Mohammad Hossein Manshaei

Bio: Mohammad Hossein Manshaei is an academic researcher from Isfahan University of Technology. The author has contributed to research in topics: Game theory & Nash equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 92 publications receiving 2793 citations. Previous affiliations of Mohammad Hossein Manshaei include French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation & Florida International University.

Game theory meets network security and privacy

Abstract: This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that use game-theoretic approaches. We present a selected set of works to highlight the application of game theory in addressing different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. We organize the presented works in six main categories: security of the physical and MAC layers, security of self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, we identify security problems, players, and game models. We summarize the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs. In addition, we provide a discussion on the advantages, drawbacks, and future direction of using game theory in this field. In this survey, our goal is to instill in the reader an enhanced understanding of different research approaches in applying game-theoretic methods to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking.

IEEE 802.11 rate adaptation: a practical approach

Abstract: Today, three different physical (PHY) layers for the IEEE 802.11 WLAN are available (802.11a/b/g); they all provide multi-rate capabilities. To achieve a high performance under varying conditions, these devices need to adapt their transmission rate dynamically. While this rate adaptation algorithm is a critical component of their performance, only very few algorithms such as Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) or Receiver Based Auto Rate (RBAR) have been published and the implementation challenges associated with these mechanisms have never been publicly discussed. In this paper, we first present the important characteristics of the 802.11 systems that must be taken into account when such algorithms are designed. Specifically, we emphasize the contrast between low latency and high latency systems, and we give examples of actual chipsets that fall in either of the different categories. We propose an Adaptive ARF (AARF) algorithm for low latency systems that improves upon ARF to provide both short-term and long-term adaptation. The new algorithm has very low complexity while obtaining a performance similar to RBAR, which requires incompatible changes to the 802.11 MAC and PHY protocol. Finally, we present a new rate adaptation algorithm designed for high latency systems that has been implemented and evaluated on an AR5212-based device. Experimentation results show a clear performance improvement over the algorithm previously implemented in the AR5212 driver we used.

On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis

Abstract: In mobile networks, authentication is a required primitive for the majority of security protocols. However, an adversary can track the location of mobile nodes by monitoring pseudonyms used for authentication. A frequently proposed solution to protect location privacy suggests that mobile nodes collectively change their pseudonyms in regions called mix zones. Because this approach is costly, self-interested mobile nodes might decide not to cooperate and could thus jeopardize the achievable location privacy. In this paper, we analyze the non-cooperative behavior of mobile nodes by using a game-theoretic model, where each player aims at maximizing its location privacy at a minimum cost. We first analyze the Nash equilibria in n-player complete information games. Because mobile nodes in a privacy-sensitive system do not know their opponents' payoffs, we then consider incomplete information games. We establish that symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria exist with simple threshold strategies in n-player games and derive the equilibrium strategies. By means of numerical results, we show that mobile nodes become selfish when the cost of changing pseudonyms is small, whereas they cooperate more when the cost of changing pseudonyms increases. Finally, we design a protocol - the PseudoGame protocol - based on the results of our analysis.

On Wireless Social Community Networks

Abstract: Wireless social community networks are emerging as a new alternative to providing wireless data access in urban areas. By relying on users in the network deployment, a wireless community can rapidly deploy a high-quality data access infrastructure in an inexpensive way. But, the coverage of such a network is limited by the set of access points deployed by the users. Currently, it is not clear if this paradigm can serve as a replacement of existing centralized networks operating in licensed bands (such as cellular networks) or if it should be considered as a complimentary service only, with limited coverage. This question currently concerns many wireless network operators. In this paper, we study the dynamics of wireless social community networks by using a simple analytical model. In this model, users choose their service provider based on the subscription fee and the offered coverage. We show how the evolution of social community networks depends on their initial coverage, the subscription fee, and the user preferences for coverage. We conclude that by using an efficient static or dynamic pricing strategy, the wireless social community can obtain a high coverage. Using a game-theoretic approach, we then study a case where the mobile users can choose between the services provided by a licensed band operator and those of a social community. We show that for specific distribution of user preferences, there exists a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative game.

