Martha Craven Nussbaum

Abstract: Acknowledgments Preface Introduction Feminism and international development 1. In defense of universal values 2. Adaptive preferences and women's options 3. The role of religion 4. Love, care, and dignity.

Abstract: This book addresses issues of defining and measuring the quality of life. Recent developments in the philosophical definition of well-being are discussed and linked to practical issues such as the delivery of health care, and the assessment of women's quality of life. Leading philosophers and economists have contributed to this volume to consider the problems the subject raises. This volume reflects the growing need for interdisciplinary work as economists become more sensitive to the importance of facing fundamental philosophical questions and of the importance of linking their theoretical enquiries to an understanding of complex practical problems. Contributors: E. Allardt, J. Annas, C. Bliss, S. Bok, D. Brock, G. A. Cohen, R. Erikson, W. Gaertner, J. Griffin, S. Hurley, C. M. Korsgaard, L. Kruger, M. C. Nussbaum, O. O'Neill, S. Osmani, D. Parfit, H. Putnam, R. A. Putnam, J. Roemer, T. Scanlon, P. Seabright, A. Sen, C. Taylor, M. Valdes, B. M. S. van Praag, M. Walzer, B.-C. Ysander

Abstract: If a country's Gross Domestic Product increases each year, but so does the percentage of its people deprived of basic education, health care, and other opportunities, is that country really making progress? If we rely on conventional economic indicators, can we ever grasp how the world's billions of individuals are really managing? In this powerful critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect. For the past twenty-five years, Nussbaum has been working on an alternate model to assess human development: the Capabilities Approach. She and her colleagues begin with the simplest of questions: What is each person actually able to do and to be? What real opportunities are available to them? The Capabilities Approach to human progress has until now been expounded only in specialized works. Creating Capabilities, however, affords anyone interested in issues of human development a wonderfully lucid account of the structure and practical implications of an alternate model. It demonstrates a path to justice for both humans and nonhumans, weighs its relevance against other philosophical stances, and reveals the value of its universal guidelines even as it acknowledges cultural difference. In our era of unjustifiable inequity, Nussbaum shows how--by attending to the narratives of individuals and grasping the daily impact of policy--we can enable people everywhere to live full and creative lives.

Abstract: Part I. Need and Recognition: 1. Emotions as judgments of value 2. Humans and other animals: the neo-stoic view revised 3. Emotions and human societies 4. Emotions and infancy Interlude: 'things such as might happen' 5. Music and emotion Part II. Compassion: 6. Tragic predicaments 7. Compassion: the philosophical debate 8. Compassion and public life Part III. Ascents of Love: 9. Ladders of love: an introduction 10. Contemplative creativity: Plato, Spinoza, Proust 11. The Christian ascent: Augustine 12. The Christian ascent: Dante 13. The Romantic ascent: Emily Bronte 14. The Romantic ascent: Mahler 15. Democratic desire: Walt Whitman 16. The transfiguration of everyday life: Joyce.

Abstract: Amartya Sen has made a major contribution to the theory of social justice, and of gender justice, by arguing that capabilities are the relevant space of comparison when justice-related issues are considered. This article supports Sen's idea, arguing that capabilities supply guidance superior to that of utility and resources (the view's familiar opponents), but also to that of the social contract tradition, and at least some accounts of human rights. But I argue that capabilities can help us to construct a normative conception of social justice, with critical potential for gender issues, only if we specify a definite set of capabilities as the most important ones to protect. Sen's "perspective of freedom" is too vague. Some freedoms limit others; some freedoms are important, some trivial, some good, and some positively bad. Before the approach can offer a valuable normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance.

Abstract: Companies are increasingly asked to provide innovative solutions to deep-seated problems of human misery, even as economic theory instructs managers to focus on maximizing their shareholders' wealt

Abstract: As GDP is a measure of market capacity and not economic well-being, this report has been commissioned to more accurately understand the social progress indicators of any given state. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most widely used measure of economic activity. There are international standards for its calculation, and much thought has gone into its statistical and conceptual bases. But GDP mainly measures market production, though it has often been treated as if it were a measure of economic well-being. Conflating the two can lead to misleading indications about how well-off people are and entail the wrong policy decisions. One reason why money measures of economic performance and living standards have come to play such an important role in our societies is that the monetary valuation of goods and services makes it easy to add up quantities of a very different nature. When we know the prices of apple juice and DVD players, we can add up their values and make statements about production and consumption in a single figure. But market prices are more than an accounting device. Economic theory tells us that when markets are functioning properly, the ratio of one market price to another is reflective of the relative appreciation of the two products by those who purchase them. Moreover, GDP captures all final goods in the economy, whether they are consumed by households, firms or government. Valuing them with their prices would thus seem to be a good way of capturing, in a single number, how well-off society is at a particular moment. Furthermore, keeping prices unchanged while observing how quantities of goods and services that enter GDP move over time would seem like a reasonable way of making a statement about how society’s living standards are evolving in real terms. As it turns out, things are more complicated. First, prices may not exist for some goods and services (if for instance government provides free health insurance or if households are engaged in child care), raising the question of how these services should be valued. Second, even where there are market prices, they may deviate from society’s underlying valuation. In particular, when the consumption or production of particular products affects society as a whole, the price that individuals pay for those products will differ from their value to society at large. Environmental damage caused by production or consumption activities that is not reflected in market prices is a well-known example.

