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Michael A. Clemens

Bio: Michael A. Clemens is an academic researcher from Center for Global Development. The author has contributed to research in topics: Labor mobility & International development. The author has an hindex of 43, co-authored 158 publications receiving 8475 citations. Previous affiliations of Michael A. Clemens include Public Policy Institute of California & Institute for the Study of Labor.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a formal model of green national accounting demonstrates that 'genuine' saving, net saving less the value of resource depletion and environmental degradation, is a useful indicator of sustainability.
Abstract: In this paper, genuine savings rates in developing countries, a formal model of green national accounting demonstrates that 'genuine' saving, net saving less the value of resource depletion and environmental degradation, is a useful indicator of sustainability. Country-level and regional calculations of genuine savings are presented for the period 1970-1993. Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the region where the greatest dissipation of wealth is occurring. After developing the basic theory of genuine savings, this paper presents empirical estimates for developing countries. These calculations account for resource depletion and carbon dioxide emissions, using consistent time series data for the period 1970-93. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy issues raised by greener national accounting.

758 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors divide aid into three categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid, likely to be negatively correlated with growth; (2) aid that affects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and (3) aid which plausibly could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry.
Abstract: Past research on aid and growth is flawed because it typically examines the impact of aggregate aid on growth over a short period, usually four years, while significant portions of aid are unlikely to affect growth in such a brief time. We divide aid into three categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid (likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that affects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. Our focus is on the third group, which accounts for about 53% of all aid flows. We find a positive, causal relationship between this “short-impact” aid and economic growth (with diminishing returns) over a four-year period. The impact is large: at least two-to-three times larger than in studies using aggregate aid. Even at a conservatively high discount rate, at the mean a $1 increase in short-impact aid raises output (and income) by $1.64 in present value in the typical country. From a different perspective, we find that higher-than-average short-impact aid to sub- Saharan Africa raised per capita growth rates there by about half a percentage point over the growth that would have been achieved by average aid flows. The results are highly statistically significant and stand up to a demanding array of tests, including various specifications, endogeneity structures, and treatment of influential observations. The basic result does not depend crucially on a recipient’s level of income or quality of institutions and policies; we find that short-impact aid causes growth, on average, regardless of these characteristics. However, we find some evidence that the impact on growth is somewhat larger in countries with stronger institutions or longer life expectancies (better health). We also find a significant negative relationship between debt repayments and growth. We make no statement on, and do not attempt to measure, any additional effect on growth from other categories of aid (e.g., emergency assistance or aid that might affect growth over a longer time period); four-year panel regressions are not an appropriate tool to examine those relationships.

662 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors re-analyse data from the three most influential published aid-growth studies, strictly conserving their regression specifications, with sensible assumptions about the timing of aid effects and without questionable instruments.
Abstract: Recent research yields widely divergent estimates of the cross-country relationship between foreign aid receipts and economic growth. We re-analyse data from the three most influential published aid‐growth studies, strictly conserving their regression specifications, with sensible assumptions about the timing of aid effects and without questionable instruments. All three research designs show that increases in aid have been followed on average by increases in investment and growth. The most plausible explanation is that aid causes some degree of growth in recipient countries, although the magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies greatly across recipients and diminishes at high levels of aid. Economists have spent decades debating, without resolution, the cross-country relationship between foreign aid receipts and economic growth. Some find that aid robustly causes positive economic growth on average. Others cannot distinguish the average effect from zero. Still others find an effect only in certain countries, such as those with good policies or governance. Wearied readers of this literature would be right to wonder what produces diverse findings from apparently the same aid and growth data. Here, we show that two traits of previous research help to explain why different studies reach different conclusions. Both traits relate to how these studies treat the timing of causal relationships between aid and growth. First, the most cited research has focused on measuring the effect of aggregate aid on contemporaneous growth, while many aid-funded projects can take a long time to influence growth. Funding for a new road might affect economic activity in short order, funding for a vaccination campaign might only affect growth decades later and humanitarian assistance may never affect growth. Second, because current growth is likely to affect current aid, these studies require a strategy to disentangle correlation from causation. They have tended to rely on instrumental variables but the instruments that have been used are of questionable validity and strength. When these issues are addressed, the divergence in empirical findings is greatly reduced. We show this by stepwise altering the research design of the three most influential papers in the aid and growth literature. We hold all else constant: we begin by