On the Age of Pseudonyms in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

Abstract: In many envisioned mobile ad hoc networks, nodes are expected to periodically beacon to advertise their presence. In this way, they can receive messages addressed to them or participate in routing operations. Yet, these beacons leak information about the nodes and thus hamper their privacy. A classic remedy consists of each node making use of (certified) pseudonyms and changing its pseudonym in specific locations called mix zones. Of course, privacy is then higher if the pseudonyms are short-lived (i.e., nodes have a short distance-to-confusion), but pseudonyms can be costly, as they are usually obtained from an external authority. In this paper, we provide a detailed analytical evaluation of the age of pseudonyms based on differential equations. We corroborate this model by a set of simulations. This paper thus provides a detailed quantitative framework for selecting the parameters of a pseudonym-based privacy system in peer-to-peer wireless networks.

Principles of Neural Science

Abstract: I have developed "tennis elbow" from lugging this book around the past four weeks, but it is worth the pain, the effort, and the aspirin. It is also worth the (relatively speaking) bargain price. Including appendixes, this book contains 894 pages of text. The entire panorama of the neural sciences is surveyed and examined, and it is comprehensive in its scope, from genomes to social behaviors. The editors explicitly state that the book is designed as "an introductory text for students of biology, behavior, and medicine," but it is hard to imagine any audience, interested in any fragment of neuroscience at any level of sophistication, that would not enjoy this book. The editors have done a masterful job of weaving together the biologic, the behavioral, and the clinical sciences into a single tapestry in which everyone from the molecular biologist to the practicing psychiatrist can find and appreciate his or

Economics of Information

Abstract: The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Achieving single channel, full duplex wireless communication

Abstract: This paper discusses the design of a single channel full-duplex wireless transceiver. The design uses a combination of RF and baseband techniques to achieve full-duplexing with minimal effect on link reliability. Experiments on real nodes show the full-duplex prototype achieves median performance that is within 8% of an ideal full-duplexing system. This paper presents Antenna Cancellation, a novel technique for self-interference cancellation. In conjunction with existing RF interference cancellation and digital baseband interference cancellation, antenna cancellation achieves the amount of self-interference cancellation required for full-duplex operation. The paper also discusses potential MAC and network gains with full-duplexing. It suggests ways in which a full-duplex system can solve some important problems with existing wireless systems including hidden terminals, loss of throughput due to congestion, and large end-to-end delays.

A Tutorial on UAVs for Wireless Networks: Applications, Challenges, and Open Problems

Abstract: The use of flying platforms such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as drones, is rapidly growing. In particular, with their inherent attributes such as mobility, flexibility, and adaptive altitude, UAVs admit several key potential applications in wireless systems. On the one hand, UAVs can be used as aerial base stations to enhance coverage, capacity, reliability, and energy efficiency of wireless networks. On the other hand, UAVs can operate as flying mobile terminals within a cellular network. Such cellular-connected UAVs can enable several applications ranging from real-time video streaming to item delivery. In this paper, a comprehensive tutorial on the potential benefits and applications of UAVs in wireless communications is presented. Moreover, the important challenges and the fundamental tradeoffs in UAV-enabled wireless networks are thoroughly investigated. In particular, the key UAV challenges such as 3D deployment, performance analysis, channel modeling, and energy efficiency are explored along with representative results. Then, open problems and potential research directions pertaining to UAV communications are introduced. Finally, various analytical frameworks and mathematical tools, such as optimization theory, machine learning, stochastic geometry, transport theory, and game theory are described. The use of such tools for addressing unique UAV problems is also presented. In a nutshell, this tutorial provides key guidelines on how to analyze, optimize, and design UAV-based wireless communication systems.