scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question

Showing papers by "Oliver E. Williamson published in 1994"


Book
01 Nov 1994
TL;DR: Williamson as discussed by the authors combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy.
Abstract: Oliver E. Williamson University of California, Berkeley This paper combines institutional economics with aspects of contract law and organization theory to identify and explicate the key differences that distinguish three generic forms of economic organization-market, hybrid, and hierarchy. The analysis shows that the three generic forms are distinguished by different coordinating and control mechanisms and by different abilities to adapt to disturbances. Also, each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law. The costeffective choice of organization form is shown to vary systematically with the attributes of transactions. The paper unifies two hitherto disjunct areas of institutional economics-the institutional environment and the institutions of governance-by treating the institutional environment as a locus of parameters, changes in which parameters bring about shifts in the comparative costs of governance. Changes in property rights, contract law, reputation effects, and uncertainty are investigated.'

6,602 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined the governance of contract, investment, and private ordering through the lens of transaction-cost economizing and assessed the efficacy of the de facto (as against the de jure) institutional environment with respect to credible commitments.
Abstract: Why are the ambitions of economic development practitioners and reformers so often disappointed? One answer is that development policymakers and reformers are congenital optimists. Another answer is that good plans are regularly defeated by those who occupy strategic positions. An intermediate answer is that institutions are important, yet are persistently neglected in the planning process. The article takes a bottom-up, microanalytical approach to economic development and reform. It examines the governance of contract, investment, and private ordering through the lens of transaction-cost economizing. And it assesses the efficacy of the de facto (as against the de jure) institutional environment with respect to credible commitments. In effect, institutional economists are cast in the role of archaeologists of economic reform and development - with the task of unpacking the lessons of the past to inform choices and programs for the future.

236 citations


Book
01 Jan 1994

83 citations