P
Patrick Bolton
Researcher at Columbia University
Publications - 274
Citations - 28962
Patrick Bolton is an academic researcher from Columbia University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Debt & Market liquidity. The author has an hindex of 67, co-authored 263 publications receiving 26756 citations. Previous affiliations of Patrick Bolton include Harvard University & Université libre de Bruxelles.
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An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor, where both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
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A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development
Philippe Aghion,Patrick Bolton +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets, and analyzed the trickle-down effect of capital accumulation, showing that when the rate of accumulation is sufficiently high, the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution.
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An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting
Philippe Aghion,Patrick Bolton +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze incomplete long-term financial contracts between an entrepreneur with no initial wealth and a wealthy investor, where both agents have potentially conflicting objectives since the entrepreneur cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns from the project while the investor is only concerned about monetary returns.
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Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors
TL;DR: In this article, the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from and allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts are analyzed.
A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the optimal financial contract in light of this predatory threat and found that the optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring predation by relaxing financial constraints against the cost of exacerbating incentive problems.