Paolo Bartolomeo

Bio: Paolo Bartolomeo is an academic researcher from Allen Institute for Brain Science. The author has contributed to research in topics: Neglect & Unilateral neglect. The author has an hindex of 59, co-authored 301 publications receiving 13368 citations. Previous affiliations of Paolo Bartolomeo include University of Milan & French Institute of Health and Medical Research.

Attentional routes to conscious perception

Abstract: The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception.

Direct Evidence for a Parietal-Frontal Pathway Subserving Spatial Awareness in Humans

Abstract: Intraoperative electrical stimulation, which temporarily inactivates restricted regions during brain surgery, can map cognitive functions in humans with spatiotemporal resolution unmatched by other methods. Using this technique, we found that stimulation of the right inferior parietal lobule or the caudal superior temporal gyrus, but not of its rostral portion, determined rightward deviations on line bisection. However, the strongest shifts occurred with subcortical stimulation. Fiber tracking identified the stimulated site as a section of the superior occipitofrontal fasciculus, a poorly known parietal-frontal pathway. These findings suggest that parietal-frontal communication is necessary for the symmetrical processing of the visual scene.

Sensitivity of clinical and behavioural tests of spatial neglect after right hemisphere stroke

Abstract: Objectives: The lack of agreement regarding assessment methods is responsible for the variability in the reported rate of occurrence of spatial neglect after stroke. The aim of this study was to assess the sensitivity of different tests of neglect after right hemisphere stroke. Methods: Two hundred and six subacute right hemisphere stroke patients were given a test battery including a preliminary assessment of anosognosia and of visual extinction, a clinical assessment of gaze orientation and of personal neglect, and paper and pencil tests of spatial neglect in the peripersonal space. Patients were compared with a previously reported control group. A subgroup of patients (n=69) received a behavioural assessment of neglect in daily life situations. Results: The most sensitive paper and pencil measure was the starting point in the cancellation task. The whole battery was more sensitive than any single test alone. About 85% of patients Presented some degree of neglect on at least one measure. An important finding was that behavioural assessment of neglect in daily life was more sensitive than any other single measure of neglect. Behavioural neglect was considered as moderate to severe in 36% of cases. A factorial analysis revealed that paper and pencil tests were related to two underlying factors. Dissociations were found between extrapersonal neglect, personal neglect, anosognosia, and extinction. Anatomical analyses showed that neglect was more common and severe when the posterior association cortex was damaged. Conclusions: The automatic rightward orientation bias is the most sensitive clinical measure of neglect. Behavioural assessment is more sensitive than any single paper and pencil test. The results also support the assumption that neglect is a heterogeneous disorder.

Left Unilateral Neglect as a Disconnection Syndrome

Abstract: Unilateral spatial neglect is a disabling neurological condition that typically results from right hemisphere damage. Neglect patients are unable to take into account information coming from the left side of space. The study of neglect is important for understanding the brain mechanisms of spatial cognition, but its anatomical correlates are currently the object of intense debate. We propose a reappraisal of the contribution of disconnection factors to the pathophysiology of neglect based on a review of animal and patient studies. These indicate that damage to the long-range white matter pathways connecting parietal and frontal areas within the right hemisphere may constitute a crucial antecedent of neglect. Thus, neglect would not result from the dysfunction of a single cortical region but from the disruption of large networks made up of distant cortical regions. In this perspective, we also reexamined the possible contribution to neglect of interhemispheric disconnection. The reviewed evidence, often present in previous studies but frequently overlooked, is consistent with the existence of distributed cortical networks for orienting of attention in the normal brain, has implications for theories of neglect and normal spatial processing, opens perspectives for research on brain-behavior relationships, and suggests new possibilities for patient diagnosis and rehabilitation.

疟原虫var基因转换速率变化导致抗原变异[英]／Paul H, Robert P, Christodoulou Z, et al//Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A

Abstract: 抗原变异可使得多种致病微生物易于逃避宿主免疫应答。表达在感染红细胞表面的恶性疟原虫红细胞表面蛋白1（PfPMP1）与感染红细胞、内皮细胞、树突状细胞以及胎盘的单个或多个受体作用，在黏附及免疫逃避中起关键的作用。每个单倍体基因组var基因家族编码约60种成员，通过启动转录不同的var基因变异体为抗原变异提供了分子基础。

Principles of Neural Science

Abstract: I have developed "tennis elbow" from lugging this book around the past four weeks, but it is worth the pain, the effort, and the aspirin. It is also worth the (relatively speaking) bargain price. Including appendixes, this book contains 894 pages of text. The entire panorama of the neural sciences is surveyed and examined, and it is comprehensive in its scope, from genomes to social behaviors. The editors explicitly state that the book is designed as "an introductory text for students of biology, behavior, and medicine," but it is hard to imagine any audience, interested in any fragment of neuroscience at any level of sophistication, that would not enjoy this book. The editors have done a masterful job of weaving together the biologic, the behavioral, and the clinical sciences into a single tapestry in which everyone from the molecular biologist to the practicing psychiatrist can find and appreciate his or

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness

Abstract: Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.