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Maxwell J. D. Ramstead

Researcher at McGill University

Publications -  54
Citations -  2074

Maxwell J. D. Ramstead is an academic researcher from McGill University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Inference & Computer science. The author has an hindex of 16, co-authored 40 publications receiving 1250 citations. Previous affiliations of Maxwell J. D. Ramstead include University of Edinburgh & Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging.

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Answering Schrödinger's question: A free-energy formulation.

TL;DR: This work exemplifies this framework by applying the FEP to Homo sapiens, before translating variational neuroethology into a systematic research heuristic that supplies the biological, cognitive, and social sciences with a computationally tractable guide to discovery.
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Cultural Affordances: Scaffolding Local Worlds Through Shared Intentionality and Regimes of Attention.

TL;DR: This framework provides an account of how cultural content and normative practices are built on a foundation of contentless basic mental processes that acquire content through immersive participation of the agent in social practices that regulate joint attention and shared intentionality.
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Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture.

TL;DR: It is argued that for humans, information from and about other people's expectations constitutes the primary domain of statistical regularities that humans leverage to predict and organize behaviour.
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A variational approach to niche construction

TL;DR: It is argued that niche construction can be described using a variational approach, and proposed new arguments to support the niche construction perspective are proposed, and the variational approaches to niche construction are extended to current perspectives in various scientific fields.
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A tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference:

TL;DR: It is argued that the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and recognition models does not do justice to the role that these constructs play in active inference under the FEP, and an enactive interpretation of active inference is proposed.