Marianne Bertrand

Bio: Marianne Bertrand is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Wage & Earnings. The author has an hindex of 63, co-authored 165 publications receiving 37087 citations. Previous affiliations of Marianne Bertrand include Economic Policy Institute & National Bureau of Economic Research.

How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?

Abstract: Most papers that employ Differences-in-Differences estimation (DD) use many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes but ignore that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its “effect” as well as the standard error of this estimate. These conventional DD standard errors severely understate the standard deviation of the estimators: we find an “effect” significant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo interventions. We use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how well existing methods help solve this problem. Econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form on the time-series process do not perform well. Bootstrap (taking into account the autocorrelation of the data) works well when the number of states is large enough. Two corrections based on asymptotic approximation of the variance-covariance matrix work well for moderate numbers of states and one correction that collapses the time series information into a “pre”- and “post”-period and explicitly takes into account the effective sample size works well even for small numbers of states.

Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

Abstract: This paper investigates whether and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. We construct a manager-e rm matched panel data set which enables us to track the top managers across different e rms over time. We e nd that manager e xed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. A signie cant extent of the heterogeneity in investment, e nancial, and organizational practices of e rms can be explained by the presence of manager e xed effects. We identify specie c patterns in managerial decision-making that appear to indicate general differences in “ style” across managers. Moreover, we show that management style is signie cantly related to manager e xed effects in performance and that managers with higher performance e xed effects receive higher compensation and are more likely to be found in better governed e rms. In a e nal step, we tie back these e ndings to observable managerial characteristics. We e nd that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear on average to be more conservative; on the other hand, managers who hold an MBA degree seem to follow on average more aggressive strategies.

Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination

Abstract: We study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. To manipulate perceived race, resumes are randomly assigned African-American- or White-sounding names. White names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews. Callbacks are also more responsive to resume quality for White names than for African-American ones. The racial gap is uniform across occupation, industry, and employer size. We also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names. Differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the U.S. labor market. (JEL J71, J64).

Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences

Abstract: Much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders’ interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant‐level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws. We find that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages (especially those of white‐collar workers) rise. The destruction of old plants falls, but the creation of new plants also falls. Finally, overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws. Our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life.

Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are

Abstract: The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to luck, where luck is defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the CEO's control. Using several measures of luck, we find that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar. A skimming model, where the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, is consistent with this fact. Because some complications to the contracting view could also generate pay for luck, we test for skimming directly by examining the effect of governance. Consistent with skimming, we find that better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck.

Econometric Analysis of Panel Data

Abstract: Preface.1. Introduction.1.1 Panel Data: Some Examples.1.2 Why Should We Use Panel Data? Their Benefits and Limitations.Note.2. The One-way Error Component Regression Model.2.1 Introduction.2.2 The Fixed Effects Model.2.3 The Random Effects Model.2.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation.2.5 Prediction.2.6 Examples.2.7 Selected Applications.2.8 Computational Note.Notes.Problems.3. The Two-way Error Component Regression Model.3.1 Introduction.3.2 The Fixed Effects Model.3.3 The Random Effects Model.3.4 Maximum Likelihood Estimation.3.5 Prediction.3.6 Examples.3.7 Selected Applications.Notes.Problems.4. Test of Hypotheses with Panel Data.4.1 Tests for Poolability of the Data.4.2 Tests for Individual and Time Effects.4.3 Hausman's Specification Test.4.4 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.5. Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation in the Error Component Model.5.1 Heteroskedasticity.5.2 Serial Correlation.Notes.Problems.6. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions with Error Components.6.1 The One-way Model.6.2 The Two-way Model.6.3 Applications and Extensions.Problems.7. Simultaneous Equations with Error Components.7.1 Single Equation Estimation.7.2 Empirical Example: Crime in North Carolina.7.3 System Estimation.7.4 The Hausman and Taylor Estimator.7.5 Empirical Example: Earnings Equation Using PSID Data.7.6 Extensions.Notes.Problems.8. Dynamic Panel Data Models.8.1 Introduction.8.2 The Arellano and Bond Estimator.8.3 The Arellano and Bover Estimator.8.4 The Ahn and Schmidt Moment Conditions.8.5 The Blundell and Bond System GMM Estimator.8.6 The Keane and Runkle Estimator.8.7 Further Developments.8.8 Empirical Example: Dynamic Demand for Cigarettes.8.9 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.9. Unbalanced Panel Data Models.9.1 Introduction.9.2 The Unbalanced One-way Error Component Model.9.3 Empirical Example: Hedonic Housing.9.4 The Unbalanced Two-way Error Component Model.9.5 Testing for Individual and Time Effects Using Unbalanced Panel Data.9.6 The Unbalanced Nested Error Component Model.Notes.Problems.10. Special Topics.10.1 Measurement Error and Panel Data.10.2 Rotating Panels.10.3 Pseudo-panels.10.4 Alternative Methods of Pooling Time Series of Cross-section Data.10.5 Spatial Panels.10.6 Short-run vs Long-run Estimates in Pooled Models.10.7 Heterogeneous Panels.Notes.Problems.11. Limited Dependent Variables and Panel Data.11.1 Fixed and Random Logit and Probit Models.11.2 Simulation Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with Panel Data.11.3 Dynamic Panel Data Limited Dependent Variable Models.11.4 Selection Bias in Panel Data.11.5 Censored and Truncated Panel Data Models.11.6 Empirical Applications.11.7 Empirical Example: Nurses' Labor Supply.11.8 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.12. Nonstationary Panels.12.1 Introduction.12.2 Panel Unit Roots Tests Assuming Cross-sectional Independence.12.3 Panel Unit Roots Tests Allowing for Cross-sectional Dependence.12.4 Spurious Regression in Panel Data.12.5 Panel Cointegration Tests.12.6 Estimation and Inference in Panel Cointegration Models.12.7 Empirical Example: Purchasing Power Parity.12.8 Further Reading.Notes.Problems.References.Index.

Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches

Abstract: In both corporate finance and asset pricing empirical work, researchers are often confronted with panel data. In these data sets, the residuals may be correlated across firms and across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased. Historically, the two literatures have used different solutions to this problem. Corporate finance has relied on clustered standard errors, while asset pricing has used the Fama-MacBeth procedure to estimate standard errors. This paper examines the different methods used in the literature and explains when the different methods yield the same (and correct) standard errors and when they diverge. The intent is to provide intuition as to why the different approaches sometimes give different answers and give researchers guidance for their use.

Gender Differences in Preferences

Abstract: This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

A Treatise on the Family

Abstract: A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …