What makes us modern? This is a classic question in philosophy as well as in political science. However it is often raised without including science and technology in its definition. The argument of this book is that we are modern as long as we split our political process in two - between politics proper, and science and technology. This division allows the formidable expansion of the Western empires. However it has become more and more difficult to maintain this distance between science and politics. Hence the postmodern predicament - the feeling that the modern stance is no longer acceptable but that there is no alternative. The solution, advances one of France's leading sociologists of science, is to realize that we have never been modern to begin with. The comparative anthropology this text provides reintroduces science to the fabric of daily life and aims to make us compatible both with our past and with other cultures wrongly called pre-modern.

We Have Never Been Modern

Introduction Part I. The Logic of Sovereignty: 1. The paradox of sovereignty 2. 'Nomos Basileus' 3. Potentiality and law 4. Form of law Threshold Part II. Homo Sacer: 1. Homo sacer 2. The ambivalence of the sacred 3. Sacred life 4. 'Vitae Necisque Potestas' 5. Sovereign body and sacred body 6. The ban and the wolf Threshold Part III. The Camp as Biopolitical Paradigm of the Modern: 1. The politicization of life 2. Biopolitics and the rights of man 3. Life that does not deserve to live 4. 'Politics, or giving form to the life of a people' 5. VP 6. Politicizing death 7. The camp as the 'Nomos' of the modern Threshold Bibliography Index of names.

Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life

This article discusses the conduct and evaluatoin of interpretive research in information systems. While the conventions for evaluating information systems case studies conducted according to the natural science model of social science are now widely accepted, this is not the case for interpretive field studies. A set of principles for the conduct and evaluation of interpretive field research in information systems is proposed, along with their philosophical rationale. The usefulness of the principles is illustrated by evaluating three published interpretive field studies drawn from the IS research literature. The intention of the paper is to further reflect and debate on the important subject of grounding interpretive research methodology.

A set of principles for conducting and evaluating interpretive field studies in information systems

The aim of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is to explore in detail how participants are making sense of their personal and social world, and the main currency for an IPA study is the meanings particular experiences, events, states hold for participants. The approach is phenomenological (see Chapter 3) in that it involves detailed examination of the participant’s lifeworld; it attempts to explore personal experience and is concerned with an individual’s personal perception or account of an object or event, as opposed to an attempt to produce an objective statement of the object or event itself. At the same time, IPA also emphasizes that the research exercise is a dynamic process with an active role for the researcher in that process. One is trying to get close to the participant’s personal world, to take, in Conrad’s (1987) words, an ‘insider’s perspective’, but one cannot do this directly or completely. Access depends on, and is complicated by, the researcher’s own conceptions; indeed, these are required in order to make sense of that other personal world through a process of interpretative activity. Thus, a two-stage interpretation process, or a double hermeneutic, is involved. The participants are trying to make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world. IPA is therefore intellectually connected to hermeneutics and theories of interpretation (Packer and Addison, 1989; Palmer, 1969; Smith, in press; see also Chapter 2 this volume). Different interpretative stances are possible, and IPA combines an empathic hermeneutics with a questioning hermeneutics. Thus, consistent with its phenomenological origins, IPA is concerned with trying to understand what it is like, from the point of view of the participants, to take their side. At the same time, a detailed IPA analysis can also involve asking critical questions of the texts from participants, such as the following: What is the person trying to achieve here? Is something leaking out here that wasn’t intended? Do I have a sense of something going on here that maybe the participants themselves are less aware of?

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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denega­ tions, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. ... In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel­ lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the tran­ scendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial

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Can the Subaltern Speak

ESTE SEMINARIO intentaba iniciar un diálogo con Hegel. El diálo­ go con un pensado pensador puede tratar sólo del asunto [Sache] del pensar. Según la determinación dada, \"asunto'' mienta el caso en litigio, lo que se halla en litigio, lo único que para el pensar es el caso que le concierne. Sin emba11go, la disputa sobre esto en liti­ gio no es el pensar el que la abra por afán de nimiedades. El asunto del pensar es lo en sí en litigio de una disputa. Nuestra palabra disputa [Streit] (a. a. a. strit) no mienta precisamente la discordia, sino el apremio. El asunto del pensar apremia al pensar de tal modo que· lo lleva ante todo a su asunto y ele allí lo trae hacia sí mismo. El asunto del pensar es para Hegel: El pensar en cuanto tal. Para no malentender esta circunscripción del asunto, a saber, el pensar en cuanto tal, como algo psicológico o como algo propio de la teoría del conocimiento, debemos agregar a modo de acla­ ración: El pensar en cuanto tal -en la plenitud desarrollada de la pensabilidad de lo pensado. Lo que aquí se denomina pensabili­ dad de lo pensado podemos comprenderlo únicamente a partir de Kant, desde la esencia de lo trascendental, que Hegel, sin embar­ go, piensa absolutamente, lo que para él quiere decir, especula­ tivamente. A ello apunta Hegel cuando dice sobre el pensar del pensar en cuanto tal que se ha desarrollado \"puro en el elemento del pensar\" (Ene., Introducción, § 14). Designado con un título conciso, pero que muy difícilmente puede ser concebido de ma­ nera adecuada, lo anterior significa: El asunto del pensar es para Hegel \"el pensamiento\". Mas éste es, desplegado hacia su más alta libertad esencial, \"la Idea absoluta\". De ella dice Hegel ha­ cia el final de la \"Ciencia de la Lógica\" (Ed. Lass. T. u, 484) : \"sólo la Idea absoluta es Ser, vida imperecedera, verdad que se sabe a sí misma, y es toda verdad\". Así pues, Hegel mismo y de modo expreso, da al asunto de su pensar aquel nombre que está sobre el asunto todo del pensar occidental, el nombre: Ser. (En el Seminario fue discutido el uso múltiple y sin embargo unitario de la palabra \"Ser\". Ser significa para Hegel en primer lugar, pero de ningún modo únicamente, la \"inmediatez indeter-

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La constitución onto-teo-lógica de la metafísica.

Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen

Llegaremos a aquello que quiere decir pensar si nosotros, por nuestra parte, pensamos. Para que este intento tenga exito tenemos que estar preparados para aprender el pensar. Asi que nos ponemos a aprender, ya estamos admitiendo que aun no somos capaces de pensar. Pero el hombre pasa por ser aquel ser que puede pensar. Y pasa por esto a justo titulo. Porque el hombre es el ser viviente racional. Pero la razon, la ratio, se despliega en el pensar. Como ser viviente racional, el hombre tiene que poder pensar cuando quiera. Pero tal vez el hombre quiere pensar y no puede. En ultima instancia, con este querer pensar el hombre quiere demasiado y por ello puede demasiado poco.

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Martin Heidegger

Papers

La constitución onto-teo-lógica de la metafísica.

Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen

Qué quiere decir pensar

Interprétation de la deuxième considération intempestive de Nietzsche

El concepto del tiempo