Nitish Korula

Bio: Nitish Korula is an academic researcher from Google. The author has contributed to research in topics: Approximation algorithm & Online algorithm. The author has an hindex of 23, co-authored 54 publications receiving 2198 citations. Previous affiliations of Nitish Korula include University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign.

An efficient reconciliation algorithm for social networks

Abstract: People today typically use multiple online social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, etc.). Each online network represents a subset of their "real" ego-networks. An interesting and challenging problem is to reconcile these online networks, that is, to identify all the accounts belonging to the same individual. Besides providing a richer understanding of social dynamics, the problem has a number of practical applications. At first sight, this problem appears algorithmically challenging. Fortunately, a small fraction of individuals explicitly link their accounts across multiple networks; our work leverages these connections to identify a very large fraction of the network. Our main contributions are to mathematically formalize the problem for the first time, and to design a simple, local, and efficient parallel algorithm to solve it. We are able to prove strong theoretical guarantees on the algorithm's performance on well-established network models (Random Graphs, Preferential Attachment). We also experimentally confirm the effectiveness of the algorithm on synthetic and real social network data sets.

Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal

Abstract: We study an online weighted assignment problem with a set of fixed nodes corresponding to advertisers and online arrival of nodes corresponding to ad impressions. Advertiser a has a contract for n(a) impressions, and each impression has a set of weighted edges to advertisers. The problem is to assign the impressions online so that while each advertiser a gets n(a) impressions, the total weight of edges assigned is maximized. Our insight is that ad impressions allow for free disposal, that is, advertisers are indifferent to, or prefer being assigned more than n(a) impressions without changing the contract terms. This means that the value of an assignment only includes the n(a) highest-weighted items assigned to each node a. With free disposal, we provide an algorithm for this problem that achieves a competitive ratio of 1 ? 1/e against the offline optimum, and show that this is the best possible ratio. We use a primal/dual framework to derive our results, applying a novel exponentially-weighted dual update rule. Furthermore, our algorithm can be applied to a general set of assignment problems including the ad words problem as a special case, matching the previously known 1 ? 1/e competitive ratio.

Improved algorithms for orienteering and related problems

Abstract: In this article, we consider the orienteering problem in undirected and directed graphs and obtain improved approximation algorithms. The point to point-orienteering problem is the following: Given an edge-weighted graph G=(V, E) (directed or undirected), two nodes s, t ∈ V and a time limit B, find an s-twalk in G of total length at most B that maximizes the number of distinct nodes visited by the walk. This problem is closely related to tour problems such as TSP as well as network design problems such as k-MST. Orienteering with time-windows is the more general problem in which each node v has a specified time-window [R(v), D(v)] and a node v is counted as visited by the walk only if v is visited during its time-window. We design new and improved algorithms for the orienteering problem and orienteering with time-windows. Our main results are the following:— A (2+e) approximation for orienteering in undirected graphs, improving upon the 3-approximation of Bansal et al. [2004].— An O(log2 OPT) approximation for orienteering in directed graphs, where OPT ≤ n is the number of vertices visited by an optimal solution. Previously, only a quasipolynomial-time algorithm due to Chekuri and Pal [2005] achieved a polylogarithmic approximation (a ratio of O(log OPT)).— Given an α approximation for orienteering, we show an O(α c max{log OPT, log lmax/lmin}) approximation for orienteering with time-windows, where lmax and lmin are the lengths of the longest and shortest time-windows respectively.

An efficient reconciliation algorithm for social networks

Abstract: People today typically use multiple online social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, etc.). Each online network represents a subset of their "real" ego-networks. An interesting and challenging problem is to reconcile these online networks, that is, to identify all the accounts belonging to the same individual. Besides providing a richer understanding of social dynamics, the problem has a number of practical applications. At first sight, this problem appears algorithmically challenging. Fortunately, a small fraction of individuals explicitly link their accounts across multiple networks; our work leverages these connections to identify a very large fraction of the network. Our main contributions are to mathematically formalize the problem for the first time, and to design a simple, local, and efficient parallel algorithm to solve it. We are able to prove strong theoretical guarantees on the algorithm's performance on well-established network models (Random Graphs, Preferential Attachment). We also experimentally confirm the effectiveness of the algorithm on synthetic and real social network data sets.

Online Stochastic Packing Applied to Display Ad Allocation

Abstract: Inspired by online ad allocation, we study online stochastic packing linear programs from theoretical and practical standpoints. We first present a near-optimal online algorithm for a general class of packing linear programs which model various online resource allocation problems including online variants of routing, ad allocations, generalized assignment, and combinatorial auctions. As our main theoretical result, we prove that a simple primal-dual training-based algorithm achieves a (1 - o(1))-approximation guarantee in the random order stochastic model. This is a significant improvement over logarithmic or constant-factor approximations for the adversarial variants of the same problems (e.g. factor 1 - 1/e for online ad allocation, and \log m for online routing). We then focus on the online display ad allocation problem and study the efficiency and fairness of various training-based and online allocation algorithms on data sets collected from real-life display ad allocation system. Our experimental evaluation confirms the effectiveness of training-based primal-dual algorithms on real data sets, and also indicate an intrinsic trade-off between fairness and efficiency.

Random graphs

Abstract: We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks

Abstract: (2003). Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks. Technometrics: Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 370-371.

Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

Abstract: We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution. In single parameter settings (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by a single private value for being served and zero for not being served) this problem is solved [20]. Unfortunately, these single parameter optimal mechanisms are impractical and rarely employed [1], and furthermore the underlying economic theory fails to generalize to the important, relevant, and unsolved multi-dimensional setting (i.e., where each agent's preference is given by multiple values for each of the multiple services available) [25].In contrast to the theory of optimal mechanisms we develop a theory of sequential posted price mechanisms, where agents in sequence are offered take-it-or-leave-it prices. We prove that these mechanisms are approximately optimal in single-dimensional settings. These posted-price mechanisms avoid many of the properties of optimal mechanisms that make the latter impractical. Furthermore, these mechanisms generalize naturally to multi-dimensional settings where they give the first known approximations to the elusive optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. In particular, we solve multi-dimensional multi-unit auction problems and generalizations to matroid feasibility constraints. The constant approximations we obtain range from 1.5 to 8. For all but one case, our posted price sequences can be computed in polynomial time.This work can be viewed as an extension and improvement of the single-agent algorithmic pricing work of [9] to the setting of multiple agents where the designer has combinatorial feasibility constraints on which agents can simultaneously obtain each service.