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Matthias Ruffert

Bio: Matthias Ruffert is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: European Union law & Sources of law. The author has an hindex of 3, co-authored 5 publications receiving 149 citations.

Papers
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Journal Article
TL;DR: In this paper, a European constitutional lawyer's view, the soundness of the reforms already at proposal stage, as well as the emergency activity currently undertaken, may be called into question, as core rules of the Treaties are disrespected.
Abstract: Economic governance in the EU has been undergoing substantial changes since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis. The re-arrangements are affecting the convergence of European economies, budgetary control and emergency reactions. Some of them are still at proposal stage, such as the "sixpack" proposed by the Commission for a series of legislative measures on convergence and budgetary surveillance, which is still under scrutiny in Parliament and which is accompanied by activity of the European Council (Euro-Plus-Pact, European Semester). Emergency action is being undertaken since May 2010 (Greek package, EFSM, EFSF) and should lead to a newly inserted provision in the TFEU together with a new international financial institution (ESM). From a European constitutional lawyer's view, the soundness of the reforms already at proposal stage, as well as the emergency activity currently undertaken, may be called into question. European constitutionalism is at stake, as core rules of the Treaties are disrespected. Democratic governance is threatened, as most of the new structures are devoid of parliamentary backing. Stability and welfare are jeopardized as the policy of the Union deviates from successful ways of economic governance as enshrined in the Treaties. European legal scholarship must not be reluctant in pointing at such deficiencies and should participate in showing ways out of the crisis.

115 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article , the authors demonstrate the magnitude of change that Next Generation EU (NGEU) creates, arguing that consensus among large Member States and key institutional stakeholders is insufficient for disregarding key Treaty principles.
Abstract: Following the early turmoil of the COVID-19 pandemic on societies in Europe, the foundations of financing the European Union have been overturned. In this article, we demonstrate the magnitude of change that Next Generation EU (NGEU) creates. While explained as exceptional and justified with reference to the pandemic, in substance, the NGEU is not a crisis measure. It will change the reading of EU law permanently by establishing a new type of instrument for redistribution between the Member States and funding this through debt. This article argues that consensus among large Member States and key institutional stakeholders is insufficient for disregarding key Treaty principles. We scrutinize the regulating capacity of EU constitutional law in relation to that consent and discuss the control of constitutionality by the Court of Justice, the role of national constitutional bodies, and the effect of the package on institutional balance. Finally, the role of EU scholarship is considered in relation to such a profound shift in the EU’s constitutional fabric. COVID-19 pandemic, finance, Next Generation EU, NGEU, crisis measures, debt funding, Treaty principles, constitutionality, role of national constitutional bodies, EU scholarship

7 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the European Union's response to the euro-crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based, and it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas.
Abstract: This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro-crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self-determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand-alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long-term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.

121 citations

MonographDOI
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, two layers of the European economic constitution are discussed, and the authors propose a framework for the analysis of the economic crisis and the response to the crisis, as well as the reform of the macroeconomic constitution.
Abstract: Part I. Setting the Scene: 1. Introduction: framework of the analysis 2. Two layers of the European economic constitution 3. Towards the crisis: an economic narrative 4. Responses to the crisis Part II. Constitutional Mutation: 5. Constitutionality of European measures 6. Realignment of the principles of the macroeconomic constitution 7. Democracy and social rights Part III. What Next?: 8. Initiatives on the table.

112 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the emergency governance of international organizations by combining securitization theory with legal theory on the state of exception is analyzed, and the main argument is that where issues...
Abstract: This article analyses the emergency governance of international organizations by combining securitization theory with legal theory on the state of exception. Our main argument is that where issues ...

91 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined national parliamentarians' approval of the increased budgetary capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in autumn 2011 and found that the financial position of a state (creditors versus debtors) does not explain the patterns of support and opposition.
Abstract: This article examines national parliamentarians’ approval of the increased budgetary capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in autumn 2011. Following the analysis of vote outcome and plenary debates in 11 euro states, it is found that the financial position of a state (creditors versus debtors) does not explain the patterns of support and opposition. Rather, two other factors account for these differences: Euroscepticism, and the government and opposition cleavage. In particular, whereas Eurosceptic MPs voted and argued against the EFSF, the parliamentary majorities supported it. Surprisingly, although the legal basis of the EFSF draws on solidarity among the European Union Member States, the supporters of the EFSF did not refer to this principle in their speeches but rather to pragmatic considerations such as national economic interests.

71 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of the Italian Prime Minister and the head of the so-called "governo tecnico words have to be seperated " as mentioned in this paper, a break up of Europe would be a more probable outcome than deeper integration.
Abstract: ‘If governments allow themselves to be entirely bound to the decisions of their parliament, without protecting their own freedom to act, a break up of Europe would be a more probable outcome than deeper integration.’ The statement of the Italian Prime Minister and head of the so-called ‘governo tecnico words have to be seperated ’ is one remarkable instance for colliding visions of representation in EU member states affected by the financial crisis. It exposes an old problem of representation: that is, representation of the whole versus representation of the parts. National parliaments are called to endorse the European decisions of their governments and simultaneously to sell the sacrifices to their constituencies. This development is conducive to clashes between parliaments and governments. The collision occurs between governments representing the Euro and Europe and national parliaments representing national voters’ interests. Nevertheless in the period of analysis (2010–2012) the governments ...

70 citations