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Showing papers by "Oliver E. Williamson published in 2001"


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: Transact cost economics as mentioned in this paper is an alternative mode of governance with the main purpose of which is to economize on transaction costs, and it originates with path-breaking contributions by Karl Llewellyn (1931) on contract law; John R. Commons (1932) on the need to come to terms with the three conditions of conflict, mutuality and order; Ronald Coase (1937) on need to make provision for positive transaction costs; and Chester Barnard (1938), on the neglected importance of coordinated adaptation.
Abstract: Hierarchies and markets are herein described as alternative modes of governance, the main purpose of which is to economize on transaction costs. It originates with path-breaking contributions by Karl Llewellyn (1931) on contract law; John R. Commons (1932) on the need to come to terms with the three conditions of conflict, mutuality and order; Ronald Coase (1937) on the need to make provision for positive transaction costs; and Chester Barnard (1938) on the neglected importance of coordinated adaptation. These fundamental ideas were joined and operationalized in the 1970s as Transaction Cost Economics took shape and has been a work in progress since. Not only does a predictive theory emerge, but a large and growing empirical research literature that is broadly supportive has taken shape. Public policy ramifications proliferate.

45 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: In this article, the economics of property rights have been studied and applied to externalities, common pool problems, variable access, the theory of the firm, rent seeking, economic development and reform, and de facto property rights.
Abstract: Property rights concepts and thinking go back to antiquity, but it was only in the 1960s, when the concept of transaction costs was introduced into the analysis of property rights by Ronald Coase, that the modern treatment of property rights got underway. Applications to externalities, common pool problems, variable access, the theory of the firm, rent seeking, economic development and reform, and de facto property rights are sketched. Although property rights concepts and property rights thinking have gone a long way to reshape our understanding of economic institutions and effect public policy reform, the early ambitions of the economics of property rights have been realized incompletely. Here, as elsewhere, there can be too much of a good thing. Examples include unduly sanguine recommendations to jetison regulation, over-reaching interpretations of the modern corporation, and undue reliance on mass and rapid privatization as the way to implement economic reform.

10 citations