Michael Lubatkin

Bio: Michael Lubatkin is an academic researcher from University of Connecticut. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate governance & Agency (sociology). The author has an hindex of 54, co-authored 90 publications receiving 22685 citations. Previous affiliations of Michael Lubatkin include Wichita State University & College of Business Administration.

Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational learning

Abstract: Much of the prior research on interorganizational learning has focused on the role of absorptive capacity, a firm's ability to value, assimilate, and utilize new external knowledge. However, this definition of the construct suggests that a firm has an equal capacity to learn from all other organizations. We reconceptualize the firm-level construct absorptive capacity as a learning dyad-level construct, relative absorptive capacity. One firm's ability to learn from another firm is argued to depend on the similarity of both firms' (1) knowledge bases, (2) organizational structures and compensation policies, and (3) dominant logics. We then test the model using a sample of pharmaceutical–biotechnology R&D alliances. As predicted, the similarity of the partners' basic knowledge, lower management formalization, research centralization, compensation practices, and research communities were positively related to interorganizational learning. The relative absorptive capacity measures are also shown to have greater explanatory power than the established measure of absorptive capacity, R&D spending. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence

Abstract: Does owner management necessarily eliminate the agency costs of ownership? Drawing on agency literature and on the economic theory of the household, we argue that private ownership and owner management expose privately held, owner-managed firms to agency threats ignored by Jensen's and Meckling's (1976) agency model. Private ownership and owner management not only reduce the effectiveness of external control mechanisms, they also expose firms to a "self-control" problem created by incentives that cause owners to take actions which "harm themselves as well as those around them" (Jensen 1994, p. 43). Thus, shareholders have incentive to invest resources in curbing both managerialand owner opportunism. We extend this thesis to the domain of the family firm. After developing hypotheses which describe how family dynamics and, specifically, altruism, exacerbate agency problems experienced by these privately held, owner-managed firms, we use data obtained from a large-scale survey of family businesses to field test our hypotheses and find evidence which suggests support for our proposed theory. Finally, we discuss the implications of our theory for research on family and other types of privately held, owner-managed firms.

Exploring the Agency Consequences of Ownership Dispersion Among The Directors of Private Family Firms

Abstract: Using an agency-theoretic lens and insights drawn from the behavioral economics and family business literatures, we developed hypotheses concerning the effect of dispersion of ownership on the use ...

The Theory of Island Biogeography

Abstract: Preface to the Princeton Landmarks in Biology Edition vii Preface xi Symbols Used xiii 1. The Importance of Islands 3 2. Area and Number of Speicies 8 3. Further Explanations of the Area-Diversity Pattern 19 4. The Strategy of Colonization 68 5. Invasibility and the Variable Niche 94 6. Stepping Stones and Biotic Exchange 123 7. Evolutionary Changes Following Colonization 145 8. Prospect 181 Glossary 185 References 193 Index 201

Dynamic capabilities, what are they?

Abstract: This paper focuses on dynamic capabilities and, more generally, the resource-based view of the firm. We argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes such as product development, strategic decision making, and alliancing. They are neither vague nor tautological. Although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their emergence, they have significant commonalities across firms (popularly termed ‘best practice’). This suggests that they are more homogeneous, fungible, equifinal, and substitutable than is usually assumed. In moderately dynamic markets, dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of routines. They are detailed, analytic, stable processes with predictable outcomes. In contrast, in high-velocity markets, they are simple, highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes. Finally, well-known learning mechanisms guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities. In moderately dynamic markets, the evolutionary emphasis is on variation. In high-velocity markets, it is on selection. At the level of RBV, we conclude that traditional RBV misidentifies the locus of long-term competitive advantage in dynamic markets, overemphasizes the strategic logic of leverage, and reaches a boundary condition in high-velocity markets. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Absorptive Capacity: A Review, Reconceptualization, and Extension

Abstract: Researchers have used the absorptive capacity construct to explain various organizational phenomena. In this article we review the literature to identify key dimensions of absorptive capacity and offer a reconceptualization of this construct. Building upon the dynamic capabilities view of the firm, we distinguish between a firm's potential and realized capacity. We then advance a model outlining the conditions when the firm's potential and realized capacities can differentially influence the creation and sustenance of its competitive advantage.

Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500

Abstract: We investigate the relation between founding-family ownership and firm performance. We find that family ownership is both prevalent and substantial; families are present in one-third of the S&P 500 and account for 18 percent of outstanding equity. Contrary to our conjecture, we find family firms perform better than nonfamily firms. Additional analysis reveals that the relation between family holdings and firm performance is nonlinear and that when family members serve as CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. Overall, our results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that minority shareholders are adversely affected by family ownership, suggesting that family ownership is an effective organizational structure. FOUNDING-FAMILYOWNERSHIPAND CONTROL in public U.S. firms is commonly perceived as a less efficient, or at the very least, a less profitable ownership structure than dispersed ownership. Fama and Jensen (1983) note that combining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents. Demsetz (1983) argues that such owners may choose nonpecuniary consumption and thereby draw scarce resources away from profitable projects. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that the large premiums associated with superiorvoting shares or control rights provide evidence that controlling shareholders seek to extract private benefits from the firm. More generally, firms with large, undiversified owners such as founding families may forgo maximum profits because they are unable to separate their financial preferences with those of outside owners.1 Families also often limit executive management positions to family

Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study:

Abstract: To assess the effects of a firm's network of relations on innovation, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework that relates three aspects of a firm's ego network—direct ties, indirect ties, an...