The American political science review

A definite idea of the university is the product of the times. As university s social being has been changeable, its-idea must be changed as time goes on. Futuristic universities must be re-classified: one is so-called brand-name university, uses of which are to contribute knowledge; another so-called mass-provider university, uses of which are provide trained personnel, namely, to train learned, skilled and numerous workers. It is the key to understand the uses of university when we discuss the ideas of university.

The Uses of the University

Journal of the American Statistical Association: William S. Cleveland, Marylyn E. McGill and Robert McGill, “The shape parameter for a two variable graph” 83 (1988) 289–300

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

/pdf/handbook-of-computational-social-choice-12i1xbv1b8.pdf

Handbook of Computational Social Choice

: This report briefly summarizes research on the following topics: game theory and energy; scheduling of large research and development programs; bimatrix games; cost/benefit analyses; measures of worth of weapons systems; hybrid primal algorithm; branch and round algorithm. A listing of papers prepared and published is included. (Author)

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA049700&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Mathematics of Operations Research.

Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory

In this article, the Program Committee of the Second Parameterized Algorithms and Computational Experiments challenge (PACE 2017) reports on the second iteration of the PACE challenge. Track A featured the Treewidth problem and Track B the Minimum Fill-In problem. Over 44 participants on 17 teams from 11 countries submitted their implementations to the competition.

https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2018/8558/pdf/LIPIcs-IPEC-2017-30.pdf/

The PACE 2017 Parameterized Algorithms and Computational Experiments Challenge: The Second Iteration

We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.

/pdf/a-framework-for-approval-based-budgeting-methods-389kh91zuo.pdf

A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

In a liquid democracy, voters can either vote directly or delegate their vote to another voter of their choice. We consider ordinal elections, and study a model of liquid democracy in which voters specify partial orders and use several delegates to refine them. This flexibility, however, comes at a price, as individual rationality (in the form of transitive preferences) can no longer be guaranteed. We discuss ways to detect and overcome such complications. Based on the framework of distance rationalization, we introduce novel variants of voting rules that are tailored to the liquid democracy context.

/pdf/pairwise-liquid-democracy-1vbzudq05n.pdf

Nimrod Talmon

Papers

Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory

The PACE 2017 Parameterized Algorithms and Computational Experiments Challenge: The Second Iteration

A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods

Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

Pairwise Liquid Democracy