Michael Ioannidis

Bio: Michael Ioannidis is an academic researcher from Max Planck Society. The author has contributed to research in topics: Rule of law & Conditionality. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 16 publications receiving 154 citations.

Systemic deficiency in the rule of law: What it is, what has been done, what can be done

Abstract: There is currently a widespread view that the EU is in crisis. This crisis is not only financial, but, most importantly, it touches upon the founding principles of the Union as set out in Article 2 TEU. Among them, a principle that has served as the cornerstone of European integration already from its early stages seems particularly threatened: the rule of law. Due to endemic corruption, weak institutional capacities, or insufficient resources at the administrative or judicial levels, some EU Member States present so grave deficiencies in guaranteeing the rule of law that their conformity with basic EU standards is seriously questioned. Although it is obvious that the EU cannot stay inactive in the face of such grave deficiencies, it remains unclear how potential responses fit with the overall EU constitutional framework. This article aims at contributing to this discussion by developing the concept of systemic deficiency in the rule of law.

EU Financial Assistance Conditionality after 'Two Pack'

Abstract: Conditionality is the new topos of EU economic governance. In Pringle, the ECJ raised “strict conditionality” to a necessary requirement of assistance to Members in financial distress, and after the recent amendment of Article 136 TFEU this is also explicitly set out in the Treaties. Moreover, conditionality proved to be an extremely powerful instrument. It has been used to press for reforms in recipient countries’ economies, healthcare and pension systems, education and research. On many occasions, the conditions for accessing European financing are prescribed in minute detail. Never before had European institutions been engaged in so close surveillance and micromanagement of domestic public policies. Starting from these observations, this article has two purposes. Firstly, to shed some light to the origins and the mechanics of EU financial assistance conditionality, and, secondly, to offer a critical appraisal of its role in the context of the new EU economic governance, especially after the so-called “Two Pack” set of reforms. Although Regulation 472/2013/EU succeeds in putting all forms of conditional lending under a common EU framework, it fails to address the basic concerns raised by the emergence of conditionality as a cornerstone of EU economic governance. Blurred responsibility, wide executive discretion, and uncertainty as to the legal instruments are some of the points that remain problematic.

Enforcing EU Values: Reverse Solange and a Systemic Deficiency Committee

Abstract: Some of the Member States of the European Union (EU) are threatening fundamental principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Authoritarian tendencies, threatening democracy and human rights, are evident in Hungary and Romania. In Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and again Romania, systemic corruption and the weakness of some domestic institutions threaten the Union’s fundamental rule of law principle. The financial crisis has aggravated some of the deficiencies. It adds to the sense of crisis that to date only few EU remedies exist. We suggest the establishment of a "Systemic Deficiency Committee" to suplemment the new EU Rule of Law Framework introduced by the Commission in 2014.

Protecting EU Values: Reverse Solange and the Rule of Law Framework

Abstract: Some of the Member States of the European Union (EU) are threatening fundamental principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU. The Polish reforms of its Constitutional Tribunal and Public Service Broadcasters are the most recent problems in a long list of concerns. This problem triggered fresh thinking concerning how the EU may monitor and enforce its fundamental values. Both in political and academic discourse, various suggestions have been made regarding the legal basis and the organizational characteristics of possible mechanisms to be used for this purpose. In this paper, we discuss the instruments that are currently on the table regarding the enforcement of EU values, exposing their strengths and weaknesses in legal and practical terms. The Commission’s Rule of Law Framework is the most prominent and promising institutional response. In this paper we also offer an evaluation of its first use. So far, most of the proposed instruments have been presented in an isolated manner. This is particularly true for the two most discussed instruments, the so called Copenhagen Commission and the Reverse Solange mechanism. This paper presents and normatively assesses the ideas proposed and discusses how to combine the different instruments, which so far have been considered separately. We argue that the most apt European response to systemic deficiencies is the Reverse Solange mechanism as well as a complementary political approach. In developing the political mechanism, we especially focus on the Rule of Law Framework and its recent first activation. We propose to supplement it with a “Systemic Deficiency Committee”. This Committee, composed of eminent figures, should monitor the respect of fundamental European values in all Member States. The proposal combines important insights from the proposal of a Copenhagen Commission by Jan-Werner Muller and the Rule of Law Framework already in place. We see our suggestion as developing both, the proposal as well as the Framework.

