We study how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. We predict that a wave of investor sentiment has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when beginning-of-period proxies for sentiment are low, subsequent returns are relatively high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these categories of stock earn relatively low subsequent returns.

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Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns

We examine how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Theory predicts that a broad wave of sentiment will disproportionately affect stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. We test this prediction by studying how the cross-section of subsequent stock returns varies with proxies for beginning-of-period investor sentiment. When sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high on smaller stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme-growth stocks, and distressed stocks, consistent with an initial underpricing of these stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these patterns attenuate or fully reverse. The results are consistent with predictions and appear unlikely to reflect an alternative explanation based on compensation for systematic risk.

Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns

Investor sentiment, defined broadly, is a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand. The question is no longer whether investor sentiment affects stock prices, but how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its effects. One approach is "bottom up," using biases in individual investor psychology, such as overconfidence, representativeness, and conservatism, to explain how individual investors underreact or overreact to past returns or fundamentals. The investor sentiment approach that we develop in this paper is, by contrast, distinctly "top down" and macroeconomic: we take the origin of investor sentiment as exogenous and focus on its empirical effects. We show that it is quite possible to measure investor sentiment and that waves of sentiment have clearly discernible, important, and regular effects on individual firms and on the stock market as a whole. The top-down approach builds on the two broader and more irrefutable assumptions of behavioral finance -- sentiment and the limits to arbitrage -- to explain which stocks are likely to be most affected by sentiment. In particular, stocks that are difficult to arbitrage or to value are most affected by sentiment.

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Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market

In the 1980s, the average first-day return on initial public offerings (IPOs) was 7%. The average first-day return doubled to almost 15% during 1990-1998, before jumping to 65% during the internet bubble years of 1999-2000 and then reverting to 12% during 2001-2003. We attribute much of the higher underpricing during the bubble period to a changing issuer objective function. We argue that in the later periods there was less focus on maximizing IPO proceeds due to an increased emphasis on research coverage. Furthermore, allocations of hot IPOs to the personal brokerage accounts of issuing firm executives created an incentive to seek rather than avoid underwriters with a reputation for severe underpricing. What explains the severe underpricing of initial public offerings in 1999-2000, when the average first-day return of 65% exceeded any level previously seen before? In this article, we address this and the related question of why IPO underpricing doubled from 7% during 1980-1989 to almost 15% during 1990-1998 before reverting to 12% during the post-bubble period of 20012003. Our goal is to explain low-frequency movements in underpricing (or first-day returns) that occur less often than hot and cold issue markets. We examine three hypotheses for the change in underpricing: 1) the changing risk composition hypothesis, 2) the realignment of incentives hypothesis, and 3) a new hypothesis, the changing issuer objective function hypothesis. The changing issuer objective function hypothesis has two components, the spinning hypothesis and the analyst lust hypothesis. The changing risk composition hypothesis, introduced by Ritter (1984), assumes that riskier IPOs will be underpriced by more than less-risky IPOs. This prediction follows from models where underpricing arises as an equilibrium condition to induce investors to participate in the IPO market. If the proportion of IPOs that represent risky stocks increases, there should be greater average underpricing. Risk can reflect either technological or valuation uncertainty. Although there have been some changes in the characteristics of firms going public, these changes are found to be too minor to explain much of the variation in underpricing over time if there is a stationary risk-return relation. The realignment of incentives and the changing issuer objective function hypotheses both

/pdf/why-has-ipo-underpricing-changed-over-time-gykmqywnng.pdf

Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time

The short of it

We investigate investor sentiment and its relation to near-term stock market returns. We find that many commonly-cited indirect measures of sentiment are related to direct measures (surveys) of investor sentiment. However, past market returns are also an important determinant of sentiment. Although sentiment changes are strongly correlated with contemporaneous market returns, our tests show that sentiment has little predictive power for near- term future stock returns. Finally, our evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that sentiment primarily affects individual investors and small stocks.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID282915_code010913670.pdf?abstractid=282915&mirid=1&type=2

Investor Sentiment and the Near-Term Stock Market

Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market

The link between asset valuation and investor sentiment is the subject of considerable debate in the profession. If excessive optimism drives prices above intrinsic values, periods of high sentiment should be followed by low returns, as market prices revert to fundamental values. Using survey data on investor sentiment, we provide evidence that sentiment affects asset valuation. Market pricing errors implied by an independent valuation model are positively related to sentiment. Future returns over multiyear horizons are negatively related to sentiment. These results are robust to the inclusion of other variables that have been shown to forecast stock returns.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/427633

Investor Sentiment and Asset Valuation

We report that initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all-star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter. These findings are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and seasoned equity offering is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post-IPO analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post-IPO analyst coverage from highly ranked analysts. INVESTMENT BANKERS PROVIDE a wide range of services to firms issuing new shares through an initial public offering (IPO). These services include pre-IPO activities, related to the pricing, marketing, and distribution of the offering, as well as post-IPO activities such as price stabilization, market making, and analyst research coverage. Despite the variety of services provided to issuers and the variation in issuer characteristics, there is surprisingly little variation in the direct costs of completing an IPO. Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001) show that underwriter spreads in IPOs are clustered at 7% for all but the very smallest and very largest offerings. Moreover, a 15% overallotment option is a standard feature of IPO contracts. Both anecdotal and academic evidence indicate that research coverage has become an essential element of the security issuance process in recent years. Press reports indicate that star analysts play an important role in securing

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Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing

We examine the links among IPO underpricing, post-IPO analyst coverage, and the likelihood of switching underwriters. Our findings indicate a significant positive relation between underpricing and analyst coverage by the lead underwriter. This positive association is robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing previously documented in the literature and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, after controlling for other potential determinants of switching underwriters, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and SEO is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post-IPO analyst coverage. We interpret these findings as consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post-IPO analyst coverage.

Michael T. Cliff

Papers

Investor Sentiment and the Near-Term Stock Market

Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market

Investor Sentiment and Asset Valuation

Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing

Do IPO Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage With Underpricing