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Michèle Breton

Researcher at HEC Montréal

Publications -  142
Citations -  1851

Michèle Breton is an academic researcher from HEC Montréal. The author has contributed to research in topics: Duopoly & Credit risk. The author has an hindex of 20, co-authored 139 publications receiving 1671 citations. Previous affiliations of Michèle Breton include École Normale Supérieure & Université de Montréal.

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Supplier selection-order allocation: A two stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach

TL;DR: In this paper, a two-stage multiple criteria dynamic programming approach for supplier selection and order allocation is proposed for two of the most critical tasks in supply chain management, namely, suppliers selection and ordering, subject to constraints on demand, capacity and inventory levels.
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Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games

TL;DR: In this article, the concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism.

Sequential Stackelberg E-Equilibria in Two-Person Games

TL;DR: The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism and can be related to previous results obtained by Başar and Haurie (1984).
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A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs), while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decides on their emissions by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatories.
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A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects

TL;DR: The results show that allowing for foreign investments could in some cases increase the welfares of both parties involved in the project and imposing an environmental target constraint does not necessarily deteriorate the payoffs of both players.