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Mark J. Roe
Researcher at Harvard University
Publications - 126
Citations - 9947
Mark J. Roe is an academic researcher from Harvard University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Corporate law. The author has an hindex of 44, co-authored 126 publications receiving 9689 citations. Previous affiliations of Mark J. Roe include University of Michigan & Columbia University.
Papers
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MonographDOI
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
TL;DR: Roe as discussed by the authors argues that the ownership structure of large US firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology, and argues that lasting change will be difficult to achieve without understanding how political and social forces created and shaped the modern American corporation.
Book ChapterDOI
A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
Lucian Arye Bebchuk,Mark J. Roe +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a theory of path dependence of corporate structure and found that the corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time depend in part on those that it had at earlier times.
Posted Content
Strong Managers, Weak Owners:The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
TL;DR: In a broad-based democracy, not all contracts will survive as discussed by the authors, if enough people dislike them, and if the average voter dislikes powerful private financial institutions, politics will, all else being equal, ban them.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance.
Annette B. Poulsen,Mark J. Roe +1 more
TL;DR: In a broad-based democracy, not all contracts will survive as mentioned in this paper, if enough people dislike them, and if the average voter dislikes powerful private financial institutions, politics will, all else being equal, ban them.
Book
Political Determinants of Corporate Governance
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the large firm's ownership structure is too often analyzed as one arising solely from organizational imperatives and technical foundations, and that the ways in which some polities settle conflict - or the way in which the corporate players team up to work together - can affect the degree to which managers ally with shareholders and concomitantly, how easy it is for ownership and control to separate.