Illiberalism within: rule of law backsliding in the EU

Abstract: How should the European Union cope with Member States that no longer respect the basic values of the Union? This article reviews the responses of the major European Union institutions to Poland and Hungary as their governments removed checks on their power, eliminated the independence of judiciaries and failed to honour their European commitments. As the article demonstrates, the responses of EU institutions have so far been ineffective in bringing these Member States back into line with European values. We examine the various proposals that have been made to do better, concluding that there is promise in some legal strategies that are available now, but have yet to be tried.

Socializing the European Semester? Economic Governance and Social Policy Coordination in Europe 2020

Abstract: This paper analyzes how EU social objectives and policy coordination have been integrated into the Europe 2020 Strategy and the Union’s emerging post-crisis architecture of economic governance. Based on published and unpublished documents as well as interviews with high-level policy makers, the paper argues that since 2011, there has been a progressive ‘socialization’ of the ‘European Semester’ of policy coordination, in terms of an increasing emphasis on social objectives and targets in the EU’s priorities and country-specific recommendations; an intensification of social monitoring, multilateral surveillance, and peer review; and an enhanced role for social and employment actors, especially the Employment and Social Protection Committees. The paper interprets these developments not only as a response by the Commission and other EU institutions to rising social and political discontent among European citizens with the consequences of post-crisis austerity policies, but also as a product of reflexive learning and creative adaptation by social and employment actors to the new institutional conditions of the European Semester: another form of ‘socialization’.

L'intervention des tierces parties dans le règlement des différends à l'OMC / Ngoc Ha Nguyen ; préface de Marie-Pierre Lanfranchi

Abstract: The third party intervention in the WTO dispute settlement has specificities compared to that existing in other international jurisdictions. The first one include very frequent access of third parties in the consultations, in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings. This frequency results from rather favorable procedural rules and an open judicial policy developed by WTO judge in favor of the third parties presence. Contrary to this, the procedural rights of third parties are still very limited. They are imprecise in the consultation phase and limited in the panel phase. In addition, third parties do not have certain rights (for example, the right to appeal) because of the absence of the binding effects of adopted reports on themselves. On the whole, these specificities allow third parties to play really an important role in this system. Their intervention can meet the judge’s information needs and contribute to the multilateralization and legitimacy of the system at a whole. It can also help to defend interests at various levels and thus becomes a procedural mean to build and strengthen the capacity and skills of developing country Members. Their intervention can sometimes involve risks and limitations on the implementation of the guaranties of due process, on certain developments of the system and on the protection of legitimate rights and interests of the main parties. However, these effects are either minimal or mitigated through certain strategies implemented by the parties to dispute or through the control of the WTO judge. Therefore, the results of the intervention which appear generally positive advocates the strengthening of third party’s rights.

Monitoring and enforcement of the rule of law in the EU: rhetoric and reality

Abstract: This article offers a comprehensive examination of the rationale underlying the rule of law framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014 before outlining its main features. It is argued that while the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ framework falls short of what is required to effectively address internal threats to EU values of a systemic nature, it remains preferable to the new mechanism adopted by the Council in December 2014 and which consists of holding an annual rule of law dialogue among all Member States within the Council. To make the Commission’s framework more workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number of modest recommendations are also offered at a time where an increasing number of voices are asking the Commission to activate the first phase its new mechanism in relation to Hungary and more recently, Poland.

Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Reality

Abstract: This article offers a comprehensive examination of the rationale underlying the rule of law framework adopted by the Commission in March 2014 before outlining its main features. It is argued that while the Commission’s ‘light-touch’ framework falls short of what is required to effectively address internal threats to EU values of a systemic nature, it remains preferable to the new mechanism adopted by the Council in December 2014 and which consists of holding an annual rule of law dialogue among all Member States within the Council. To make the Commission’s framework more workable and effective, which should in turn increase its ‘dissuasive potential’, a number of modest recommendations are also offered at a time where an increasing number of voices are asking the Commission to activate the first phase its new mechanism in relation to Hungary and more recently, Poland.