The second edition of this acclaimed graduate text provides a unified treatment of two methods used in contemporary econometric research, cross section and data panel methods. By focusing on assumptions that can be given behavioral content, the book maintains an appropriate level of rigor while emphasizing intuitive thinking. The analysis covers both linear and nonlinear models, including models with dynamics and/or individual heterogeneity. In addition to general estimation frameworks (particular methods of moments and maximum likelihood), specific linear and nonlinear methods are covered in detail, including probit and logit models and their multivariate, Tobit models, models for count data, censored and missing data schemes, causal (or treatment) effects, and duration analysis. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data was the first graduate econometrics text to focus on microeconomic data structures, allowing assumptions to be separated into population and sampling assumptions. This second edition has been substantially updated and revised. Improvements include a broader class of models for missing data problems; more detailed treatment of cluster problems, an important topic for empirical researchers; expanded discussion of "generalized instrumental variables" (GIV) estimation; new coverage (based on the author's own recent research) of inverse probability weighting; a more complete framework for estimating treatment effects with panel data, and a firmly established link between econometric approaches to nonlinear panel data and the "generalized estimating equation" literature popular in statistics and other fields. New attention is given to explaining when particular econometric methods can be applied; the goal is not only to tell readers what does work, but why certain "obvious" procedures do not. The numerous included exercises, both theoretical and computer-based, allow the reader to extend methods covered in the text and discover new insights.

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Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data

This paper differs from previous examinations of organizational learning in that it is broader in scope and more evaluative of the literatures. Four constructs related to organizational learning knowledge acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational memory are articulated, and the literatures related to each are described and critiqued.

The literature on knowledge acquisition is voluminous and multi-faceted, and so the knowledge acquisition construct is portrayed here as consisting of five subconstructs or subprocesses: 1 drawing on knowledge available at the organization's birth, 2 learning from experience, 3 learning by observing other organizations, 4 grafting on to itself components that possess knowledge needed but not possessed by the organization, and 5 noticing or searching for information about the organization's environment and performance. Examination of the related literatures indicates that much has been learned about learning from experience, but also that there is a lack of cumulative work and a lack of integration of work from different research groups. Similarly, much has been learned about organizational search, but there is a lack of conceptual work, and there is a lack of both cumulative work and syntheses with which to create a more mature literature. Congenital learning, vicarious learning, and grafting are information acquisition subprocesses about which relatively little has been learned.

The literature concerning information distribution is rich and mature, but an aspect of information distribution that is central to an organization's benefitting from its learning, namely how units that possess information and units that need this information can find each other quickly and with a high likelihood, is unexplored. Information interpretation, as an organizational process, rather than an individual process, requires empirical work for further advancement. Organizational memory is much in need of systematic investigation, particularly by those whose special concerns are improving organizational learning and decision making.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2634941.pdf

Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures

1. Introduction and Overview. 2. Detecting Influential Observations and Outliers. 3. Detecting and Assessing Collinearity. 4. Applications and Remedies. 5. Research Issues and Directions for Extensions. Bibliography. Author Index. Subject Index.

Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity

This paper investigates whether and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. We construct a manager-e rm matched panel data set which enables us to track the top managers across different e rms over time. We e nd that manager e xed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. A signie cant extent of the heterogeneity in investment, e nancial, and organizational practices of e rms can be explained by the presence of manager e xed effects. We identify specie c patterns in managerial decision-making that appear to indicate general differences in “ style” across managers. Moreover, we show that management style is signie cantly related to manager e xed effects in performance and that managers with higher performance e xed effects receive higher compensation and are more likely to be found in better governed e rms. In a e nal step, we tie back these e ndings to observable managerial characteristics. We e nd that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear on average to be more conservative; on the other hand, managers who hold an MBA degree seem to follow on average more aggressive strategies.

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Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w8178/w8178.pdf

The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century

This papers analyzes dispersion in the prices that an airline charges to different customers on the same route. Such variation in airlines fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two of an airline's passengers on a route averages thirty-six percent of the airline's average ticket price on the route. The pattern of price dispersion that we find does not seem to be explained solely by cost differences. Dispersion is higher on more competitive routes, possibly reflecting a pattern of discrimination against customers who are less willing to switch to alternative flights or airlines. We argue that the data support an explanation based on theories of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive industries.

Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry

We study dispersion in the prices an airline charges to different passengers on the same route This variation in fares is substantial: the expected absolute difference in fares between two passengers on a route is 36 percent of the airline's average ticket price The pattern of observed price dispersion cannot easily be explained by cost differences alone Dispersion increases on routes with more competition or lower flight density, consistent with discrimination based on customers' willingness to switch to alternative airlines or flights We argue that the data support models of price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets

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"This paper is a substantially revised version of an earlier working paper, number 1683-85 (July 1985).

Labor rent-sharing and regulation: evidence from the trucking industry

While neoclassical models assume static cost-minimization by firms, agency models suggest that firms may not minimize costs in less-competitive or regulated environments. We test this using a transition from cost-of-service regulation to market-orientedenvironments formany US electric generating plants. Our estimates of input demand suggest that publicly owned plants, whose owners were largely insulated from these reforms, experienced the smallest efficiency gains, while investor-owned plants in states that restructured their wholesale electricity markets improved the most. The results suggest modest medium-term efficiency benefits from replacing regulated monopoly with a market-based industry structure.

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Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency

Correlations between legislative support scores and presidential popularity do not accurately reflect the relationship between public opinion and presidential influence in Congress. Presidents make strategic choices to expend their public prestige to obtain congressional approval of programmatic initiatives. Previous studies have ignored such choices as well as other features of the strategic environment which tend to lower the apparent legislative success rates of popular presidents. A model of presidential and congressional behavior is proposed, and it is estimated that a 1 percent increase in a president's public support level increases the president's legislative approval rate by approximately 1 percent (holding program size fixed). Elections, it has long been recognized, do not provide U.S. presidents with clear policy mandates. In part this is because the voice of the electorate is often ambiguous. Elections are a good indicator of voters' general state of mind whether they are pleased or displeased by the overall course of government policy-but they give legislators little specific guidance on how existing programs should be changed or what new programs are needed. Presidents will read into their electoral majorities what they like, but Congress is under no obligation to take the same interpretation. The president's legislative program represents one interpretation of what the public demands; the congressional response to it represents another. Political scientists have traditionally shown a healthy skepticism toward the claims of congressmen that they merely give the public what it wants, but this impulse does exist and is reinforced by certain institutional arrangements - most notably, but not exclusively, elections. In this paper we will try to determine how and to what extent the fate of the president's legislative program rests on public opinion. We argue that previous studies have understated the extent to which congressional support of presidential policy initiatives depends on the president's public standing, but have also neglected some of the perils inherent in a presidential leadership style that rests on the president's personal popularity. Much of the argument is familiar. Twenty years ago Richard Neustadt (1955) identified "public prestige" as a source of presidential influence in Congress. While Neustadt (1980) has pointed out that public support for a president "operates mostly in the background as a conditioner, not the determinant of what

/pdf/passing-the-president-s-program-public-opinion-and-3ixlz58tdm.pdf

Nancy L. Rose

Papers

Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry

Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry

Labor rent-sharing and regulation: evidence from the trucking industry

Do Markets Reduce Costs? Assessing the Impact of Regulatory Restructuring on US Electric Generation Efficiency

Passing the president's program: Public opinion and presidential influence in Congress