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Oliver Kosut

Bio: Oliver Kosut is an academic researcher from Arizona State University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Computer science & Mathematics. The author has an hindex of 22, co-authored 124 publications receiving 2678 citations. Previous affiliations of Oliver Kosut include Cornell University & Massachusetts Institute of Technology.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Malicious attacks against power systems are investigated, in which an adversary controls a set of meters and is able to alter the measurements from those meters, and an optimal attack based on minimum energy leakage is proposed.
Abstract: Malicious attacks against power systems are investigated, in which an adversary controls a set of meters and is able to alter the measurements from those meters. Two regimes of attacks are considered. The strong attack regime is where the adversary attacks a sufficient number of meters so that the network state becomes unobservable by the control center. For attacks in this regime, the smallest set of attacked meters capable of causing network unobservability is characterized using a graph theoretic approach. By casting the problem as one of minimizing a supermodular graph functional, the problem of identifying the smallest set of vulnerable meters is shown to have polynomial complexity. For the weak attack regime where the adversary controls only a small number of meters, the problem is examined from a decision theoretic perspective for both the control center and the adversary. For the control center, a generalized likelihood ratio detector is proposed that incorporates historical data. For the adversary, the trade-off between maximizing estimation error at the control center and minimizing detection probability of the launched attack is examined. An optimal attack based on minimum energy leakage is proposed.

770 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
04 Nov 2010
TL;DR: The problem of constructing malicious data attack of smart grid state estimation is considered together with countermeasures that detect the presence of such attacks and an efficient algorithm with polynomial-time complexity is obtained.
Abstract: The problem of constructing malicious data attack of smart grid state estimation is considered together with countermeasures that detect the presence of such attacks. For the adversary, using a graph theoretic approach, an efficient algorithm with polynomial-time complexity is obtained to find the minimum size unobservable malicious data attacks. When the unobservable attack does not exist due to restrictions of meter access, attacks are constructed to minimize the residue energy of attack while guaranteeing a certain level of increase of mean square error. For the control center, a computationally efficient algorithm is derived to detect and localize attacks using the generalized likelihood ratio test regularized by an L_1 norm penalty on the strength of attack.

353 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A bi-level optimization problem is introduced whose objective is to maximize the physical line flows subsequent to an FDI attack on DC SE, subject to constraints on both attacker resources and attack detection.
Abstract: An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level optimization problem is introduced whose objective is to maximize the physical line flows subsequent to an FDI attack on DC SE. The maximization is subject to constraints on both attacker resources (size of attack) and attack detection (limiting load shifts) as well as those required by DC optimal power flow (OPF) following SE. The resulting attacks are tested on a more realistic non-linear system model using AC state estimation and ACOPF, and it is shown that, with an appropriately chosen sub-network, the attacker can overload transmission lines with moderate shifts of load.

156 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
17 Mar 2010
TL;DR: An easily computable heuristic is developed to find bad adversarial attacks in all cases, and a new L∞ norm detector is introduced that outperforms more standard L2 norm based detectors by taking advantage of the inherent sparsity of the false data injection.
Abstract: Malicious attacks against power system state estimation are considered. It has been recently observed that if an adversary is able to manipulate the measurements taken at several meters in a power system, it can sometimes change the state estimate at the control center in a way that will never be detected by classical bad data detectors. However, in cases when the adversary is not able to perform this attack, it was not clear what attacks might look like. An easily computable heuristic is developed to find bad adversarial attacks in all cases. This heuristic recovers the undetectable attacks, but it will also find the most damaging attack in all cases. In addition, a Bayesian formulation of the bad data problem is introduced, which captures the prior information that a control center has about the likely state of the power system. This formulation softens the impact of undetectable attacks. Finally, a new L ∞ norm detector is introduced, and it is demonstrated that it outperforms more standard L 2 norm based detectors by taking advantage of the inherent sparsity of the false data injection.

151 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A general universal achievability procedure for finite blocklength analyses of other network information theory problems such as the multiple-access channel and broadcast channel is developed and a so-called information dispersion matrix characterizes these inner bounds.
Abstract: We analyze the dispersions of distributed lossless source coding (the Slepian-Wolf problem), the multiple-access channel, and the asymmetric broadcast channel. For the two-encoder Slepian-Wolf problem, we introduce a quantity known as the entropy dispersion matrix, which is analogous to the scalar dispersions that have gained interest recently. We prove a global dispersion result that can be expressed in terms of this entropy dispersion matrix and provides intuition on the approximate rate losses at a given blocklength and error probability. To gain better intuition about the rate at which the nonasymptotic rate region converges to the Slepian-Wolf boundary, we define and characterize two operational dispersions: 1) the local dispersion and 2) the weighted sum-rate dispersion. The former represents the rate of convergence to a point on the Slepian-Wolf boundary, whereas the latter represents the fastest rate for which a weighted sum of the two rates converges to its asymptotic fundamental limit. Interestingly, when we approach either of the two corner points, the local dispersion is characterized not by a univariate Gaussian, but a bivariate one as well as a subset of off-diagonal elements of the aforementioned entropy dispersion matrix. Finally, we demonstrate the versatility of our achievability proof technique by providing inner bounds for the multiple-access channel and the asymmetric broadcast channel in terms of dispersion matrices. All our proofs are unified by a so-called vector rate redundancy theorem, which is proved using the multidimensional Berry-Esseen theorem.

