A club is a voluntary group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members' characteristics, or a good characterized by excludable benefits. When production costs are shared and the good is purely private, a private good club is being analyzed (McGuire 1972; Wiseman 1957). If membership characteristics differ and motivate sharing, then membership fees will differ among members (DeSerpa 1977; Scotchmer 1994b; Scotchmer and Wooders 1987). Such fees are nonanonymous , inasmuch as a fee structure is related to the identity and attributes of a member. The focus of our analysis is the sharing of an excludable (rivalrous) public good, which we term a club good . Unless otherwise specified, crowding is assumed to be independent of the individual and hence anonymous. A number of aspects of the club definition deserve highlighting. Privately owned and operated clubs must be voluntary; members choose to belong because they anticipate a net benefit from membership. Thus, the utility jointly derived from membership and from the consumption of other goods must exceed the utility associated with nonmembership status. Furthermore, the net gain in utility from membership must exceed or equal membership fees or toll payments. This voluntarism serves as the first characteristic by which to distinguish between pure public goods and club goods. In the case of a pure public good, voluntarism may be absent, since the good might harm some recipients (e.g., defense to a pacifist, fluoridation to someone who opposes its use).

The theory of externalities, public goods, and club goods: Homogeneous clubs and local public goods

Thank you for reading environment and statecraft the strategy of environmental treaty making. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have look numerous times for their chosen readings like this environment and statecraft the strategy of environmental treaty making, but end up in infectious downloads. Rather than reading a good book with a cup of tea in the afternoon, instead they juggled with some infectious virus inside their computer.

Environment And Statecraft The Strategy Of Environmental Treaty Making

This survey investigates the increasing importance of global public goods (GPGs) in today's interdependent world, driven by ever-growing, cross-border externalities and public good spillovers. Novel technologies, enhanced globalization, and population increases are among the main drivers of the rise of GPGs. Key GPGs include curbing climate change, instituting universal regulatory practices, eradicating infectious diseases, preserving world peace, discovering scientific breakthroughs, and limiting financial crises. The survey presents a compact theoretical foundation for GPGs, grounded in the provision of public goods. Because countries may be contributors or noncontributors to a particular GPG, coalition formation and behavior play a role, as do strategic interactions between a contributor coalition and other countries. In the survey, recurrent themes include strategic considerations, alternative institutional arrangements, GPGs' defining properties, new actors' roles, and collective action concerns. The four properties of GPGs—benefit non-rivalry, benefit non-excludability, aggregator technology, and spillover range—influence the GPGs' supply prognoses and the need for and form of provision intervention, which may affect the requisite institutional changes. Three representative case studies illustrate how theoretical insights inform policy and empirical tests. Regional public goods are shown to involve a question of subsidiarity and different actors compared to GPGs.

Global Public Goods: A Survey

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs about others' contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.

Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments

Pricing carbon to address climate change sparks divisions like few other policy options. From street riots to academic debate, it has stirred both passionate and principled disagreement, leaving scarce room for compromise between advocates and critics. Among scholars, what used to be nearly unanimous support for carbon pricing has ceded way to a more bifurcated landscape. We review the growing literature on carbon pricing shortfalls, and suggest a conceptual framework to differentiate three dimensions of failure, based on different manifestations of human behaviour: Homo Economicus, Homo Irrationalis, and Homo Politicus. We also apply this framework to identify and classify principles to overcome the three dimensions of failure. Our Perspective offers an agent-based view on the constraints that prevent deployment and efficient operation of carbon pricing in practice, and identifies pathways for improved policy design and implementation.

Climate change and carbon pricing : overcoming three dimensions of failure

Subsidizing renewables as part of taking leadership in international climate policy: The German case

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader–follower (Stackelberg) game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this needs no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology. Then both countries also are better off in the Stackelberg game than in the Nash game. Our general result is illustrated by an example with Cobb–Douglas preferences and, finally, an empirical application to global climate policy is briefly discussed.

/pdf/advantageous-leadership-in-public-good-provision-the-case-of-5a4dnpp0nf.pdf

Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology

Pioneering activities in climate policy through increased abatement efforts or financial transfers are costly but often not very successful. In this chapter, we show that leading behavior by a coalition of countries, which is instead based on green technological innovations by members of the coalition and a subsequent costless transfer of the improved technology to other countries, may provide a sensible approach for combatting global warming through unilateral action. In particular, we examine in an otherwise standard model of private public good supply how the effects of such a policy on total greenhouse gas mitigation and welfare of countries depend on the level of research and development (R&D) costs, the intensity and scope of technological spillovers, the size of the technological coalition and the number of countries outside the coalition. In particular, it is shown that such technological transfers, which can be considered as an instrument of “climate finance” in a broader sense, may be required to induce in the strategic context of global public good provision R&Dactivities and thus leading to the formation of a technological coalition.

Technological Transfers in Global Climate Policy — A Strategic Perspective

This review aims at exploring main results of leading-by-example in public goods experiments. Based on a systematic literature analysis, I examine whether leadership increases contributions to a public good. Moreover, I outline factors that foster or impede leadership success. To understand how leadership becomes effective, followers' reactions as well as leadership behavior are examined in more detail. Besides classical linear summation technology public goods games, I also consider weakest-link, threshold and summation technology public goods games with predicted interior equilibrium and field experiments. Finally, I briefly discuss the external validity in the context of global public goods.

Michael Eichenseer

Papers

Subsidizing renewables as part of taking leadership in international climate policy: The German case

Advantageous leadership in public good provision: the case of an endogenous contribution technology

Technological Transfers in Global Climate Policy — A Strategic Perspective

Leading by Example in Public Goods Experiments: What Do We Know?

Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games