Marius Schwartz

TL;DR: This paper showed that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third-degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large, and that mixed systems, permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets, yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors assume that firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants, who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry, leading perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries.

TL;DR: This is a report on a major rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, entitled “Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets” (FCC 03-113), which was published in the Federal Register as a final rule on November 25, 2003.

Abstract: In a recent paper, Comanor and Frech (1985, "CF") claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price The two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing CF also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong CF's analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality Doing so within CF's model, I reach opposite conclusions Exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers Relative to nonexclusive dealing, price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other Moreover, exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak