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Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management

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Public Health Surveillance: A Tool for Targeting and Monitoring Interventions

The present invention provides devices and systems for use at the point of care. The methods devices of the invention are directed toward automatic detection of analytes in a bodily fluid. The components of the device are modular to allow for flexibility and robustness of use with the disclosed methods for a variety of medical applications.

Modular point-of-care devices, systems, and uses thereof

These recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) update the previous recommendations for anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) (CDC. Use of anthrax vaccine in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2000;49:1-20; CDC. Use of anthrax vaccine in response to terrorism: supplemental recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP]. MMWR 2002;51:1024-6) and reflect the status of anthrax vaccine supplies in the United States. This statement 1) provides updated information on anthrax epidemiology; 2) summarizes the evidence regarding the effectiveness and efficacy, immunogenicity, and safety of AVA; 3) provides recommendations for pre-event and preexposure use of AVA; and 4) provides recommendations for postexposure use of AVA. In certain instances, recommendations that did not change were clarified. No new licensed anthrax vaccines are presented. Substantial changes to these recommendations include the following: 1) reducing the number of doses required to complete the pre-event and preexposure primary series from 6 doses to 5 doses, 2) recommending intramuscular rather than subcutaneous AVA administration for preexposure use, 3) recommending AVA as a component of postexposure prophylaxis in pregnant women exposed to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores, 4) providing guidance regarding preexposure vaccination of emergency and other responder organizations under the direction of an occupational health program, and 5) recommending 60 days of antimicrobial prophylaxis in conjunction with 3 doses of AVA for optimal protection of previously unvaccinated persons after exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores.

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Use of Anthrax Vaccine in the United States: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2009

This invention is in the field of medical devices. Specifically, the present invention provides portable medical devices that allow real-time detection of analytes from a biological fluid. The methods and devices are particularly useful for providing point-of-care testing for a variety of medical applications.

Systems and methods of sample processing and fluid control in a fluidic system

Autonomous detection systems (ADSs) are under development to detect agents of biologic and chemical terror in the environment. These systems will eventually be able to detect biologic and chemical hazards reliably and provide approximate real-time alerts that an agent is present. One type of ADS that tests specifically for Bacillus anthracis is being deployed in hundreds of postal distribution centers across the United States. Identification of aerosolized B. anthracis spores in an air sample can facilitate prompt on-site decontamination of workers and subsequent administration of postexposure prophylaxis to prevent inhalational anthrax. Every employer who deploys an ADS should develop detailed plans for responding to a positive signal. Responding to ADS detection of B. anthracis involves coordinating responses with community partners and should include drills and exercises with these partners. This report provides guidelines in the following six areas: 1) response and consequence management planning, including the minimum components of a facility response plan; 2) immediate response and evacuation; 3) decontamination of potentially exposed workers to remove spores from clothing and skin and prevent introduction of B. anthracis into the worker's home and conveyances; 4) laboratory confirmation of an ADS signal; 5) steps for evaluating potentially contaminated environments; and 6) postexposure prophylaxis and follow-up.

Patrick J Meehan

Papers

Responding to detection of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis by autonomous detection systems in the workplace.