Oded Berman

Bio: Oded Berman is an academic researcher from University of Toronto. The author has contributed to research in topics: Facility location problem & 1-center problem. The author has an hindex of 52, co-authored 283 publications receiving 9541 citations. Previous affiliations of Oded Berman include University of Massachusetts Amherst & California State University, Fullerton.

Optimal Location of Discretionary Service Facilities

Abstract: Automatic teller machines and gasoline service stations are two examples of a growing number of “discretionary service facilities.” In consuming service from these facilities, a significant fraction of customers do so on an otherwise preplanned trip (e.g., on the daily commute to and from work). A system planner, in determining the best locations of such facilities, is more concerned with placing the facilities along paths of customer flow rather than, say, near the center of a cluster of residences or work places. We formally model this problem and present a method for determining the optimal locations of m discretionary service facilities so as to intercept the maximum possible potential customer flow. We also show how to determine the minimal number of facilities required to intercept a prespecified fraction of total customer flow. Computational results are included.

Facility Reliability Issues in Network p-Median Problems: Strategic Centralization and Co-location Effects

Abstract: In this paper we analyze a facility location model where facilities may be subject to disruptions, causing customers to seek service from the operating facilities. We generalize the classical p-Median problem on a network to explicitly include the failure probabilities, and analyze structural and algorithmic aspects of the resulting model. The optimal location patterns are seen to be strongly dependent on the probability of facility failure - with facilities becoming more centralized, or even co-located, as the failure probability grows. Several exact and heuristic solution approaches are developed. Extensive numerical computations are performed

Facility Reliability Issues in Network p-Median Problems: Strategic Centralization and Co-Location Effects

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze a facility location model where facilities may be subject to disruptions, causing customers to seek service from the operating facilities. We generalize the classical p-median problem on a network to explicitly include the failure probabilities, and analyze structural and algorithmic aspects of the resulting model. The optimal location patterns are seen to be strongly dependent on the probability of facility failure, with facilities becoming more centralized, or even co-located, as the failure probability grows. Several exact and heuristic solution approaches are developed. Results of numerical experiments are reported.

Optimal Server Location on a Network Operating as an M/G/1 Queue

Abstract: This paper extends Hakimi's one-median problem by embedding it in a general queueing context. Demands for service arise solely on the nodes of a network G and occur in time as a Poisson process. A single mobile server resides at a facility located on G. The server, when available, is dispatched immediately to any demand that occurs. When a demand finds the server busy with a previous demand, it is either rejected Model 1 or entered into a queue that is depleted in a first-come, first-served manner Model 2. Service time for each demand comprises travel time to the scene, on-scene time, travel time back to the facility and possibly additional off-scene time. One desires to locate the facility on G so as to minimize average cost of response, which is either a weighted sum of mean travel time and cost of rejection Model 1, or the sum of mean queueing delay and mean travel time. For Model 1, one finds that the optimal location reduces to Hakimi's familiar nodal result. For Model 2, nonlinearities in the objective function can yield an optimal solution that is either at a node or on a link. Properties of the objective function for Model 2 are utilized to develop efficient finite-step procedures for finding the optimal location. Certain interesting properties of the optimal location as a function of demand rate are also developed.

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

Abstract: THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment

Abstract: The network structure of a hyperlinked environment can be a rich source of information about the content of the environment, provided we have effective means for understanding it. We develop a set of algorithmic tools for extracting information from the link structures of such environments, and report on experiments that demonstrate their effectiveness in a variety of context on the World Wide Web. The central issue we address within our framework is the distillation of broad search topics, through the discovery of “authorative” information sources on such topics. We propose and test an algorithmic formulation of the notion of authority, based on the relationship between a set of relevant authoritative pages and the set of “hub pages” that join them together in the link structure. Our formulation has connections to the eigenvectors of certain matrices associated with the link graph; these connections in turn motivate additional heuristrics for link-based analysis.

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Abstract: Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory

Abstract: Praise for the Third Edition: "This is one of the best books available. Its excellent organizational structure allows quick reference to specific models and its clear presentation . . . solidifies the understanding of the concepts being presented."IIE Transactions on Operations EngineeringThoroughly revised and expanded to reflect the latest developments in the field, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition continues to present the basic statistical principles that are necessary to analyze the probabilistic nature of queues. Rather than presenting a narrow focus on the subject, this update illustrates the wide-reaching, fundamental concepts in queueing theory and its applications to diverse areas such as computer science, engineering, business, and operations research.This update takes a numerical approach to understanding and making probable estimations relating to queues, with a comprehensive outline of simple and more advanced queueing models. Newly featured topics of the Fourth Edition include:Retrial queuesApproximations for queueing networksNumerical inversion of transformsDetermining the appropriate number of servers to balance quality and cost of serviceEach chapter provides a self-contained presentation of key concepts and formulae, allowing readers to work with each section independently, while a summary table at the end of the book outlines the types of queues that have been discussed and their results. In addition, two new appendices have been added, discussing transforms and generating functions as well as the fundamentals of differential and difference equations. New examples are now included along with problems that incorporate QtsPlus software, which is freely available via the book's related Web site.With its accessible style and wealth of real-world examples, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, Fourth Edition is an ideal book for courses on queueing theory at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It is also a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners who analyze congestion in the fields of telecommunications, transportation, aviation, and management science.

Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment

Abstract: The network structure of a hyperlinked environment can be a rich source of information about the content of the environment, provided we have eective means for understanding it. We develop a set of algorithmic tools for extracting information from the link structures of such environments, and report on experiments that demonstrate their eectiveness in a variety of contexts on the World Wide Web. The central issue we address within our framework is the distillation of broad search topics, through the discovery of \authoritative" information sources on such topics. We propose and test an algorithmic formulation of the notion of authority, based on the relationship between a set of relevant authoritative pages and the set of \hub pages" that join them together in the link structure. Our formulation has connections to the eigenvectors of certain matrices associated with the link graph; these connections in turn motivate additional heuristics for link-based analysis.