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Paul C. Kocher
Researcher at Cryptography Research
Publications - 33
Citations - 16120
Paul C. Kocher is an academic researcher from Cryptography Research. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cryptography & Side channel attack. The author has an hindex of 19, co-authored 32 publications receiving 14636 citations.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Differential Power Analysis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. And they also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.
Book ChapterDOI
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
Proceedings Article
Meltdown: reading kernel memory from user space
Moritz Lipp,Michael Schwarz,Daniel Gruss,Thomas Prescher,Werner Haas,Anders Fogh,Jann Horn,Stefan Mangard,Paul C. Kocher,Daniel Genkin,Yuval Yarom,Mike Hamburg +11 more
TL;DR: It is shown that the KAISER defense mechanism for KASLR has the important (but inadvertent) side effect of impeding Meltdown, which breaks all security guarantees provided by address space isolation as well as paravirtualized environments.
Patent
Reprogrammable security for controlling piracy and enabling interactive content
Paul C. Kocher,Joshua M. Jaffe,Benjamin C. Jun,Carter C. Laren,Peter K. Pearson,Nathaniel J. Lawson +5 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed a solution to transfer responsibility and control over security from player makers to content authors by enabling integration of security logic and content, which can be seen as a kind of virtualization.
Posted Content
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul C. Kocher,Daniel Genkin,Daniel Gruss,Werner Haas,Mike Hamburg,Moritz Lipp,Stefan Mangard,Thomas Prescher,Michael Schwarz,Yuval Yarom +9 more
TL;DR: This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process that violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms.