Michael Veale

Bio: Michael Veale is an academic researcher from University College London. The author has contributed to research in topics: Data Protection Act 1998 & European Union law. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 13 publications receiving 805 citations. Previous affiliations of Michael Veale include The Turing Institute.

'It's Reducing a Human Being to a Percentage': Perceptions of Justice in Algorithmic Decisions

Abstract: Data-driven decision-making consequential to individuals raises important questions of accountability and justice. Indeed, European law provides individuals limited rights to 'meaningful information about the logic' behind significant, autonomous decisions such as loan approvals, insurance quotes, and CV filtering. We undertake three experimental studies examining people's perceptions of justice in algorithmic decision-making under different scenarios and explanation styles. Dimensions of justice previously observed in response to human decision-making appear similarly engaged in response to algorithmic decisions. Qualitative analysis identified several concerns and heuristics involved in justice perceptions including arbitrariness, generalisation, and (in)dignity. Quantitative analysis indicates that explanation styles primarily matter to justice perceptions only when subjects are exposed to multiple different styles --- under repeated exposure of one style, scenario effects obscure any explanation effects. Our results suggests there may be no 'best' approach to explaining algorithmic decisions, and that reflection on their automated nature both implicates and mitigates justice dimensions.

Fairer machine learning in the real world: Mitigating discrimination without collecting sensitive data:

Abstract: Decisions based on algorithmic, machine learning models can be unfair, reproducing biases in historical data used to train them. While computational techniques are emerging to address aspects of th...

Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For

Abstract: Algorithms, particularly of the machine learning (ML) variety, are increasingly important to individuals' lives, but have caused a range of concerns evolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in the form of a "right to an explanation" has emerged as a compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively presents as a means to "open the black box", hence allowing individual challenge and redress, as well as potential to instil accountability to the public in ML systems. In the general furore over algorithmic bias and other issues laid out in section 2, any remedy in a storm has looked attractive. However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the GDPR is unlikely to be a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core "algorithmic war stories" that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. We present several reasons for this conclusion. First (section 3), the law is restrictive on when any explanation-related right can be triggered, and in many places is unclear, or even seems paradoxical. Second (section 4), even were some of these restrictions to be navigated, the way that explanations are conceived of legally — as "meaningful information about the logic of processing" — is unlikely to be provided by the kind of ML "explanations" computer scientists have been developing. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the multi-dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. However “subject-centric" explanations (SCEs), which restrict explanations to particular regions of a model around a query, show promise for interactive exploration, as do pedagogical rather than decompositional explanations in dodging developers' worries of IP or trade secrets disclosure. As an interim conclusion then, while convinced that recent research in ML explanations shows promise, we fear that the search for a "right to an explanation" in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of "transparency fallacy". However, in our final sections, we argue that other parts of the GDPR related (i) to other individual rights including the right to erasure ("right to be forgotten") and the right to data portability and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to build a more responsible, explicable and user-friendly algorithmic society.

'It's Reducing a Human Being to a Percentage': Perceptions of Justice in Algorithmic Decisions

Abstract: Data-driven decision-making consequential to individuals raises important questions of accountability and justice. Indeed, European law provides individuals limited rights to 'meaningful information about the logic' behind significant, autonomous decisions such as loan approvals, insurance quotes, and CV filtering. We undertake three experimental studies examining people's perceptions of justice in algorithmic decision-making under different scenarios and explanation styles. Dimensions of justice previously observed in response to human decision-making appear similarly engaged in response to algorithmic decisions. Qualitative analysis identified several concerns and heuristics involved in justice perceptions including arbitrariness, generalisation, and (in)dignity. Quantitative analysis indicates that explanation styles primarily matter to justice perceptions only when subjects are exposed to multiple different styles---under repeated exposure of one style, scenario effects obscure any explanation effects. Our results suggests there may be no 'best' approach to explaining algorithmic decisions, and that reflection on their automated nature both implicates and mitigates justice dimensions.

Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” to a “Right to Better Decisions”?

Abstract: As concerns about unfairness and discrimination in “black box” machine learning systems rise, a legal “right to an explanation” has emerged as a compellingly attractive approach for challenge and redress. We outline recent debates on the limited provisions in European data protection law, and introduce and analyze newer explanation rights in French administrative law and the draft modernized Council of Europe Convention 108. While individual rights can be useful, in privacy law they have historically unreasonably burdened the average data subject. “Meaningful information” about algorithmic logics is more technically possible than commonly thought, but this exacerbates a new “transparency fallacy”—an illusion of remedy rather than anything substantively helpful. While rights-based approaches deserve a firm place in the toolbox, other forms of governance, such as impact assessments, “soft law,” judicial review, and model repositories deserve more attention, alongside catalyzing agencies acting for users to control algorithmic system design.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Abstract: What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI.

Abstract: In the last years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has achieved a notable momentum that may deliver the best of expectations over many application sectors across the field. For this to occur, the entire community stands in front of the barrier of explainability, an inherent problem of AI techniques brought by sub-symbolism (e.g. ensembles or Deep Neural Networks) that were not present in the last hype of AI. Paradigms underlying this problem fall within the so-called eXplainable AI (XAI) field, which is acknowledged as a crucial feature for the practical deployment of AI models. This overview examines the existing literature in the field of XAI, including a prospect toward what is yet to be reached. We summarize previous efforts to define explainability in Machine Learning, establishing a novel definition that covers prior conceptual propositions with a major focus on the audience for which explainability is sought. We then propose and discuss about a taxonomy of recent contributions related to the explainability of different Machine Learning models, including those aimed at Deep Learning methods for which a second taxonomy is built. This literature analysis serves as the background for a series of challenges faced by XAI, such as the crossroads between data fusion and explainability. Our prospects lead toward the concept of Responsible Artificial Intelligence, namely, a methodology for the large-scale implementation of AI methods in real organizations with fairness, model explainability and accountability at its core. Our ultimate goal is to provide newcomers to XAI with a reference material in order to stimulate future research advances, but also to encourage experts and professionals from other disciplines to embrace the benefits of AI in their activity sectors, without any prior bias for its lack of interpretability.

The global landscape of AI ethics guidelines

Abstract: In the past five years, private companies, research institutions and public sector organizations have issued principles and guidelines for ethical artificial intelligence (AI). However, despite an apparent agreement that AI should be ‘ethical’, there is debate about both what constitutes ‘ethical AI’ and which ethical requirements, technical standards and best practices are needed for its realization. To investigate whether a global agreement on these questions is emerging, we mapped and analysed the current corpus of principles and guidelines on ethical AI. Our results reveal a global convergence emerging around five ethical principles (transparency, justice and fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility and privacy), with substantive divergence in relation to how these principles are interpreted, why they are deemed important, what issue, domain or actors they pertain to, and how they should be implemented. Our findings highlight the importance of integrating guideline-development efforts with substantive ethical analysis and adequate implementation strategies.

Artificial Intelligence: the global landscape of ethics guidelines.

Abstract: In the last five years, private companies, research institutions as well as public sector organisations have issued principles and guidelines for ethical AI, yet there is debate about both what constitutes "ethical AI" and which ethical requirements, technical standards and best practices are needed for its realization. To investigate whether a global agreement on these questions is emerging, we mapped and analyzed the current corpus of principles and guidelines on ethical AI. Our results reveal a global convergence emerging around five ethical principles (transparency, justice and fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility and privacy), with substantive divergence in relation to how these principles are interpreted; why they are deemed important; what issue, domain or actors they pertain to; and how they should be implemented. Our findings highlight the importance of integrating guideline-development efforts with substantive ethical analysis and adequate implementation strategies.