Morgan Williams

Bio: Morgan Williams is an academic researcher from Swarthmore College. The author has contributed to research in topics: Social environment & Generalizability theory. The author has an hindex of 4, co-authored 5 publications receiving 148 citations.

The social psychology of perception experiments: hills, backpacks, glucose, and the problem of generalizability.

Abstract: Experiments take place in a physical environment but also a social environment. Generalizability from experimental manipulations to more typical contexts may be limited by violations of ecological validity with respect to either the physical or the social environment. A replication and extension of a recent study (a blood glucose manipulation) was conducted to investigate the effects of experimental demand (a social artifact) on participant behaviors judging the geographical slant of a large-scale outdoor hill. Three different assessments of experimental demand indicate that even when the physical environment is naturalistic, and the goal of the main experimental manipulation was primarily concealed, artificial aspects of the social environment (such as an explicit requirement to wear a heavy backpack while estimating the slant of a hill) may still be primarily responsible for altered judgments of hill orientation.

Anchoring in action: Manual estimates of slant are powerfully biased toward initial hand orientation and are correlated with verbal report

Abstract: People verbally overestimate hill slant by ~15–25° whereas manual estimates (e.g., palm board measures) are thought to be more accurate. The relative accuracy of palm boards has contributed to the widely cited theoretical claim that they tap into an accurate, but unconscious motor representation of locomotor space. In the current work, four replications (total N = 204) carried out by two different laboratories tested an alternative, anchoring hypothesis that manual action measures give low estimates because they are always initiated from horizontal. The results of all four replications indicate that the bias from response anchoring can entirely account for the difference between manual and verbal estimates. Moreover consistent correlations between manual and verbal estimates given by the same observers support the conclusion that both measures are based on the same visual representation. Concepts from the study of judgment under uncertainty apply even to action measures in information rich environments.

Direct manipulation of perceived angular declination affects perceived size and distance: a replication and extension of Wallach and O’Leary (1982)

Abstract: In two experiments involving a total of 83 participants, the effect of vertical angular optical compression on the perceived distance and size of a target on the ground was investigated. Replicating an earlier report (Wallach & O’Leary, 1982), reducing the apparent angular declination below the horizon produced apparent object width increases (by 33 %), consistent with the perception of a greater ground distance to the object. A throwing task confirmed that perceived distance was indeed altered by about 33 %. The results are discussed in relation to cue recruitment and to recent evidence of systematic bias in the perception of angular declination.

Direct manipulation of perceived angular declination affects perceived size and distance: A replication and extension of Wallach and O'Leary (1982).

Abstract: In two experiments involving a total of 83 participants, the effect of vertical angular optical compression on the perceived distance and size of a target on the ground was investigated. Replicating an earlier report (Wallach & O’Leary, 1982), reducing the apparent angular declination below the horizon produced apparent object width increases (by 33 %), consistent with the perception of a greater ground distance to the object. A throwing task confirmed that perceived distance was indeed altered by about 33 %. The results are discussed in relation to cue recruitment and to recent evidence of systematic bias in the perception of angular declination.

The Perception of the Visual World. By James J. Gibson. U.S.A.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950 (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London). Price 35s.

Abstract: Let's read! We will often find out this sentence everywhere. When still being a kid, mom used to order us to always read, so did the teacher. Some books are fully read in a week and we need the obligation to support reading. What about now? Do you still love reading? Is reading only for you who have obligation? Absolutely not! We here offer you a new book enPDFd the perception of the visual world to read.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for "top-down" effects.

Abstract: What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional "modular" understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies - either individually or collectively - provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions. Language: en

“Top-Down” Effects Where None Should Be Found The El Greco Fallacy in Perception Research

Abstract: A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states such as moods, action capabilities, and categorical knowledge can literally and directly affect how things look. Are these truly effects on perception, or might some instead reflect influences on judgment, memory, or response bias? Here, we exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called “El Greco fallacy”) to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception. We suggest that this error may also contaminate several other varieties of top-down effects and that this discovery has implications for debates over the continuity (or lack thereof) of perception and cognition.

How "Paternalistic" Is Spatial Perception? Why Wearing a Heavy Backpack Doesn't— and Couldn't—Make Hills Look Steeper

Abstract: A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment. According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this view-including, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The "paternalistic" theory of spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true, it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here, this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic account of spatial perception not only isn't true-it couldn't be true, even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.

Are Older Adults Less Embodied? A Review of Age Effects through the Lens of Embodied Cognition

Abstract: Embodied cognition is a theoretical framework which posits that cognitive function is intimately intertwined with the body and physical actions. Although the field of psychology is increasingly accepting embodied cognition as a viable theory, it has rarely been employed in the gerontological literature. However, embodied cognition would appear to have explanatory power for aging research given that older adults typically manifest concurrent physical and mental changes, and that research has indicated a correlative relationship between such changes. The current paper reviews age-related changes in sensory processing, mental representation, and the action-perception relationship, exploring how each can be understood through the lens of embodied cognition. Compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit across all three domains an increased tendency to favor visual processing over bodily factors, leading to the conclusion that older adults are less embodied than young adults. We explore the significance of this finding in light of existing theoretical models of aging and argue that embodied cognition can benefit gerontological research by identifying further factors that can explain the cause of age-related declines.