Michael A. Harrison

Bio: Michael A. Harrison is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Context-free language & Deterministic context-free grammar. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 98 publications receiving 3760 citations. Previous affiliations of Michael A. Harrison include System Development Corporation & University of California.

Protection in operating systems

Abstract: A model of protection mechanisms in computing systems is presented and its appropriateness is argued The “safety” problem for protection systems under this model is to determine in a given situation whether a subject can acquire a particular right to an object In restricted cases, it can be shown that this problem is decidable, ie there is an algorithm to determine whether a system in a particular configuration is safe In general, and under surprisingly weak assumptions, it cannot be decided if a situation is safe Various implications of this fact are discussed

An Improved Context-Free Recognizer

Abstract: A new algorithm for recognizing and parsing arbitrary context-free languages is presented, and several new results are given on the computational complexity of these problems. The new algorithm is of both practical and theoretical interest. It is conceptually simple and allows a variety of efficient implementations, which are worked out in detail. Two versions are given which run in faster than cubic time. Surprisingly close connections between the Cocke-Kasami-Younger and Earley algorithms are established which reveal that the two algorithms are “almost” identical.

One-way stack automata

Abstract: A number of operations which either preserve sets accepted by one-way stack automata or preserve sets accepted by deterministic one-way stack automata are presented. For example, sequential transduction preserves the former; set complementation, the latter. Several solvability questions are also considered.

Stack automata and compiling

Abstract: Compilation consists of two parts, recognition and translation. A mathematical model is presented which embodies salient features of many modern compiling techniques. The model, called the stack automaton, has the desirable feature of being deterministic in nature. This deterministic device is generalized to a nondeterministic device (nondeterministic stack automaton) and particular instances of this more general device are noted. Sets accepted by nondeterministic stack automata are recursive. Each set accepted by a deterministic linear bounded automaton is accepted by some nonerasing stack automaton. Each context-sensitive language is accepted by some (deterministic) stack automaton.

On the security of public key protocols

Abstract: Recently the use of public key encryption to provide secure network communication has received considerable attention. Such public key systems are usually effective against passive eavesdroppers, who merely tap the lines and try to decipher the message. It has been pointed out, however, that an improperly designed protocol could be vulnerable to an active saboteur, one who may impersonate another user or alter the message being transmitted. Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely. Algorithms and characterizations that can be used to determine protocol security in these models are given.

Supervisory control of a class of discrete event processes

Abstract: This paper studies the control of a class of discrete event processes, i.e. processes that are discrete, asynchronous and possibly nondeter-ministic. The controlled process is described as the generator of a formal language, while the controller, or supervisor, is constructed from the grammar of a specified target language that incorporates the desired closed-loop system behavior. The existence problem for a supervisor is reduced to finding the largest controllable language contained in a given legal language. Two examples are provided.

A lattice model of secure information flow

Abstract: This paper investigates mechanisms that guarantee secure information flow in a computer system. These mechanisms are examined within a mathematical framework suitable for formulating the requirements of secure information flow among security classes. The central component of the model is a lattice structure derived from the security classes and justified by the semantics of information flow. The lattice properties permit concise formulations of the security requirements of different existing systems and facilitate the construction of mechanisms that enforce security. The model provides a unifying view of all systems that restrict information flow, enables a classification of them according to security objectives, and suggests some new approaches. It also leads to the construction of automatic program certification mechanisms for verifying the secure flow of information through a program.

Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems

Abstract: Gigantically comprehensive and carefully researched, Security Engineering makes it clear just how difficult it is to protect information systems from corruption, eavesdropping, unauthorized use, and general malice. Better, Ross Anderson offers a lot of thoughts on how information can be made more secure (though probably not absolutely secure, at least not forever) with the help of both technologies and management strategies. His work makes fascinating reading and will no doubt inspire considerable doubt--fear is probably a better choice of words--in anyone with information to gather, protect, or make decisions about. Be aware: This is absolutely not a book solely about computers, with yet another explanation of Alice and Bob and how they exchange public keys in order to exchange messages in secret. Anderson explores, for example, the ingenious ways in which European truck drivers defeat their vehicles' speed-logging equipment. In another section, he shows how the end of the cold war brought on a decline in defenses against radio-frequency monitoring (radio frequencies can be used to determine, at a distance, what's going on in systems--bank teller machines, say), and how similar technology can be used to reverse-engineer the calculations that go on inside smart cards. In almost 600 pages of riveting detail, Anderson warns us not to be seduced by the latest defensive technologies, never to underestimate human ingenuity, and always use common sense in defending valuables. A terrific read for security professionals and general readers alike. --David Wall Topics covered: How some people go about protecting valuable things (particularly, but not exclusively, information) and how other people go about getting it anyway. Mostly, this takes the form of essays (about, for example, how the U.S. Air Force keeps its nukes out of the wrong hands) and stories (one of which tells of an art thief who defeated the latest technology by hiding in a closet). Sections deal with technologies, policies, psychology, and legal matters.

Design and validation of computer protocols

Abstract: Part 1 Basic: introduction protocol structure error control flow control. Part 2 Specification and modeling: validation models correctness requirements protocol design finite state machines. Part 3 Conformance testing synthesis and validation: conformance testing protocol synthesis protocol validation. Part 4 Design tools: a protocol simulator a protocol validator using the validator.