Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism

Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist

Series Editor's Preface. Introduction by John Breuilly. Acknowledgements. 1. Definitions. State and nation. The nation. 2. Culture in Agrarian Society. Power and culture in the agro-literature society. The varieties of agrarian rulers. 3. Industrial Society. The society of perpetual growth. Social genetics. The age of universal high culture. 4. The Transition to an Age of Nationalism. A note on the weakness of nationalism. Wild and garden culture. 5. What is a Nation. The course of true nationalism never did run smooth. 6. Social Entropy and Equality in Industrial Society. Obstacles to entropy. Fissures and barriers. A diversity of focus. 7. A Typology of Nationalisms. The varieties of nationalist experience. Diaspora nationalism. 8. The Future of Nationalism. Industrial culture - one or many?. 9. Nationalism and Ideology. Who is for Nuremberg?. One nation, one state. 10. Conclusion. What is not being said. Summary. Select bibliography. Bilbliography of Ernest Gellner's writing: Ian Jarvie. Index

Nations and Nationalism

Climate change, human security and violent conflict

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, by Olivier Roy. New York: Columbia University Press, in association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2004. xi + 340 pages. Index to p. 349. $29.50. Olivier Roy devotes much of Globalized Islam to the distinction between what he calls "Islamism" and "neofundamentalism." He argues that Islamist movements tend to seek power in specific countries and have become increasingly nationalistic. Neofundamentalist movements, on the other hand, tend to focus on the Islamic world as a whole and do not concentrate on achieving power. According to Roy, neofundamentalists usually favor da'wa, or preaching, over jihad. "For neofundamentalists the aim of action is salvation, not revolution" (p. 248). Even when neofundamentalists do engage in jihad, they still shun "political action" (p. 250). Yet, Roy's list of "neofundamentalist" movements includes al-Qa'ida as well as the Tablighi Jama'a (p. 234). It is hard to see how anyone could argue that al-Qa'ida is more interested in salvation than revolution or that its acts of violence are not political. Roy is a knowledgeable and insightful scholar, and he makes many important points. He rightly stresses that Islam often serves primarily as a marker of national and/ or ethnic identity rather than as a political program. He rightly criticizes those who think that the behavior of Muslims today can simply be explained by examining verses of the Qur'an. And he correctly emphasizes that al-Qa'ida has an anti-imperialist dimension that should not be ignored (although this is hard to reconcile with his characterization of al-Qa'ida as an apolitical neofundamentalist movement). At the same time, however, Roy makes many sweeping generalizations that are simply inaccurate. He claims that "Bin Laden only paid lip-service to Palestine till the end of 2001" (p. 3). This is a common assertion. It is also an erroneous one. In a 1994 letter to Sheikh 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Baz, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden wrote: "The Shar'i obligation regarding Palestine and our Palestinian brothers, [who are] among the helpless oppressed men, women, and children, is jihad in the path of God and inciting the Umma to jihad to liberate all of Palestine and return it to Islamic rule." Much of this letter is devoted to rejecting the very idea of a peace agreement with Israel. (The Arabic text of the letter is available online at http://www.alwahabiya.org/articles/binladen_to_binbaz.htm) Roy asserts that "popular mobilisation in the Middle East centres around nationalism...not around Islam" (p. 51). Similarly, he contends that "Osama Bin Laden did not grasp that the genuine antiAmericanism of the 'average' Arab had never led to a sustainable political mobilisation, and that if such mobilisation ever did happen it would be over Palestine and Iraq that is, over Arab and not Islamic issues" (p. 56). It is true that groups like Hamas and the main movements fighting the American-led occupation of Iraq have a nationalist dimension, and this is an important point. …

Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah

Examining onsets of political instability in countries worldwide from 1955 to 2003, we develop a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/ autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the Polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions,properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability.

A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability

Examining onsets of political instability in countries worldwide from 1955 to 2003, we develop a model that distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereas regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocracy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear five-category measure of regime type based on the Polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instability.

/pdf/a-global-model-for-forecasting-political-instability-36zu6tynx5.pdf

Essentially a critique of Geertz's Religion of Java, which claimed that Islam has never really taken hold in Java except among a small community of merchants. Argues that Islam is the predominant force in the religious beliefs and rites of central Javanese, and that it shapes the character of social interaction and daily life in all segments of Javanese society. T his penetration was achieved so quickly and completely because Islam was embraced by the royal courts as the basis for a theocractic state. Sufism forms the core of the state cult and the theory of kingship, with religious discord based on the age-old Islamic question of how to balance the legalistic and mystical dimensions of the tradition. T he chapters examine: texts and ethnography, Java and the Islamic tradition, Sufism, royal and village religion, the F Search by expertise, name or affiliation B Language English (US) Title of host publication Islam in Java Subtitle of host publication normative piety and mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta Publisher University of Arizona Press, T ucson; Association for Asian Studies Monograph, 45 ISBN (Print) 0816511039, 9780816511037 State Published Jan 1 1989 Externally published Yes

Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta

1. Religion, Culture and Nationality 2. The Javanese Dukun: Healing and Moral Authority 3. The Slametan: Textual Knowledge and Ritual Performance in Yogyakarta 4. Order and Meaning in the Yogyakarta Kraton 5. The Garebeg Malud: Veneration of the Prophet as Imperial Ritual 6. The Fast of Ramadan in Yogyakarta 7. The Kraton Revolution: Religion, Culture, Regime Change and Democracy in Yogyakarta

Java, Indonesia and Islam

This is the first English-language book on Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation & also one of its least studied. This book seeks to explain key aspects of its behaviour & ideology & its relationship with the state & other internal power structures along with attitudes to change & modernisation & adds scholarship to area.

Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Edited by Greg Barton and Greg Fealy. Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996. xvii, 293 pp.

Mark Woodward

Papers

A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability

A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability

Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta

Java, Indonesia and Islam

Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia. Edited by Greg Barton and Greg Fealy. Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996. xvii, 293 pp.