Bio: 敏夫 久郷 is an academic researcher. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 30 citations.
01 Jan 1981
TL;DR: The present article delineates the complex structure of collective identity by incorporating two levels of analysis: the micro level and the macro level, which relates to individual society members’ recognition of and categorization as belonging to a group, with the accompanying cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences.
Abstract: The present article delineates the complex structure of collective identity by incorporating two levels of analysis. The first, the micro level, pertains to individual society members' recognition of and categorization as belonging to a group, with the accompanying cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences. The second, the macro level, pertains to the notion of collective identity that denotes the shared awareness by constituents of a society of being members of a collective. This level is founded on two pillars: One pillar consists of generic features that characterize the collective identity. These features apply to macro-level collectives and allow a comparison among them. The other pillar is particular and consists of content characteristics that provide the unique features of the collective identity. The conceptual framework is applied to the analysis of the national collective identity as a case example. The contributions and implications of the described conception are discussed.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend a straightforward application of Lockean property arguments to territorial rights and argue that it is possible to apply directly Lockean principles regarding land use to territorial claims.
Abstract: In this article I defend a straightforward application of Lockean property arguments to territorial rights. The article is divided into three parts. In the first part I explain the difference between two rights to land: property rights and territorial rights. In the second part I explain why an individualistic account of a Lockean theory of territory cannot be used to theorise about territorial rights. In the third part I defend a collectivist version of Lockean theory of territory. I argue that it is possible to apply directly Lockean principles regarding land use to territorial rights. I punctuate my defence with examples where Lockean principles are intuitively helpful in resolving conflicts over territorial rights.
01 Jan 1989
Abstract: Throughout the reading process, a narrative text produces various sensations of immediacy or distance. One important reason for this is that a narrative will in some places present situtations from a particular perspective, with which the reader is implicitly invited to identify, while in other places it will describe situations as independent of any perspective. If a perspective (that of the narrator, or that of a character in the text) is introduced, the narrative reflects an individual's (potentially fallible) perceptions, attitudes or beliefs; and this creates the impression of perspectival immediacy. If no perspective is introduced, on the other hand, the narrative pretends to relate "objective facts" within the fiction; and this creates the impression of perspectival distance. Thus the contrast between perepectivally situated and perepectivally non-situated sentences in a narrative produces perspectival refractions. The difference between both types of sentences, however, is often felt to be recalcitrant to a full linguistic analysis. For example, it is generally assumed that the perspectival status of a sentence is determined by the presence or absence of aubject-oriented elements in the sentence. But although such elements play an important role in focusing perspective, they need not occur in a sentence for the sentence to be perspectivally situated. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, we draw attention to an observation which has received very little attention in the existing literature on perspective: per pectivally non-situated sentences typically move narrative time forward (in the sense that the order of the sentences on the page mimics temporal progression on the imaginary time line of the narrative), while perspectivally situated sentences do not convey forward movement in time. In other words, there appears to be a relationship between temporal ordering and perspective. Our aim is to specify the precise nature of this relationship.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors sketch the contours of an alternative resource governance scheme built around the idea of an International Court of the Environment and show that states do not require full control over all resources found in their territory in order to be sovereign.
Abstract: The national resource privilege, which holds that states are allowed to control all the natural resources found in their territory, is a cornerstone of international politics. Supporters of the national resource privilege claim that without the privilege states would fail to be sovereign and self-determining entities which provide for the needs of their citizens. However, as this paper shows the case is not as simple as that. In fact, control over resources must be carefully unpacked. Doing so shows that states do not require full control over all resources found in their territory in order to be sovereign. Moreover, sovereignty and self-determination come with a set of responsibilities and duties attached. Based on these observations the paper will sketch the contours of an alternative resource governance scheme built around the idea of an International Court of the Environment.
01 Mar 2015
TL;DR: This paper argued that both of those approaches endorse an unacceptably strong view of the justifiability of states and should therefore be rejected, and that the view in On Global Justice emerges vindicated, according to which territorial rights, the justification of states, and immigration all need to be theorized together.
Abstract: The author’s 2012 book On Global Justice gives pride of place to the idea that humanity collectively owns the earth. Independently, there has been a flourishing literature on the justification of rights to territory. Central to this discussion are a Kantian and a Lockean approach. This paper recapitulates the author’s approach to humanity’s collective ownership of the earth and argues that, properly understood, both of those approaches should integrate the global standpoint constituted thereby. However, the goal here is not to amend the Kantian and Lockean approaches to territory, but to refute them. To that end the paper also argues that both approaches endorse an unacceptably strong view of the justifiability of states and should therefore be rejected. The view in On Global Justice emerges vindicated, according to which territorial rights, the justification of states and immigration all need to be theorized together, and need to be theorized from a genuinely global standpoint.