Matthew Levitt

Bio: Matthew Levitt is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Competition law & Enforcement. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 2 citations.

Towards an optimal enforcement of competition rules in Europe: Time for a Review of Regulation 1/2003?

Abstract: The Fifth annual conference of the Global Competition Law Centre, held in Brussels on 11-12 June 2009, was dedicated to the Commission's review of EC Regulation 1/2003. These contributions are the…

Member States’ Interest in the Enforcement of EU Competition Law

Abstract: The decentralisation of the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU under Regulation 1/2003 altered not only its institutional setup by delegating enforcement responsibilities to national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts, but also the possibilities for Member States to implement their respective national competition policies and the domestic interest considerations embedded therein. In the multilevel governance framework established by Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement of EU competition law takes place exposed to the national political, institutional and procedural context. In particular, national laws and legal and administrative practices, which bind NCAs and national courts, directly influence the application of Articles 101 and 102 in the national territory. This chapter examines examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact of re-nationalising EU competition law and policy.

Outlook: Discussion of Reform Proposals

Abstract: So far, the present study has argued that most of the criticism that is levelled at the Commission’s use of commitment decisions is not justified. In the view defended here, the recourse to the Article 9 instead of the Article 7 procedure entails only a modest relaxation of the link between harm and remedy and of the procedural safeguards; it entails also only a modest negative impact on legal certainty. It is submitted that these modest shortcomings are, from an abstract point of view, acceptable in view of the consensual nature of commitments and of their underlying goal of procedural economy. This conclusion applies without prejudice to the necessity to balance the respective costs and benefits of Article 7 and Article 9 in each individual case according to the circumstances of the case at hand.