Nicolas de Condorcet

Bio: Nicolas de Condorcet is an academic researcher. The author has contributed to research in topics: Condorcet's jury theorem & Condorcet method. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 1713 citations.

Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite Des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite Des Voix

Abstract: A central figure in the early years of the French Revolution, Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–94) was active as a mathematician, philosopher, politician and economist. He argued for the values of the Enlightenment, from religious toleration to the abolition of slavery, believing that society could be improved by the application of rational thought. In this essay, first published in 1785, Condorcet analyses mathematically the process of making majority decisions, and seeks methods to improve the likelihood of their success. The work was largely forgotten in the nineteenth century, while those who did comment on it tended to find the arguments obscure. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, it was rediscovered as a foundational work in the theory of voting and societal preferences. Condorcet presents several significant results, among which Condorcet's paradox (the non-transitivity of majority preferences) is now seen as the direct ancestor of Arrow's paradox.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

Multiple criteria decision analysis: state of the art surveys

Abstract: In two volumes, this new edition presents the state of the art in Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). Reflecting the explosive growth in the field seen during the last several years, the editors not only present surveys of the foundations of MCDA, but look as well at many new areas and new applications. Individual chapter authors are among the most prestigious names in MCDA research, and combined their chapters bring the field completely up to date. Part I of the book considers the history and current state of MCDA, with surveys that cover the early history of MCDA and an overview that discusses the “pre-theoretical” assumptions of MCDA. Part II then presents the foundations of MCDA, with individual chapters that provide a very exhaustive review of preference modeling, along with a chapter devoted to the axiomatic basis of the different models that multiple criteria preferences. Part III looks at outranking methods, with three chapters that consider the ELECTRE methods, PROMETHEE methods, and a look at the rich literature of other outranking methods. Part IV, on Multiattribute Utility and Value Theories (MAUT), presents chapters on the fundamentals of this approach, the very well known UTA methods, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and its more recent extension, the Analytic Network Process (ANP), as well as a chapter on MACBETH (Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Technique). Part V looks at Non-Classical MCDA Approaches, with chapters on risk and uncertainty in MCDA, the decision rule approach to MCDA, the fuzzy integral approach, the verbal decision methods, and a tentative assessment of the role of fuzzy sets in decision analysis. Part VI, on Multiobjective Optimization, contains chapters on recent developments of vector and set optimization, the state of the art in continuous multiobjective programming, multiobjective combinatorial optimization, fuzzy multicriteria optimization, a review of the field of goal programming, interactive methods for solving multiobjective optimization problems, and relationships between MCDA and evolutionary multiobjective optimization (EMO). Part VII, on Applications, selects some of the most significant areas, including contributions of MCDA in finance, energy planning problems, telecommunication network planning and design, sustainable development, and portfolio analysis. Finally, Part VIII, on MCDM software, presents well known MCDA software packages.

Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections

Abstract: Theory: Recent scholarship has emphasized the potential importance of cues, information shortcuts, and statistical aggregation processes in allowing relatively uninformed citizens to act, individually or collectively, as if they were fully informed. Hypotheses: Uninformed voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were fully informed. Failing that, individual deviations from fully informed voting cancel out in a mass electorate, producing the same aggregate election outcome as if voters were fully informed. Methods: Hypothetical "fully informed" vote choices are imputed to individual voters using the observed relationship between political information and vote choices for voters with similar social and demographic characteristics, estimated by probit analysis of data from National Election Study surveys conducted after the six most recent United States presidential elections. Results: Both hypotheses are clearly disconfirmed. At the individual level, the average deviation of actual vote probabilities from hypothetical "fully informed" vote probabilities was about ten percentage points. In the electorate as a whole, these deviations were significantly diluted by aggregation, but by no means eliminated: incumbent presidents did almost five percentage points better, and Democratic candidates did almost two percentage points better, than they would have if voters had in fact been "fully informed."

Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived