Norbert Ladoux

Bio: Norbert Ladoux is an academic researcher from University of Toulouse. The author has contributed to research in topics: Optimal tax & Value-added tax. The author has an hindex of 6, co-authored 21 publications receiving 309 citations.

Second-Best Pollution Taxes and the Structure of Preferences

Abstract: We characterize optimal taxes on polluting and nonpolluting goods in Ramsey and Mirrlees second-best environments. The polluting good tax differs from the Pigouvian tax by Ramsey terms in the first and by Stiglitz/Mirrlees plus another adjustment term in the second. These terms can be positive, negative, or zero. If preferences are weakly separable in public and private goods, with the private good subutility weakly separable in labor and produced goods, nonpolluting goods are taxed uniformly and the concept of a tax differential between polluting and nonpolluting goods is well defined. The differential is then less than the Pigouvian tax in the Ramsey framework, but it can be greater, equal to, or smaller than the Pigouvian tax in the Mirrlees second best. In Mirrlees second best, if preferences are separable in labor supply and other goods, the second-best tax differential is identical to the Pigouvian tax.

Modeling Corner Solutions with Panel Data : Application to the Industrial Energy Demand in France.

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical application of Lee and Pitt’s (1986) approach to the problem of corner solutions in the case of panel data. This model deals with corner solutions in a manner consistent with the firm behavior theory while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In this model, energy demand at industrial plant level is the result of a discrete choice of the type of the energy to be consumed and a continuous choice that defines the level of demand. The econometric model is, essentially, an endogenous switching regime model which requires the evaluation of multivariate probability integrals. We estimate the random effect model by maximum likelihood using a panel of industrial French plants from the paper and pulp industry. We calculate empirical price elasticities of energy demand from the model. We also study the effects on energy demand of an environmental policy aimed at reducing CO2 emissions.

Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: an Updated Reader's Guide

Abstract: This paper draws on the literature on the double dividend to explore whether an environmental tax reform yields not only a cleaner environment but also non-environmental benefits In doing so, it investigates how environmental tax reforms impact welfare, the distribution of income, and employment Also the political economy of environmental taxation is discussed

Making carbon pricing work for citizens

Abstract: The gap between actual carbon prices and those required to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation could be closed by enhancing the public acceptability of carbon pricing through appropriate use of the revenues raised. In this Perspective, we synthesize findings regarding the optimal use of carbon revenues from both traditional economic analyses and studies in behavioural and political science that are focused on public acceptability. We then compare real-world carbon pricing regimes with theoretical insights on distributional fairness, revenue salience, political trust and policy stability. We argue that traditional economic lessons on efficiency and equity are subsidiary to the primary challenge of garnering greater political acceptability and make recommendations for enhancing political support through appropriate revenue uses in different economic and political circumstances. Ambitious carbon pricing reform is needed to meet climate targets. This Perspective argues that effective revenue recycling schemes should prioritize behavioural considerations that are aimed at achieving greater political acceptance.

Transfers in Cash and in Kind: Theory Meets the Data

Abstract: We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations including the "Samaritan's Dilemma", pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs, but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.

The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics

Abstract: Preface xvii CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 PART I: FRAMEWORK CHAPTER 2: An Integrated View 13 CHAPTER 3: The Social Objective 35 PART II: OPTIMAL TAXATION CHAPTER 4: Optimal Income Taxation 53 CHAPTER 5: Elaboration and Extensions 80 CHAPTER 6: Income and Commodity Taxation 122 PART III: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES CHAPTER 7: Transfer Payments 151 CHAPTER 8: Goods and Services 179 PART IV: ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF TAXATION CHAPTER 9: Taxation of Capital 221 CHAPTER 10: Taxation of Transfers 249 CHAPTER 11: Taxation and Social Security 275 CHAPTER 12: Taxation of Families 315 PART V: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE CHAPTER 13: Welfare 347 CHAPTER 14: Social Welfare Function 370 CHAPTER 15: Other Normative Criteria 391 CHAPTER 16: Conclusion 407 References 417 Index 455

Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data

Abstract: We review theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers in light of the limited empirical evidence. After reviewing the traditional paternalistic arguments, we consider explanations based on imperfect information and self-targeting. We then discuss the large literature on in-kind programs as a way of improving the efficiency of the tax system and a range of other possible explanations, including the "Samaritan's Dilemma," pecuniary effects, credit constraints, asymmetric information amongst agents, and political economy considerations. Our reading of the evidence suggests that paternalism and interdependent preferences are leading overall explanations for the existence of in-kind transfer programs but that some of the other arguments may apply to specific cases. Political economy considerations must also be part of the story.