Minlei Ye

TL;DR: This article examined the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry and found that bank managers with high equity incentives are more likely to manage earnings, but only when capital ratios are closer to the minimum regulatory capital requirements.

TL;DR: In this paper, the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the banking industry is examined, focusing on this regulated industry and using industry-specific earnings management proxies, and the relationship is examined in the context of the financial services industry.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that joint audits by one big firm and one small firm may impair audit quality, because, in that situation, joint audits induce a free-riding problem between audit firms, lowering audit evidence precision, and creating an opportunity for internal opinion shopping, compromising auditor independence.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a theory of the negotiating positions, or preferences over auditing standards, of the interest groups that may set such standards, and show that auditors and investors would consider both toughness and vagueness in influencing or setting auditing standard.

TL;DR: The authors showed that joint audits by one big firm and one small firm may impair audit quality, because, in that situation, joint audits induce a free-riding problem between audit firms and reduce audit evidence precision.