Author
Nana Ma
Bio: Nana Ma is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Profitability index & Information asymmetry. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 8 citations.
Papers
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TL;DR: An agency problem with two companies competing over a menu of career incentive contracts for a manager, it is confirmed that it is unnecessary to provide career incentives under full information regardless of whether competition exists, and recommendations on mitigating the adverse impacts caused by competition and asymmetric information are provided.
8 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, two competing air cargo carriers' incentives of cooperation with promised-delivery-time (PDT) sensitive demand were studied, where Carrier 1 may invest in big data and share demand signal with Carrier 2.
Abstract: We study two competing air cargo carriers’ incentives of cooperation with promised-delivery-time (PDT) sensitive demand, where Carrier 1 may invest in big data and share demand signal with Carrier 2. When the carriers focus on demand competition, Carrier 1’s big data investment may benefit itself and the rival, while Carrier 1 never shares its updated demand signal. When the carriers focus on PDT competition, Carrier 2 does not prefer Carrier 1’s big data investment when the PDT competition is fierce. Interestingly, Carrier 1 may be willing to share its updated demand signal and a “win-win” situation occurs.
39 citations
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01 Jan 2010TL;DR: The authors formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real world contracting environments (e.g., agents with power utility and limited liability, lognormal stock price distributions, and stock options) as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC).
Abstract: The two major paradigms in the theoretical agency literature are moral hazard (i.e., hidden action) and adverse selection (i.e., hidden information). Prior research typically solves these problems in isolation, as opposed to simultaneously incorporating both adverse selection and moral hazard features. We formulate two complementary generalized principal-agent models that incorporate features observed in real world contracting environments (e.g., agents with power utility and limited liability, lognormal stock price distributions, and stock options) as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We use state- of-the-art numerical algorithms to solve the resulting models. We find that many of the standard results no longer obtain when wealth effects are present. We also develop a new measure of incentives calculated as the change in the agent's certainty equivalent under the optimal contract for a change in action evaluated at the optimal action. This measure facilitates interpretation of the resulting contracts and allows us to compare contracts across different contracting environments.
21 citations
TL;DR: A column generation-based distributed scheduling algorithm for multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem, where many independent processors coordinate with a resource manager who provides different types of vehicles to deliver products to the customers.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors summarize a sample of papers selected from a systematic literature review (SLR), involving research papers published from 1985 to 2019 based on a review of this literature, characterizing three stages within the careers of project managers.
12 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a risk-averse owner (he) who engages a risk neutral co-operator (co-operator) in a construction project is considered, where the cost details are unobserved or unknown to the owner.
Abstract: As a prevalent problem for construction projects, contractor cost details are unobserved or unknown to the owner. This paper considers a risk-averse owner (he) who engages a risk-neutral co...
8 citations