Bio: Or Brook is an academic researcher from University of Amsterdam. The author has contributed to research in topics: Multi-level governance & Competition law. The author has an hindex of 1, co-authored 1 publications receiving 2 citations.
17 Mar 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact on re-nationalising EU competition law and policy, and assess the impact of renationalizing EU competition policy.
Abstract: The decentralisation of the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU under Regulation 1/2003 altered not only its institutional setup by delegating enforcement responsibilities to national competition authorities (NCAs) and courts, but also the possibilities for Member States to implement their respective national competition policies and the domestic interest considerations embedded therein. In the multilevel governance framework established by Regulation 1/2003, the enforcement of EU competition law takes place exposed to the national political, institutional and procedural context. In particular, national laws and legal and administrative practices, which bind NCAs and national courts, directly influence the application of Articles 101 and 102 in the national territory. This chapter examines examples of such national measures and practices and assesses their impact of re-nationalising EU competition law and policy.
TL;DR: The European Commission used the term "modernization" in referring to the important set of changes in the institutional structure and procedures of competition law that it introduced in 2004, and it has fundamentally changed important procedures for developing and applying competition law in Europe as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: In European competition law, the term "modernization" has been a catchword and focus of attention since the late 1990s Usually, the reference is to "procedural" or "institutional" modernization The European Commission used the term "modernization" in referring to the important set of changes in the institutional structure and procedures of competition law that it introduced in 2004, and it has fundamentally changed important procedures for developing and applying competition law in Europe During the same period in which this form of modernization was proceeding, another form of "modernization" was also taking shape that represents a fundamental reorientation of much of the substantive law thinking in European competition law Curiously, little attention has been paid to the relationship between these two processes Yet they have taken place over roughly the same period; many of the same people have been involved in instigating the changes; and they have been driven by many of the same forces and pressures Understanding the relationship between these two processes promises not only to provide a better understanding of each, but also important insights into the current roles of competition law in the further integration of Europe Even more broadly, it helps to reveal the forces at work in this critical period of European legal and political development The Article makes two central claims One is that the two processes are related in important ways and that neither can be fully understood without understanding the other The other is that the relationships between the two reveal changes in the dynamics of European competition law that have so far been little noticed
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the policies displayed towards foreign direct investment and cross-border mergers in the EU, focusing on the question of when public policy factors may impact on merger control within the EU and override competition law assessments.
Abstract: In many jurisdictions across the world concern about foreign control of key national businesses appears to be mounting. This article examines the policies displayed towards foreign direct investment and cross-border mergers in the EU, focusing on the question of when public policy factors may impact on merger control within the EU and override competition law assessments. The article notes that not only do EU cases in this area raise the potential for differences in opinion as to how the benefits and costs of merger transactions should be assessed and weighed, and a clash between proponents of the principle of an open market economy and proponents of greater protectionism, but they raise delicate issues relating to the balance of competence between the EU and the Member States. Consequently, it analyses (i) how EU law, especially the free movement rules and the EUMR limit the ability of the Member States either to impose obstacles in the path of foreign mergers (whether from inside or outside of the EU/EEA) or to authorise the creation of national champions, on public interest grounds and (ii) how EU law seeks to balance EU goals against the acutely felt and sensitive national interests at stake. Given concerns expressed about a rising tide of protectionism within the EU, it also examines EU enforcement mechanisms. The article concludes that although EU law clearly prohibits national laws that impose unjustified obstacles in the path of investment from other EU Member States, it may not always be able to prevent the authorisation of national champions which may damage competition within the EU and that changes to the EU merger rules would be required to deal with this latter problem. Further, the extent to which Member States are able to control investments from third countries (outside of the EU/EEA) is extremely sensitive, controversial and requires clarification. It also notes that although some problems do lie in preventing Member States from taking protectionist steps and violating fundamental provisions of EU law, enforcement mechanisms are in place which can help to ensure the effectiveness of EU law.