132 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids is presented and analyzed, under the assumption that the attacker can access the current power system configuration information and manipulate the measurements of meters at physically protected locations such as substations.
Abstract: A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, nonrandom causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers.In this article, we expose an unknown vulnerability of existing bad measurement detection algorithms by presenting and analyzing a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. Under the assumption that the attacker can access the current power system configuration information and manipulate the measurements of meters at physically protected locations such as substations, such attacks can introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables without being detected by existing algorithms. Moreover, we look at two scenarios, where the attacker is either constrained to specific meters or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios to change the results of state estimation in arbitrary ways. We also extend these attacks to generalized false data injection attacks, which can further increase the impact by exploiting measurement errors typically tolerated in state estimation. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems, and also discuss the practicality of these attacks and the real-world constraints that limit their effectiveness.

2,064 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
09 Nov 2009
TL;DR: A new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids are presented, showing that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection.
Abstract: A power grid is a complex system connecting electric power generators to consumers through power transmission and distribution networks across a large geographical area. System monitoring is necessary to ensure the reliable operation of power grids, and state estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state through analysis of meter measurements and power system models. Various techniques have been developed to detect and identify bad measurements, including the interacting bad measurements introduced by arbitrary, non-random causes. At first glance, it seems that these techniques can also defeat malicious measurements injected by attackers.In this paper, we present a new class of attacks, called false data injection attacks, against state estimation in electric power grids. We show that an attacker can exploit the configuration of a power system to launch such attacks to successfully introduce arbitrary errors into certain state variables while bypassing existing techniques for bad measurement detection. Moreover, we look at two realistic attack scenarios, in which the attacker is either constrained to some specific meters (due to the physical protection of the meters), or limited in the resources required to compromise meters. We show that the attacker can systematically and efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can not only change the results of state estimation, but also modify the results in arbitrary ways. We demonstrate the success of these attacks through simulation using IEEE test systems. Our results indicate that security protection of the electric power grid must be revisited when there are potentially malicious attacks.

1,592 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: The significance of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate cyber attacks is highlighted and a layered approach is introduced to evaluating risk based on the security of both the physical power applications and the supporting cyber infrastructure.
Abstract: The development of a trustworthy smart grid requires a deeper understanding of potential impacts resulting from successful cyber attacks. Estimating feasible attack impact requires an evaluation of the grid's dependency on its cyber infrastructure and its ability to tolerate potential failures. A further exploration of the cyber-physical relationships within the smart grid and a specific review of possible attack vectors is necessary to determine the adequacy of cybersecurity efforts. This paper highlights the significance of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate cyber attacks. A layered approach is introduced to evaluating risk based on the security of both the physical power applications and the supporting cyber infrastructure. A classification is presented to highlight dependencies between the cyber-physical controls required to support the smart grid and the communication and computations that must be protected from cyber attack. The paper then presents current research efforts aimed at enhancing the smart grid's application and infrastructure security. Finally, current challenges are identified to facilitate future research efforts.

1,012 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This highly successful textbook, widely regarded as the “bible of computer algebra”, gives a thorough introduction to the algorithmic basis of the mathematical engine in computer algebra systems.
Abstract: Computer algebra systems are now ubiquitous in all areas of science and engineering. This highly successful textbook, widely regarded as the “bible of computer algebra”, gives a thorough introduction to the algorithmic basis of the mathematical engine in computer algebra systems. Designed to accompany oneor two-semester courses for advanced undergraduate or graduate students in computer science or mathematics, its comprehensiveness and reliability has also made it an essential reference for professionals in the area. Special features include: detailed study of algorithms including time analysis; implementation reports on several topics; complete proofs of the mathematical underpinnings; and a wide variety of applications (among others, in chemistry, coding theory, cryptography, computational logic, and the design of calendars and musical scales). A great deal of historical information and illustration enlivens the text. In this third edition, errors have been corrected and much of the Fast Euclidean Algorithm chapter has been renovated.

937 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: It is argued that the “smart” grid, replacing its incredibly successful and reliable predecessor, poses a series of new security challenges, among others, that require novel approaches to the field of cyber security.
Abstract: It is often appealing to assume that existing solutions can be directly applied to emerging engineering domains. Unfortunately, careful investigation of the unique challenges presented by new domains exposes its idiosyncrasies, thus often requiring new approaches and solutions. In this paper, we argue that the “smart” grid, replacing its incredibly successful and reliable predecessor, poses a series of new security challenges, among others, that require novel approaches to the field of cyber security. We will call this new field cyber-physical security. The tight coupling between information and communication technologies and physical systems introduces new security concerns, requiring a rethinking of the commonly used objectives and methods. Existing security approaches are either inapplicable, not viable, insufficiently scalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to address the challenges posed by highly complex environments such as the smart grid. A concerted effort by the entire industry, the research community, and the policy makers is required to achieve the vision of a secure smart grid infrastructure.

933 citations