scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Author

Marius Schwartz

Bio: Marius Schwartz is an academic researcher from Georgetown University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Price discrimination & Oligopoly. The author has an hindex of 18, co-authored 50 publications receiving 1455 citations. Previous affiliations of Marius Schwartz include United States Department of Justice & University of Washington.


Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper showed that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third-degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large, and that mixed systems, permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets, yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing.

275 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assume that firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants, who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry, leading perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries.
Abstract: This paper assumes that incumbent firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants, who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry. The main theoretical result is that such divisionalization ability leads perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries. In contrast, existing models of entry deterrence imply that informed incumbents, even those with steadily decreasing average costs, will often allow rational entry. Our result may explain why successful, large-scale entry by firms with no informational advantage is extremely rare. The use of divisions to preempt entry may also explain why large firms in high-profit oligopolies often divisionalize, allowing their divisions to compete freely despite the negative pecuniary externality that each division imposes on others.

105 citations

01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This is a report on a major rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission, entitled “Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets” (FCC 03-113), which was published in the Federal Register as a final rule on November 25, 2003.
Abstract: Pursuant to section 801(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, this is our report on a major rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), entitled “Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets” (FCC 03-113). We received the rule on December 4, 2003. It was published in the Federal Register as a final rule on November 25, 2003. 68 Fed. Reg. 66252.

98 citations

Posted Content
Abstract: In a recent paper, Comanor and Frech (1985, "CF") claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price The two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing CF also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong CF's analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality Doing so within CF's model, I reach opposite conclusions Exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers Relative to nonexclusive dealing, price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other Moreover, exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak

90 citations


Cited by
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and present new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.
Abstract: The paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets and presents new results. It identifies two-sided markets with markets in which the structure, and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters. The failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two-sidedness. The paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities, that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality, and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end-users.

2,524 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: A transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th Meeting of the American Economic Association on December 29, 1981 can be found in this article, where the authors discuss developments in the theory of industry structure; welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior; Characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium; Intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry.
Abstract: Presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th Meeting of the American Economic Association on December 29, 1981. Discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure; Welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior; Characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium; Intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry. (Из Ebsco)

1,585 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly and found general conditions under which such mergers raise price, and showed that any merger not creating synergies raises price.
Abstract: The authors analyze horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly. They find general conditions under which such mergers raise price, and show that any merger not creating synergies raises price. The authors develop a procedure for analyzing the effect of a merger on rivals and consumers and, thus, provide sufficient conditions for profitable mergers to raise welfare. They show that traditional merger analysis can be misleading in its use of the Herfindahl Index. Their analysis stresses the output responses of large firms not participating in the merger. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

1,154 citations