498 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine problems of instrument validity and strength in several growth papers recently published in general-interest and top field journals, and discuss how an instrument that is plausibly valid when used in a single setting can be shown invalid by its use in additional settings.
Abstract: Concern has intensified in recent years that many instrumental variables used in widely-cited growth regressions may be invalid, weak, or both. Attempts to remedy this general problem remain inadequate. We show how a range of published studies can offer more evidence that their results are not spurious. Key steps include: grounding growth regressions in more generalized theoretical models, deployment of new methods for estimating sensitivity to violations of exclusion restrictions, opening the “black box” of GMM with supportive evidence of instrument strength, and utilization of weak-instrument robust tests and estimators. (JEL C52, E23, F35, O41, O47) O ne of the great projects of economic research is to establish the causes of growth. Separating causes from correlates, however, is difficult. Many researchers have recently addressed this difficulty by deploying instrumental variables in cross-country datasets. This can help to identify causes of growth if the instruments do not materially affect growth through channels other than the variable of interest (the instruments are “valid”) and if the instruments correlate well with the variable of interest (the instruments are “strong”). Unfortunately, for reasons not always transparent in published studies, these instruments can be invalid, weak, or both. In this paper, we examine problems of instrument validity and strength in several growth papers recently published in general-interest and top field journals—not to single out those papers, but to concretely illustrate a general phenomenon that goes well beyond them. First, we discuss how an instrument that is plausibly valid when used in a single setting can be shown invalid by its use in additional settings. Second, we offer evidence that unacknowledged weak instruments may generate spurious findings in important applications, especially those using the popular Generalized Method

483 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors divide aid into three categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid, likely to be negatively correlated with growth; (2) aid that affects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and (3) aid which plausibly could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry.
Abstract: Past research on aid and growth is flawed because it typically examines the impact of aggregate aid on growth over a short period, usually four years, while significant portions of aid are unlikely to affect growth in such a brief time. We divide aid into three categories: (1) emergency and humanitarian aid (likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that affects growth only over a long period of time, if at all, such as aid to support democracy, the environment, health, or education (likely to have no relationship to growth over four years); and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in four years, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and industry. Our focus is on the third group, which accounts for about 53% of all aid flows. We find a positive, causal relationship between this “short-impact” aid and economic growth (with diminishing returns) over a four-year period. The impact is large: at least two-to-three times larger than in studies using aggregate aid. Even at a conservatively high discount rate, at the mean a $1 increase in short-impact aid raises output (and income) by $1.64 in present value in the typical country. From a different perspective, we find that higher-than-average short-impact aid to sub- Saharan Africa raised per capita growth rates there by about half a percentage point over the growth that would have been achieved by average aid flows. The results are highly statistically significant and stand up to a demanding array of tests, including various specifications, endogeneity structures, and treatment of influential observations. The basic result does not depend crucially on a recipient’s level of income or quality of institutions and policies; we find that short-impact aid causes growth, on average, regardless of these characteristics. However, we find some evidence that the impact on growth is somewhat larger in countries with stronger institutions or longer life expectancies (better health). We also find a significant negative relationship between debt repayments and growth. We make no statement on, and do not attempt to measure, any additional effect on growth from other categories of aid (e.g., emergency assistance or aid that might affect growth over a longer time period); four-year panel regressions are not an appropriate tool to examine those relationships.

430 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) as mentioned in this paper was created to marshal the evidence on what can be done to promote health equity and to foster a global movement to achieve it.

7,335 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: A Treatise on the Family by G. S. Becker as discussed by the authors is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics.
Abstract: A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

4,817 citations

01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: This article investigated whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997) with negative results.
Abstract: We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

3,770 citations