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

Abstract: Part 1. Interdisciplinary Foundations. R.C. Solomon, The Philosophy of Emotions. P.N. Stearns, History of Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact. J.E. Stets, J.H. Turner, The Sociology of Emotions. J. Panksepp, The Affective Brain and Core Consciousness: How Does Neural Activity Generate Emotional Feelings? N.H. Frijda, The Psychologist's Point of View. L.S. Greenberg, The Clinical Application of Emotion in Psychotherapy. P.N. Johnson-Laird, K. Oatley, Emotions, Music, and Literature. J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, The Evolutionary Psychology of the Emotions and Their Relationship to Internal Regulatory Variables. R. Loewenstein, G. Loewenstein, The Role of Emotion in Economic Behavior. Part 2. Biological and Neurophysiological Approaches to Emotion. J.E. LeDoux, E.A. Phelps, Emotional Networks in the Brain. J.T. Larsen, G.G. Berntson, K.M. Poehlmann, T.A. Ito, J.T. Cacioppo, The Psychophysiology of Emotion. J. Bachorowski, M.J. Owren, Vocal Expressions of Emotion. D. Matsumoto, D. Keltner, M.N. Shiota, M. O'Sullivan, M. Frank, Facial Expressions of Emotion. J.M. Haviland-Jones, P.J. Wilson, A "Nose" for Emotion: Emotional Information and Challenges in Odors and Semiochemicals. T.D. Wager, L. Feldman Barrett, E. Bliss-Moreau, K. Lindquist, S. Duncan, H. Kober, J. Joseph, M. Davidson, J. Mize, The Neuroimaging of Emotion. A.D. Craig, Interoception and Emotion: A Neuroanatomical Perspective. Part 3. Developmental Changes. L.A. Camras, S.S. Fatani, The Development of Facial Expressions: Current Perspectives on Infant Emotions. M. Lewis, The Emergence of Human Emotions. P.L. Harris, Children's Understanding of Emotion. C. Saarni, The Interface of Emotional Development with Social Context. S.C. Widen, J.A. Russell, Young Children's Understanding of Others' Emotions. A.S. Walker-Andrews, Intermodal Emotional Processes in Infancy. C. Magai, Long-Lived Emotions: A Lifecourse Perspective on Emotional Development. Part 4. Social Perspectives. L.R. Brody, J.A. Hall, Gender and Emotion in Context. R.A. Shweder, J. Haidt, R. Horton, C. Joseph, The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions: Ancient and Renewed. E.R. Smith, D.M. Mackie, Intergroup Emotions. M.L. Hoffman, Empathy and Prosocial Behavior. A.H. Fischer, A.S.R. Manstead, Social Functions of Emotion. Part 5. Personality Issues. R.E. Lucas, E. Diener, Subjective Well-Being. J.E. Bates, J.A. Goodnight, J.E. Fite, Temperament and Emotion. J.J. Gross, Emotion Regulation. K.A. Lindquist, L. Feldman Barrett, Emotional Complexity. Part 6. Cognitive Factors. P. Salovey, B.T. Detweiler-Bedell, J.B. Detweiler-Bedell, J.D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence. A.M. Isen, Some Ways in which Positive Affect Influences Decision Making and Problem Solving. N.L. Stein, M.W. Hernandez, T. Trabasso, Advances in Modeling Emotion and Thought: The Importance of Development, On-Line and Multilevel Analyses. P.M. Niedenthal, Emotion Concepts. E.A. Kensinger, D.L. Schacter, Memory and Emotion. M. Minsky, A Framework for Representing Emotional States. G.L. Clore, A. Ortony, Appraisal Theories: How Cognition Shapes Affect into Emotion. Part 7. Health and Emotions. M.A. Diefenbach, S.M. Miller, M. Porter, E. Peters, M. Stefanek, H. Leventhal, Emotions and Health Behavior: A Self-Regulation Perspective. M.E. Kemeny, A. Shestyuk, Emotions, the Neuroendocrine and Immune Systems, and Health. N.S. Consedine, Emotions and Health. A.M. Kring, Emotion Disturbances as Transdiagnostic Processes in Psychopathology. Part 8. Select Emotions. A. Ohman, Fear and Anxiety: Overlaps and Dissociations. E.A. Lemerise, K.A. Dodge, The Development of Anger and Hostile Interactions. M. Lewis, Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt. P. Rozin, J. Haidt, C.R. McCauley, Disgust. B.L. Fredrickson, M.A. Cohn, Positive Emotions. G.A. Bonanno, L. Goorin, K.G. Coifman, Sadness and Grief.

Abstract: This article aims (1) to analytically disaggregate agency into its several component elements (though these are interrelated empirically), (2) to demonstrate the ways in which these agentic dimensions interpenetrate with forms of structure, and (3) to point out the implications of such a conception of agency for empirical research. The authors conceptualize agency as a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its “iterational” or habitual aspect) but also oriented toward the future (as a “projective” capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a “practical‐evaluative” capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).