes this foundation to propose a cognitive model for lithium's anti-manic action, its inhibition of violent impulsivity, and its prophylactic effects in recurrent depression. Previous formulations which were clinically based, such as that of Mabel Blake Cohen and her associates, stressed the primacy of depression and noted the \"manic defense\" as an attempt to ward off intolerable depression. In direct contrast, Johnson views mania as the primary disturbance in bipolar disorder. He considers depression in bipolar disease as an over-zealous homeostatic inhibitory responsf to a maniaassociated cognitive overload. Consistent with this, he believes, lit lum exerts its anti-manic effect by decreasing cognitive processing in a manner analogous to his animal studies. Johnson also suggests that lithium exerts its prophylactic effect in recurrent depressions by treating subclinical mania. These concepts are supported by the work of Johnson's associate, Kukopulos, to whom the book is dedicated. The bulk of the research which describes the cognitive disturbance in mania is complex, however, and uncomfortably open to multiple interpretations. Recognized as a preliminary effort, Johnson's formulation may help to guide further research. Although Johnson clearly traces lithium actions through a broad range of subjects, his discussion of the neurophysiological aspects of this drug is notably spotty. In particular, Johnson ignores the work of Svensson, DeMontigny, Aghajanian, and others who suggest that serotonergic systems may play an important role in the antidepressant actions of lithium. As a result, he fails to discuss one of the most important current uses of lithium: as an agent used in conjunction with antidepressant medications to increase treatment response in medication-resistant forms of depression. Lithium augmentation of antidepressant medication also challenges the formulation presented by Johnson. This formulation suggests that lithium should have no therapeutic value in patients, such as those with endogenous depression, who already \"under-process\" cognitive information. The omission of lithium augmentation in depression is clearly unfortunate in this text. Overall, this volume demonstrates the benefits of a single-authored text. It it clearly organized and readable. The bibliography is also broad and useful. In this book, Johnson primarily addresses a research audience, and his model seems designed to stimulate thought rather than to improve clinical technique. In this capacity, his book will be of most interest to behavioral psychologists. Other books, focusing purely on clinical data, may be more useful to clinicians. Nevertheless, the clear organization, the large bibliography, and the thoughtful presentation may make this text a useful addition to a clinical library as well.

The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.

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Cognition In The Wild

Preface Introduction: The Role of the Reader I. Open 1. The Poetics of the Open Work 2. The Semantics of Metaphor 3. On the Possibility of Generating Aesthetic Messages in an Edenic Language II. Closed 4. The Myth of Superman 5. Rhetoric and Ideology in Sue's Les Mysteres de Paris 6. Narrative Structures in Fleming III. Open/Closed 7. Peirce and the Semiotic Foundations of Openness: Signs as Texts and Texts as Signs 8. Lector in Fabula: Pragmatic Strategy in a Metanarrative Text Appendix 1 Appendix 2 Bibliography

The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts

Many claims have been advanced about the effects of specific narrative strategies on readers’ engagement with characters, but the available evidence is still limited. One question in particular stands out in the current debate. Is first-person narrative more or less conducive to empathy and trust for the protagonist than third-person, internally focalized narrative? This essay tackles this question by examining the effect of narrative perspective on readers’ responses to a complex, and potentially unreliable, character. To this end, we conducted an experimental study with 76 Dutch high-school students. Contrary to our predictions, the manipulation of narrative perspective did not affect empathy for the character, but did affect trust. We suggest that the increase in trust in third-person narrative depends on the external narrator’s authority, which validates the perspective of the protagonist. The essay discusses these and other findings, combining experimental research with a qualitative analysis of readers’ comments on the character.

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Difficult empathy the effect of narrative perspective on readers’ engagement with a first-person narrator

Internally focalized passages in narrative often employ metaphors to capture the experiential states of the focalizing character. My investigation of these metaphors – ‘phenomenological metaphors’,...

Phenomenological metaphors in readers' engagement with characters: The case of Ian McEwan's Saturday

Strange Narrators in Contemporary Fiction: Explorations in Readers' Engagement with Characters

/pdf/tell-tale-rhythms-embodiment-and-narrative-discourse-4wja4leon2.pdf

Tell-Tale Rhythms: Embodiment and Narrative Discourse

Introduction In recent years, a surge of interest in what David Herman has called the "nexus of narrative and mind" has swept through narratology and its related disciplines (Basic Elements of Narrative 137-60). Alan Palmer and Lisa Zunshine have published two important monographs (respectively Fictional Minds and Why We Read Fiction), which Herman himself lists under the heading of "Issues of Consciousness Representation" in the entry "Cognitive Narratology" for the de Gruyter Handbook of Narratology. On a broad understanding of the word "consciousness," Herman's label is perfectly fitting. However, if we run a quick search for the word "representation" in Palmer's and Zunshine's books, we find out that it is almost never used in tandem with "consciousness." What Palmer and Zunshine focus on is the reader's attribution of mental states to the characters; they do not seem to devote special attention to consciousness proper. To clarify, l would like to introduce David Chalmers's distinction between "two concepts of mind." One may want to explore the mind's role in influencing behavior, and admit the existence of mental states only in so much as they can cause people's actions. Alternatively, one may focus on the subjective quality of our experience. One who takes the former approach is a devotee of functionalism, and his or her object of study is what Chalmers calls "the psychological mind." The latter is interested in "the conscious mind" or, simply put, in consciousness or subjective experience (I will use these terms interchangeably). My feeling is that both Palmer and Zunshine devote most of their books to the psychological mind (Palmer, in Fictional Minds 87-91, for instance, openly declares his allegiance to functionalism), leaving the issue of fictional consciousnesses unsolved. In John Searle's words, consciousness is "an inner, first-person, qualitative phenomenon"; it "refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or die or otherwise become 'unconscious'" (5). Philosophers of mind love to talk about zombies--beings identical to us from a functionalist viewpoint, but which (unlike us) have no subjective experience. Just as functionalism has led to important scientific discoveries, defining fictional characters in functionalist terms has yielded deep insights, well exemplified by Palmer's and Zunshine's books. And yet, it is important to remind ourselves that readers do not just attribute mental states to fictional characters--they attribute to them mental states with a qualitative aspect. In short, they attribute to them a consciousness. This is the angle from which I will approach fictional characters in this article. Although I will not address the issue of focalization directly, I intend my article to have a bearing on the widespread belief that, in internal focalization, readers experience the fictional world through the consciousness of a character. I will argue that we should not view characters' consciousnesses as "things in the text." Readers can enact a fictional consciousness, they can perform it on the basis of textual cues--but this phenomenon, which I will call consciousness-enactment, cannot be simply identified with internal focalization. Not all internally localized texts induce the reader to enact the character's consciousness. What does it mean that we should not view characters' consciousnesses as "things in the text"? It means that a consciousness (be it fictional or not) cannot be represented--and this is my chief complaint against Herman's section heading ("Issues of Consciousness Representation"). Drawing on the work of philosophers of the "enactivist" stripe such as Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe, and (in particular) Daniel D. Hutto, I would like to show that consciousness and subjective experience resist capture in representationalist terms. This will be my task in section I. …

Marco Caracciolo

Papers

Difficult empathy the effect of narrative perspective on readers’ engagement with a first-person narrator

Phenomenological metaphors in readers' engagement with characters: The case of Ian McEwan's Saturday

Strange Narrators in Contemporary Fiction: Explorations in Readers' Engagement with Characters

Tell-Tale Rhythms: Embodiment and Narrative Discourse

Fictional Consciousnesses: A Reader's Manual